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This thesis intends to critically evaluate the current model of asset reallocation, as it 
is applied in everyday, low-value divorces. In particular, it will focus on the principle 
of need, which has come to represent an integral element of our current model’s 
approach. A primary research question that will guide this thesis is an assessment of 
why the law provides for needs on divorce. This will require a historical evaluation of 
the principle’s foundations in order to identify the influences that have moulded this 
principle into its current form. An understanding will then be developed regarding 
the modern facets of this principle. This will enable this thesis to question the relevant 
and opposing policies that regulate the principle’s contemporary operation. 
 
It will then be queried whether it is justifiable to retain this principle in the light of its 
historical development, its contemporary use as well as the current state of divorce 
law. Alternatively, a number of proposals for reforms shall be identified and 
evaluated. It will be concluded that given recent legal developments and 
contemporary understandings of gender, obligation and marriage, the principle of 
needs is no longer an appropriate principle through which to govern the asset 
reallocation process in everyday divorces. A proposal for reforming the current 
model of asset reallocation will accordingly be identified and defended. 
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Introduction 
Overview of the Asset Reallocation Process 
 
This thesis will critically evaluate the law governing asset reallocation on divorce.1 It 
is important to recognise at the outset that the current statutory provisions governing 
asset reallocation on divorce stem from a statute that is now more than forty years 
old: the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973).2 This statute operates to grant 
the judiciary broad discretionary powers when reallocating assets on divorce.3 
Legally, reallocation requires the grant of a financial order by the court, of which 
various are available.4 The salient statutory provisions that guide these far-reaching 
discretionary powers are contained within section 25 of the MCA 1973. It recognises 
a number of matters to which the judiciary should ‘have regard to’ when reallocating 
assets. It has since been confirmed that weight should be attributed to these statutory 
considerations to the extent that they are compatible with the overarching objective of 
the court; the grant of a ‘fair’ reallocation of the assets.5 
 
This thesis will focus closely on section 25(2)(b), which requires the judiciary to have 
regard to the divorcing parties’ ‘financial needs’ when reallocating assets. Though 
this is the statutory foundation of modern needs provision, in recent years other 
statutory subsections have been deemed relevant when assessing needs on divorce.6 
This has occurred following the increasing importance that the judiciary have 
attributed to provision for needs. This is most lucidly exemplified within the House of 
Lords ruling of Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane, where Lord Nicholls 
                                                 
1 The term ‘divorce’ will be used for brevity, but encompasses heterosexual and same sex divorces, as 
well as dissolutions of civil partnerships. Similarly, the term ‘asset reallocation’ will be used in order 
to refer to the process by which the judiciary grant financial orders on divorce; previously known as 
ancillary relief and currently governed by Part II of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. 
2 Its provisions being largely reflected within the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 and the Civil 
Partnership Act 2004. 
3 It can be contrasted with systems that operate a community of property regime. These regimes pool 
spouses’ assets on marriage and rely to a greater degree on rules to govern the financial consequences 
of divorce. For an outline of the variety of forms such regimes can take see, A Barlow, T Callus and E 
Cooke, 'Community of Property: A Study for England and Wales' (2004) 34 Fam Law 47. 
4 The types of financial orders that judges can make are contained within MCA 1973 ss.23-24. 
5 See, White v White [2000] UKHL 54, [2001] 1 AC 596, [35] (Lord Nicholls). 
6 Particularly MCA 1973 s.25(2)(c), requiring judges to look at the spouses’ marital standard of living. 
See, Charman v Charman (No 4) [2007] EWCA Civ 503, [2007] 1 FLR 1246 [70] (Sir Mark Potter P). 
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recognised that provision for spouses’ needs was a key requirement of fairness.7 
Accordingly, providing for the parties’ needs on divorce has since been recognised as 
an important non-statutory principle governing the asset reallocation process. 
 
While compensation and equal sharing of the assets were enunciated as additional 
requirements of fairness,8 it was with reference to the principle of need that Lord 
Nicholls stated, ‘[i]n most cases the search for fairness largely begins and ends at this 
stage’.9 Accordingly, when reallocating assets on divorce, the courts are frequently 
required ‘to stretch modest finite resources so far as possible to meet the parties’ 
needs’.10 It is only when this principle has been adequately satisfied that the courts 
will consider the alternative requirements of fairness.11  
 
It is in the context of divorces concerned with the division of limited assets or even 
debts, that divorcing spouses are often unable, or, unwilling to pursue court 
proceedings, often owing to ‘the threat of increased costs that would arise from a final 
hearing’.12 Such costs can quickly accumulate, as applications for financial orders on 
divorce generally take approximately six to twelve months to reach a final hearing.13 
Instead, the couple are permitted to come to a voluntary financial contract stipulating 
the financial consequence of their divorce.14 However, in order for such agreements 
to be legally binding they must be endorsed by a judge, who is free to reject the 
agreement if they view it as unfair. Accordingly, it is apparent that, whether applied 
through the lens of the statute or as a requirement of the overarching objective of 
achieving a fair division of the assets, the principle of need is of crucial significance 
in low-value asset reallocation proceedings. 
 
                                                 
7 See, Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24, [2006] 2 FCR 213 [10] (Lord 
Nicholls). 
8 ibid [16] (Lord Nicholls). 
9  ibid [12] (Lord Nicholls). 
10 ibid [12] (Lord Nicholls). 
11 Thus, they are often only raised in cases with significant assets for reallocation.  
12 Emma Hitchings, ‘Chaos or Consistency?’ in J Miles & R Probert (eds), Sharing Lives: Dividing 
Assets: An Inter-disciplinary Study (Hart Publishing 2009) 196. 
13 See, ‘Money and Property When A Relationship Ends’ (Gov.uk, 10 August 2015) < 
https://www.gov.uk/money-property-when-relationship-ends/apply-for-a-financial-order> accessed 15 
August 2015. 
14 See MCA 1973, s.33A. 
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Problems with the Current Framework 
 
Whilst the MCA 1973 has been amended,15 most would be quick to query why the 
English and Welsh system remains tied to the intents and purposes of a legislative 
body that operated at a time where social and moral expectations about marriage were 
dramatically different to those of today.16 This absence of legislative development is 
particularly pronounced when one considers the role that moral and social attitudes 
have to play in marriage; an area so innately concerned with religion, gender and 
obligation. Consequently, this thesis argues that the asset reallocation process should 
be viewed as ‘a concept in flux, ever-changing to meet the concerns of public 
policy’.17 In any case, it is apparent that the task of developing the law has been left 
to the judiciary. This has been pursued on a case-by-case basis through the 
application of their far-reaching discretionary powers. However, it must be 
recognised that a number of problems have arisen as a result of judicial adjudication 
being the primary means through which the domestic asset reallocation regime has 
been developed. 
 
The recognition of some of these deficiencies led the Law Commission to undertake a 
two year consultation-driven, ‘targeted review’ into, inter alia, the modern need 
principle.18 Its express aim was ‘to bring clarity and predictability to areas of that law 
that cause particular difficulties’.19 It was the publication of this Report that helped to 
prompt this thesis, as whilst the Law Commission did take decisive and influential 
steps towards recognising the law’s unpredictability of outcome, it will be argued that 
                                                 
15 Most notably, via the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 and the Civil Partnership Act 
2004. 
16 For example, in 1966 there were fewer than 40,000 divorces in England and Wales and 384,497 
marriages. Comparatively, in 2010 there were 119,589 divorces and a mere 243,808 marriages. See, 
Office for National Statistics, ‘Number of Divorces’ (ONS Statistical Bulletin, 6 February 2014) 
<http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/vsob1/divorces-in-england-and-wales/2012/stb-divorces-
2012.html#tab-Number-of-divorces> accessed 20 July 2015. Whilst these figures are not conclusive, 
they are indicative of the fact that social and moral expectations surrounding marriage and divorce 
have evolved. 
17 Laura Morgan, ‘Current Trends in Alimony Law: Where Are We Now?’ (GPSolo eReport, 2012) 
<http://www.americanbar.org/publications/gpsolo_ereport/2012/april_2012/current_trends_alimony_la
w.html> accessed 10 July 2015. 
18 For their final report see, Law Commission, Matrimonial Property, Needs and Agreements (Law 
Com No. 343, 2014).  
19 Law Commission, ‘Matrimonial Property, Needs and Agreements: Current Project Status’ (Law 
Commission) <http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/matrimonial-property-needs-and-agreements/>  
accessed 20 July 2015. 
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their Report did not go far enough towards recommending substantive reform. In 
particular, it shall be asserted that the Law Commission’s recommendations failed to 
sufficiently recognise the need to rein in the excessive amount of discretion currently 
granted to the judiciary. This becomes apparent when looking at their omission to 
recommend a substantive change to the matters currently considered under MCA 
1973 section 25(2), despite the existence of heavily subjective and outdated statutory 
facets of the need principle that are present within this section.20 
 
The discretionary nature of the current system has also caused legal unpredictability 
following the judiciary’s failure to agree on the precise meaning and parameters of 
the need principle. It is an unsatisfactory state of law when legal principles have 
received divergent interpretations, such as in the House of Lords decision in Miller; 
McFarlane.21 It was in this case that Baroness Hale expanded the traditional 
understanding of the need principle, stating that it should be  ‘generously interpreted’ 
in cases with substantial assets, so as to not limit the amount of the award.22 However, 
she went on to suggest that this principle would only justify redistribution for needs 
that have been generated by the relationship.23 In the same ruling, Lord Nicholls 
stated that the need principle could justify provision for needs that have not arisen as 
a result of the relationship, such as those ‘rising from age or disability’.24 The fact 
that clear ambiguity regarding the precise role of the need principle is present within 
one senior court decision evidences the difficulties that may occur when applying the 
law.  
 
The uncertainty present in the current law is likely to become a more prominent 
deficiency in the light of the austerity measures taken by the previous Coalition 
Government in relation to legal aid. The introduction of the Legal Aid, Sentencing 
and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO 2012) reflected an intention to 
reduce the 2014 legal aid budget by £350m.25 All private family law cases that do not 
                                                 
20 This argument will be developed in Chapter Three. 
21 Miller; McFarlane (n 7). 
22 ibid [144] (Baroness Hale). 
23 ibid [138] (Baroness Hale). 
24 ibid [11] (Lord Nicholls). 
25 ‘Legal Aid Cuts and Reforms’ (Chambers Students, November 2013) 
<http://www.chambersstudent.co.uk/Articles/Newsletter/1155> accessed 7 August 2014. 
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involve domestic violence are essentially no longer covered by legal aid.26 Instead, 
the Government appears to be reserving court adjudication to those litigants that can 
afford it. This has led some academics to characterise the Government as 
incentivising a ‘settlement culture’.27 In this context, increasing numbers of divorcing 
spouses are unable to obtain not only legal aid but also legal advice. These litigants 
are either forced into representing themselves in court or into cheaper forms of 
dispute resolution such as mediation.28 This class of litigants will be referred to as 
‘litigants in person’.29 
 
Whilst the legal aid reforms were aimed at reducing expenditure, the law’s current 
unpredictability is preventing them from having the desired effect. The costs of 
protracted proceedings involving litigants in person can be very substantial, and 
judicial criticism of disproportionate costs is frequently voiced.30 This point has been 
recognised by the Lord Chief Justice Sir John Thomas, who has noted that the 
presence of litigants in person ‘significantly added to the time [a case takes]’.31 Thus, 
it is clear that if the current Government wants to successfully achieve its cost-cutting 
aims, it must guide litigants in person in order to prevent them ‘clogging up’ the court 
system, exacerbating an already laborious process.32 These sentiments have been 
recognised by both the President of the Supreme Court33 and NAPO34, who found that 
                                                 
26 For further information see, ‘Legal Aid Changes: Key Information and Advice’ (Law Society, 13 
March 2013)  <http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/support-services/advice/articles/legal-aid-changes-key-
information-and-advice/> accessed 22 January 2015, 
27 G Davis, S Cretney, J Collins, Simple Quarrels (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 211. 
28 Which is still covered by legal aid, see the Civil Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013 SI 
2013/422. 
29 For further information regarding the resulting negative consequences of these cuts, see, C Bevan 
‘Self-Represented Litigants: the Overlooked and Unintended Consequence of Legal Aid Reform’ 
(2013) 35 JSWFL 43. 
30 See A v A (No 2) [2007] EWHC 1810 (Fam) (Munby J). 
31 John Hyde, ‘Litigants in person putting pressure on courts system’ (The Law Society Gazette, 3 April 
2014) <http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/law/litigants-in-person-putting-pressure-on-courts-system-
lcj/5040663.article> Accessed 30 July 2014.  
32 See; Lesley Pendlebury Cox, ‘Litigants in Person Cases: It Doesn’t Have to Be Like This’ (Family 
Law Week, 2012) <http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed97034> Accessed 6 August. 
33 Lord Neuberger, ‘Judges and Policy: A Delicate Balance’ (Institute for Government Lecture, 18 June 
2013) [27]; ‘less legal aid means more unrepresented litigants and worse lawyers, which will lead to 
longer hearings and more judge time’. 
34 The union representing family court staff. 
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following the aforementioned legal aid cuts, almost two thirds of its surveyed 
members ‘said they spend more time on court duties and in longer first hearings’.35  
 
Consequently, some academics have argued that the law’s lack of clarity combined 
with the trend within family law to encourage private settlements may lead to ‘a risk 
that individuals may agree to accept inadequate financial support or be pressured into 
accepting unsafe contact arrangements’36 when ‘bargaining in the shadow of the 
law’.37 It is this thesis’ view that for the above reasons there is a need now more than 
ever to clarify the framework guiding the asset reallocation process. This requires the 
need principle to be sufficiently transparent for all practitioners and litigants who are 
required to interpret and apply it to their specific factual circumstances. Finding a 
potential solution to these criticisms and exploring the extent to which the legal 
framework should continue to rely on judicial discretion rather than strict rules will 
form central themes of this thesis. 
Research Questions 
 
Accordingly, a number of research questions must be raised in order to guide this 
thesis in its search for the most appropriate means of legal reform. Firstly, it will be 
queried why the law has traditionally made provision for needs on divorce. This will 
provide an initial understanding as to some of the traditional justifications for needs-
based provision. These findings will then guide an assessment of the role of the need 
principle within modern asset reallocation proceedings. An understanding of the 
historical and contemporary objectives of the need principle will then assist this thesis 
to uncover whether the need principle remains fit for purpose.  
 
The conclusions drawn from these questions will then justify the extent to which the 
implementation of objective, rule-based foundations are required in order to govern 
                                                 
35See, ‘The impact of legal aid cuts on Family Justice’ (Family Court Unions Parliamentary Group, 
April 2014) 
<https://www.napo.org.uk/sites/default/files/The%20Impact%20of%20Legal%20Aid%20Cuts%20on
%20Family%20Justice.pdf> accessed 22 January 2015. 
36 J. Masson, R. Bailey-Harris, R. Probert, Principles of Family Law (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2008) 
7. 
37 See, RH Mnookin, L Kornhauser, ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce’ 
(1979) 88 Yale Law Journal 950. 
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the asset reallocation process. This thesis will conclude by supporting the reform 
proposal that provides the most appropriate response to the prevailing criticisms of 
this area of law, whilst simultaneously recognising the context in which the current 




This thesis’ assessment of the need principle will occur within the context of the 
‘everyday divorce’.38 This term is used to refer to those divorces that have insufficient 
assets to make provision beyond the need principle. This category of cases will be the 
focus of this thesis for two main reasons. Firstly, in everyday divorces assets that are 
expended in order to ascertain suitable provision under the need principle are 
subsequently unavailable to help realise this objective. Therefore, the law should be 
as transparent as possible in order to prevent wasted legal costs that could otherwise 
be used to meet spouses’ needs. Secondly, it is in these cases that spouses are likely to 
lack access to legal representation, particularly following the introduction of the 
aforementioned legal aid cuts that have had a dramatic impact on private family law 
proceedings.39 Thus, an uncertain and expensive asset reallocation process is likely to 
cause the greatest harm and inequity to spouses who are financially vulnerable and in 
the greatest need. Reference will be made to so-called ‘big money’ divorces only 
when such decisions affect the need principle’s operation within everyday divorces. 
 
 
The first chapter of this thesis is a historical exploration into the evolving models of 
asset reallocation that have developed by varying institutions. This will assist in 
uncovering why parties have had their needs provided for on divorce. This will pave 
the way for later chapters to highlight where facets of the modern approach to need 
provision can be attributed to outdated justifications. This chapter will also illustrate 
that the law governing asset reallocation is a product of its time, having been 
                                                 
38 This wording has been chosen due to the fact that this classification encompasses the majority of 
asset reallocation proceedings on divorce. This point was recently recognised by the Law Commission, 
see, Law Commission (n 18) para 1.16. This classification of divorces can be contrasted with those 
concerned with substantial assets for division, often referred to as ‘big money cases’. 
39 See LASPO 2012. 
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consistently modified in order to respond to both the legal landscape it operates 
within and to societal views regarding marriage and divorce. Recognition of this will 
provide further justification for this thesis’ call for reform.  
 
 
Chapter Two will then turn to evaluate the current model of asset reallocation in 
England and Wales. This will be with a view to understanding the role that the need 
principle plays within everyday divorces as well as the objectives that this principle is 
explicitly and implicitly tasked with achieving. Hence, this thesis will turn to assess 
the principle’s current mode of operation when governing the asset reallocation 
exercise. This will be achieved through assessing the effect that this principle has had 
on judicial reasoning when reallocating assets. It will also evaluate the statutory 
considerations now understood to be facets of the need principle. This chapter will 
then turn to evaluate the other matters that influence judicial applications of 
discretion. Such an evaluation will provide an understanding as to the compatibility, 
or otherwise, of these considerations with the need principle.  
 
Chapter Three will then build upon the findings of the previous chapters through 
providing a critical evaluation of the need principle within everyday divorces. It will 
start by raising more general problems with the leading statute governing the asset 
reallocation process, the MCA 1973. This will be with a view to understanding the 
framework within which the need principle operates. It will also help to identify some 
of the implications that have resulted from this statute’s reliance on exercises of 
judicial discretion. 
 
Referencing both the context and framework within which the need principle 
operates, criticisms will then be levelled against the modern principle. Thus, 
criticisms will be targeted at specific examples of where the judiciary have failed to 
elucidate or agree upon the parameters and applicability of the need principle. It will 
also highlight aspects of the need principle that are no longer justified. This chapter 
will also draw upon socio-economic research in order to substantiate the claim that 
the objectives that the need principle has been tasked with are not being achieved. 
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This chapter will end with an evaluation of the Law Commission’s recent report 
concerning the law governing asset reallocation on divorce. This will recognise any 
omissions from the Law Commission’s Report, before identifying problems with their 
reform recommendations. Some of this Report’s conclusions, however, will be 
supported, particularly the invitation for further research into a formula to govern the 
asset reallocation exercise.40 This report will also provide an alternative basis on 
which to evaluate the forthcoming reform proposals. 
 
With the aforementioned faults of the current law in mind, the final chapter of this 
thesis will turn to address the most appropriate means of rectifying or reforming the 
English and Welsh approach to asset reallocation and the need principle in everyday 
divorces. Thus, this chapter shall provide a response to the law’s current deficiencies 
whilst acknowledging the changed landscape of modern family law. It will begin with 
a discussion as to some of the advantages and disadvantages of basing an asset 
reallocation regime on rules or discretion. This discussion will recognise that if the 
Government wishes the judiciary to continue to pursue its current model of asset 
reallocation, then an appropriate balance ‘between different mixes of discretion and 
rules’ is required.41 It will then go on to suggest an alternative justification for 
dividing assets that, if accepted, may provide coherent and transparent guidance in 
order to assist all litigants, especially those without legal representation, when 
calculating their entitlements on divorce. 
 
Accordingly, this chapter will raise three alternative proposals for reform that attempt 
to realign the law with an appropriate balance between rules and discretion. Each of 
these proposals will offer alternative means of reaching this balance. This thesis will 
ultimately argue that the introduction of duration-based guiding presumptions will 
provide the most effective reform proposal. It will be argued that such presumptions 
provide an adequate middle ground between rules and discretion, whilst continuing to 
achieve the objective pursued through modern needs provision. It will also be argued 
that this proposal is largely compatible with the recent Law Commission Report’s 
                                                 
40 See, Law Commission (n 18) para 3.159. 
41 Carl E Schneider, ‘Discretion and Rules: A Lawyer's View' in K Hawkins (eds), The Uses of 
Discretion (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1992) 49. 
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recommendations.42 However, it will be shown that this proposal offers a more 
proactive response to the law’s current context and consequential shortfalls.  
 
Whilst this thesis is incapable of defining the precise parameters of what the chosen 
reform proposal would require for its implementation into law, it is hoped that this 
thesis is able to generate further awareness and debate in pursuit of this proposal. To 
this end it invites further research and criticism into its findings.  
                                                 
42 See, Law Commission (n 18). 
16 




This chapter intends to question why the law has traditionally made provision for 
spouses’ needs on divorce. In order to achieve this it will explore some of the 
historical models of asset reallocation under which the concept of need has been 
drawn upon and attributed weight. In order to delineate these models, this chapter 
shall examine some of the societal influences and institutions that have constrained 
and guided the law’s operation. This will provide this thesis with an understanding of 
why the principle of need has arrived at its current state. In turn, this will also pave 
the way for future chapters to attribute facets of modern needs provision to the 
context it developed within, thereby, adding weight to the view that it contains 
outdated elements. 
  
This chapter shall also evidence that the identified models of asset reallocation are 
innately a product of their time, developed with reference to the religious, moral and 
societal views prevalent during their development. The recognition of these influences 
will allow this thesis to develop its proposal to reform the law in line with 
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The focus of this chapter will be on analysing the historical development of the law 
with respect to asset reallocation on divorce. This will be with a view to answering a 
core research question of this thesis, namely, why has the law made provision for 
financial needs on divorce? In order to answer this question, this thesis will discern 
the objectives that have influenced the courts when making financial provision 
between spouses on divorce. Accordingly, models of asset reallocation will be 
identified, with reference to the objectives they pursued and the bodies that 
administered them. It will be shown that three separate models of asset reallocation 
can be discerned, as applied by the Ecclesiastic Courts and the secular Judiciary. This 
will be with a view to understanding the varying justifications that have been raised in 
support of making provision for needs on divorce. This will provide an understanding 
as to why need provision has become a guiding consideration within our most recent 
model of asset reallocation.  
 
It should be recognised at the outset that the law surrounding asset reallocation on 
divorce is inextricably linked to the evolution of societal views regarding the 
permissibility of obtaining a divorce. Hence, this chapter will inevitably make 
reference to the historical state of divorce law when evaluating the various models of 
asset reallocation. In this chapter, the link between the acceptability of divorce and 
the subsequent catering for its financial consequences will be shown. To this end, the 
effects of evolving societal views of marriage on the law relating to asset reallocation 
on divorce will be considered. This is because the understanding that society 
attributes to marriage has consistently played a central role in dictating the possibility 
of its dissolution and the resulting financial consequences. It will be shown that as 
societal views have changed so too have the justifications for granting financial 
reallocation on divorce. For example, the common law doctrine of coverture has had 
a profound influence over the asset reallocation exercise.43  
 
                                                 
43 The traditional definition of this doctrine is contained within 1 Bl Comm ch 15; ‘[b]y marriage, the 
husband and wife are one person in law; that is the very being or legal existence of the woman is 
suspended during the marriage’. Prior to its abolition, this doctrine resulted in the husband acquiring 
ownership rights to his wife’s property on marriage. 
19 
This chapter will pave the way for the forthcoming chapters to evaluate contemporary 
views of marriage and divorce with a view to assessing the compatibility of the 
current law with contemporary social views and realities surrounding divorce. It will 
also evaluate the extent to which some of the historic statutory considerations had 
their roots in outdated understandings of marriage and divorce. Chapter Two will then 
turn to assess which contemporary statutory provisions embody these foundations and 
the extent to which the modern need principle remains influenced by these outdated 
views. This will justify the removal or amendment of any such statutory provisions in 
order to better align the law with current social practice. This objective will require 
thorough emphasis to be placed on tracking and evaluating the development and 
recognition of modern facets of needs provision within these historic models of asset 
reallocation. 
 
The conclusions drawn in this chapter will lead on to an assessment as to whether 
modern provision for need is based on outdated foundations. This will involve 
identifying the similarities between the historic models and the approach currently 
taken by the judiciary when reallocating assets in everyday divorces. The comparison 
of the various models of asset reallocation will enable this thesis to assess the 
judiciary’s current approach to needs, for its compatibility with the context it operates 
within and societal views regarding marriage and divorce.  
 
The Evolution of Marriage, Divorce and Resulting Financial Obligations 
The Ecclesiastical Model’s Divorce a Mensa Et Thoro 
 
A historical exploration into needs reveals that they have been considered from an 
early period of history. During the 11th century King William I separated the 
jurisdictions of the lay and ecclesiastical courts of England. As marriage was viewed 
as a ‘sacrament of the Church, the ecclesiastical courts were not slow in asserting 
exclusive jurisdiction over matters appertaining thereto’.44 The ecclesiastical courts 
maintained their day-to-day jurisdiction regarding marriage and divorce for almost 
                                                 
44 EL Johnson, Family Law (Sweet & Maxwell 1958) 1. 
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eight centuries, due to their unique position to interpret canon law.45 Throughout this 
period they remained steadfast in their deference to canon law and the Book of 
Common Prayer; where marriage was viewed as an indissoluble sacrament, enduring 
‘till death do us part’.46 Thus, if a married couple came before the ecclesiastical courts 
seeking a divorce, the best they could hope to achieve was a divorce a mensa et 
thoro;47 grantable on the basis of cruelty, adultery or heresy.48  
 
This ecclesiastical doctrine, similar to the modern decree of ‘legal separation’,49 did 
not ‘purport to dissolve the marriage’.50 Consequently, the rationale for imposing a 
continued obligation to provide financial assistance to one’s spouse after divorce was 
clear-cut:  
 
[A]t marriage a husband undertook a lifelong obligation to support his wife. Alimony 
[sic] was the tool for enforcing that obligation during the spouses’ separation.51  
 
Thus, the husband’s common law obligation of spousal maintenance,52 which was 
described as ‘a concomitant of the husband’s “ownership” of his wife’s labour and of 
the legal doctrine of unity of husband and wife’, was not severed by the ecclesiastic 
mensa et thoro.53 The orders that resulted from the refusal to sever this common law 
obligation were ‘allotted for the maintenance of a wife from year to year’54 and so 
‘invariably [were] periodical payments’.55 Financial orders requiring the reallocation 
                                                 
45 i.e. the body of rules and legal principles governing the practice of the Catholic religion and its 
followers; for a more in-depth discussion regarding the meaning and role of canon law see, Norman 
Doe, ‘Canon Law and Communion’ (2002) 6 Ecc LJ 241. 
46 The Book of Common Prayer, Solemnization of Matrimony. 
47 A divorce ‘from bed and board’ which relieved parties of the obligation to cohabit; see, 1 Bl Comm 
ch 15. 
48 This was confirmed by Archbishop of Canterbury Whitgift in, Rye c Fuliambe (1602) 3 Salk 138. 
49 This is a legal process enabling a married couple to formalize a de facto separation. However, it does 
not legally terminate the marriage. Such a separation is available via court order and does not require 
proof that the marriage has broken down irretrievably; see, MCA 1973, ss.17-18. 
50 CG Vernier and JB Hurlbut, ‘The Historical Background of Alimony Law and its Present Statutory 
Structure’ (1939) 6 LCP 197, 197. 
51 Cynthia Lee Starnes, ‘Alimony Theory’ (2011) 45 Fam L.Q. 271, 276. Within English and Welsh 
Law, the term ‘alimony’ has been replaced with reference to the specific financial order/s granted on 
divorce. 
52 This was a gender specific obligation discharged by providing for the necessities of life; it was 
unequivocally removed from law through Equality Act 2010, s.198. 
53 J Eekelaar and M Maclean, Maintenance After Divorce (OUP, 1986) 2. 
54 Wilson c Wilson (1830) 3 Hag. Ecc. 329, 331. 
55 Vernier and Hurlbut (n 50) 198. 
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of capital lump sum payments were not yet available. In exercising their discretion, 
the ecclesiastical courts’ ultimate concern was the wife’s ‘comfortable subsistence in 
proportion to her husband’s income’,56 which was also ‘consistent with her station in 
society’.57 The preservation of this obligation represented a response to the traditional 
gender-structure of marriage, whereby the care-giving wife was viewed as dependent 
on her husband for subsistence. 
 
This emphasis on maintaining the wife’s standard of living also reflected the 
ecclesiastic recognition of the life-long obligation of maintenance that stemmed from 
the ‘indivisible spiritual unity’ of the vows made on marriage.58 That is to say that the 
standard of living maintenance obligation was grounded in the status of the spouses’ 
sacramental relationship. The practical result of this ecclesiastical approach to 
maintenance was an implicit objective to place the parties in the position they would 
have been in had a separation never taken place. Thus, the ecclesiastical courts 
refused to absolve former spouses of their ‘fiscal obligations’.59 
 
However, as a result of the sexual inequality that was pervasive prior to the 
nineteenth century, the asset reallocation exercise was also riddled with inequality. 
This is readily apparent in that the ecclesiastical courts frequently quantified the 
maintenance award to be periodic payments tantamount to one-third of the husband’s 
income.60 It was believed that this arbitrary and unfair fractional reallocation rule was 
the best way to pay respect to the wife’s entitlement to maintenance that stemmed 
from the marriage. Clearly, any attempts to implement this rule into the law today 
would be rejected outright on the grounds of sexual discrimination.61 Nevertheless, as 
the asset reallocation exercise on divorce has always been innately tied to 
                                                 
56 Kempe c Kempe (1828) 1 Hag. Ecc. 532, 533. 
57 Durant c Durant (1826) 1 Hag. Ecc. 528, 531. 
58 Kevin J Gray, Reallocation of Property on Divorce (Professional Books Ltd 1977) 284. 
59 The obligations can be described as ‘fiscal’ as they were directed towards ensuring a basic level of 
support that would ordinarily have been the obligation of the state. For more information relating to the 
Government’s gradual acceptance and undertaking of this obligation see, P Thane, ‘Women and the 
Poor Law in Victorian and Edwardian England’ (1978) 6 History Workshop 29. 
60 See, L Stone, The Road to Divorce, 1530–1987 (Oxford 1990) 210. 
61 Nevertheless, as discussed below, an attempt was made by Lord Denning in Wachtel v Wachtel 
[1973] Fam 72, to revitalise this approach. However, it was rightly viewed as a historic relic and, 
accordingly, was greatly criticised thereby failing to attract widespread support. 
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contemporaneous views of marriage and divorce, this model of asset reallocation 
prevailed. 
 
The approach taken by the ecclesiastic courts described above will be referred to as 
the Ecclesiastic Model. Its defining features are its refusal to permit divorces in the 
modern sense of the word and its attribution of considerable weight to the parties’ 
previous standard of living. Provision for this consideration following the grant of a 
divorce a mensa et thoro was justified as being a natural result of the court’s inability 
to interfere with the sanctity of marriage. Therefore, the common law obligations 
were not severed on divorce and any attempt to provide for a sustained standard of 
living through use of the other spouses’ assets stems from the Ecclesiastic Model’s 
refusal to sever the sacramental bonds and financial obligations that arose from 
marriage. 
 
It has already been shown that some of the elements now relevant to provision under 
the modern need principle were being drawn upon by the ecclesiastical courts when 
undertaking the maintenance quantum assessment on the grant of a divorce a mensa 
et thoro.62 It will be questioned in Chapter Three whether it is still appropriate to 
consider the parties’ standard of living when reallocating assets on the basis of need, 
given that today’s law permits an absolute decree of divorce rather than a mere 
divorce a mensa et thoro. Accordingly, Chapter Four will incorporate these 
conclusions into its reform proposal assessment. 
 
The prevailing societal understanding of the nature of marriage has not stayed 
consistent nor has the institution which has held jurisdiction to grant legal 
dissolutions of these relationships. As a result, justifications for providing spousal 
support beyond divorce have not remained straightforward or easily identifiable. The 
remaining sections in this chapter will examine how the change in societal institutions 
governing the asset reallocation exercise has affected the application of the asset 
reallocation process on divorce. 
 
                                                 
62 Namely the requirement to consider the parties previous standards of living before the marriage’s 
breakdown; see, MCA 1973, s.25(2)(c). 
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The Move Away From Ecclesiastic Jurisdiction: Parliamentary and Judicial Divorce 
 
Following the granting of a divorce a mensa et thoro, and the establishment of 
adultery via a ‘criminal conversation’ action,63 extremely wealthy husbands did have 
access to a process to terminate their marriage.64 This was via a Private Act of 
Parliament which upon receipt of royal assent would relieve the husband of his 
support obligations. These divorces were justified in a time of anti-Catholic sentiment 
where the indissoluble nature of marriage was attributed to Catholic teachings. 
Accordingly, the asset reallocation process, as applied by the legislature, evolved in 
response to religious agendas and the wealth of those parties who came before it. 
Ultimately, Parliament required that the wife’s ‘defection was accompanied by 
palliating circumstances’.65 However, this often only amounted to the grant of 
‘sufficient property to produce an income which would serve [the wife] at any rate for 
her bare support’.66 The provision for bare support in these divorces, which were 
concerned with considerable assets, reflected the respect that was attributed to the 
wife’s matrimonial contributions. 
 
Nevertheless, due to the innate difficulty in passing an idiosyncratic statute, such a 
Bill had to be the subject of arduous endeavour, and, consequently, such divorces 
were relatively unusual. However, despite religious contempt, many members of the 
nobility were not deterred. Accordingly, the frequency of such Private Acts increased 
over the decades.67 The steady increase of such Private Acts evidenced the shift of 
societal understanding regarding the moral permissibility of divorce and, 
consequently, the acceptability of terminating life-long support obligations. 
 
                                                 
63 This was a tort action directed against the ‘seducer’ of a man’s wife. Due to the doctrine of 
coverture, the wife had no right to intervene as she effectively lacked legal existence.  
64 As opposed to merely the termination of the obligation to cohabit. Grounds by which a woman could 
receive a parliamentary divorce did exist but were stricter. 
65 J MacQueen, The Law of Marriage, Divorce and Legitimacy (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1860) 145-
46. 
66 J. Barton, ‘The Enforcement of Financial Provisions’ in RH Graveson, FR Crane (eds), A Century of 
Family Law 1857-1957 (London, Sweet & Maxwell 1957) 357. 
67 I Holdsworth, A History of the English Law (Methuen & Company 1903) 390: ‘Before 1715 only 5 
such bills were known, between 1715 and 1775 there were 60, between 1775 and 1800 there were 74, 
between 1800 and 1850 there were 90.’ 
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This was the first time that recognition was paid to the inherent problems in forcing 
spouses to remain married, and the negative consequences of precluding parties from 
remarrying.68 In this sense the law had taken an initial step towards the current law 
due to the permissibility of serial marriages. However, the fact that divorce was 
largely only available to rich men meant that the law continued to reflect both social 
and sexual inequality with respect to granting divorces and reallocating assets.69 
 
The exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament to dissolve marriages continued until 1857 
and the enactment of the first Matrimonial Causes Act. A great number of factors led 
to the introduction of the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857 (MCA 1857).70 This 
statute removed the ecclesiastical court’s divorce jurisdiction and for the first time 
granted the secular courts the jurisdiction to decree a divorce. Such decrees permitted 
the divorce a vinculo matrimonii.71 In determining the appropriate level of financial 
reallocation, the judiciary were guided by a number of statutory considerations. The 
MCA 1857 required the judiciary to pay regard to, ‘her fortune, if any, to the ability 
of the husband and to the conduct of the parties’ and to order such maintenance as it 
‘may consider reasonable’.72 However, it must be recognised that although this 
statute ‘altered the procedure for obtaining divorce, [it] introduced no new  
principles’.73 Accordingly, it remained outside of the secular judiciary’s power to 
grant financial orders requiring the reallocation of capital lump sum payments 
between divorcing spouses. 
 
The change in jurisdiction relating to financial matters on divorce was achieved by 
setting up a new court in order to exercise that function: the Court for Divorce and 
                                                 
68 See, Stone (n 60) 301. 
69 During the 180 years they were available, only four Parliamentary divorces were granted to women; 
R. Phillips, Untying the Knot – A Short History of Divorce (CUP 1991) 66. 
70 This discussion largely goes beyond the remit of this thesis. For contextual purposes, it is sufficient 
to note that the reforms were influenced by a number of diverse groups recognising a number of 
different factors in justifying reform. For more information, see the prompting Report; Royal 
Commission, ‘Report of the Royal Commission on Divorce and Matrimonial Causes’ (HM Stationary 
Office, 1853). 
71 i.e. a divorce from the financial obligations of marriage, permitting one or both of the parties to 
remarry. The MCA 1857 also replaced the divorce a mensa et thoro with the concept of judicial 
separation. 
72 Matrimonial Causes Act 1950, ss.19(2), (3) (emphasis added); these provisions largely reflected 
those contained within the original Matrimonial Causes Act 1857, s.32. 
73 O.R. McGregor, ‘The Morton Commission: A Social and Historical Commentary’ (1956) 7 The 
London School Of Economics and Political Science 171, 173. 
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Matrimonial Causes. Following the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 this 
jurisdiction was then vested within the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of 
the new High Court, reaffirming that it was the secular judiciary that was the correct 
body to determine such matters. This reflected a move away from the traditional 
position of affording paramountcy to Anglo-Christian values governing this area, 
marking the ‘final shift in the modern secularization of divorce and an acceptance of 
the appropriateness of judicial oversight in matrimonial affairs’.74 It also reflected the 
first time that the prohibitive cost of divorce had justified a change in the law.75 
 
Consequently, financial provision on divorce required justification beyond being the 
continuation of the common law maintenance obligation that stemmed from the 
creation of an indissoluble sacrament. Thus, the judiciary had to formulate a model of 
asset reallocation for cases where the available assets for division were limited. The 
justifications raised for such provision will now be explored. 
 
 
Judicial Divorce: The Contractual Model 
 
The Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 granted the judiciary the discretion to provide for 
spousal maintenance needs, ‘even after the obligations of marriage had been 
dissolved by judicial divorce… [Thus] the courts needed to find justification for 
creating such obligations’.76 It no longer made sense to view an ecclesiastical 
sacrament as the sole theoretical justification for maintaining financial obligations 
beyond divorce. An alternative view that some members of the judiciary supported 
was that marriage should be viewed as a ‘civil contract to be regulated by the state’.77 
Accordingly, divorces began to be governed with reference to the same principles that 
                                                 
74 DC Wright, ‘Untying the Knot: An Analysis of the English Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Court 
Records, 1858-1866’ (2004) 38 U. Rich. L. Rev. 903, 906. 
75 However, according to Phillips the cost of obtaining a judicial divorce remained a fifth of what was 
required to obtain a divorce through Parliament; Phillips (n 69) 129-130. 
76 Eekelaar and Maclean (n 53) 8. 
77 McGregor (n 73) 173. Nevertheless, the sacramental view of marriage continued to influence 
judicial views into the twentieth century; see, Wilson v Carnley (1908) 1 KB 729 (Kennedy LJ). 
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were used to govern contracts, and the judiciary gradually recognised the value of 
voluntary agreements.78 
 
In line with this contract-based understanding of marriage, the right to continue to 
receive support after the legal dissolution of the marriage was ‘inextricably linked 
with the concept of… relief for wrong doing’.79 Consequently, the matrimonial 
offences80 became both ‘the key to divorce… [and] a determinant in property 
distribution’.81 Therefore, reallocation was applied in order to provide for an innocent  
wife’s expectation interest. This method of awarding damages on divorce followed 
the contractual remedy of expectation damages. This requires innocent parties to a 
breached contract ‘to be placed in the same situation with respect to damages as if the 
contract had been performed’.82 This remedy for breach of contract has since been 
described as the ‘ruling principle’ of contract damages.83 
 
The reasoning for imposing this contractual doctrine into family law stemmed from 
the judicial recognition that the ‘object of the Legislature was to compel the husband 
to make such a provision… in substitution for that support to which she would have 
been entitled had she continued his wife’.84 Thus, a husband who breached the marital 
contract, by committing a matrimonial offence, ‘remained under a liability to support 
his wife’.85 This was enforced through the courts making an order for maintenance; in 
essence refusing to sever his support obligations on divorce. This also explained why 
a wife could continue to receive maintenance from her first husband, even if she 
remarried.86 Alternatively, if the wife committed a matrimonial offence, the husband 
could obtain a divorce a vinculo matrimonii as a remedy, thus freeing himself from 
further support obligations. Therefore, despite the implicit rejection of marriage as an 
indissoluble spiritual sacrament, the view that the courts should seek to maintain 
                                                 
78 See, Hunt v Hunt (1861) 4 De GF & J 221. 
79 Law Commission, The Financial Consequences of Divorce: The Basic Policy (Law Com No. 103, 
1980) para 16. 
80 That is, the statutorily codified grounds for divorce. 
81 Wright (n 74) 906. 
82 See Robinson v Harman (1848) 1 Exch. 850, 855 (Parke B). 
83 Nykredit Mortgage Bank plc v Edward Erdman Group Ltd (No. 2) [1997] 1 WLR 1627, 1634 (Lord 
Nicholls). 
84 Watkins v Watkins [1896] P. 222, 230 (Lopes LJ). 
85 Barton (n 66) 357. 
86 See, Snelling v Snelling (1952) 2 All ER 196. 
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marriages persisted. Enduring financial obligations were a means of deterring 
matrimonial offences and thus, a conservative ethos persevered.  
 
Furthermore, overt discrimination remained present in the law of divorce, maintaining 
the position whereby it was more difficult for wives to prove a matrimonial offence 
had occurred than it was for husbands to do so. This was because wives had to 
provide evidence of desertion, cruelty, incest, rape, sodomy or bestiality in addition to 
their petition for adultery. No such additional hurdles were required of the husband.87 
This extra hurdle was a product of its time and ‘reflected the values of male-
dominated Victorian society’.88 
 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, in cases with high earning husbands, any 
award was generally capped at £3,000 of the husband’s income.89 The courts justified 
these awards by granting what was ‘adequate, having regard to the wife’s position in 
life and necessities’.90 This was the first time that needs provision was drawn upon as 
a principle governing the asset reallocation exercise. Interestingly, it was utilised as a 
cap on the extent of entitlement to asset reallocation. This cap also limited the extent 
to which legal recognition could be paid to the value of the wife’s matrimonial 
contributions. Alternatively, where there were limited divisible assets, the courts 
continued to attempt to preserve the innocent spouse’s living standards as if the 
marriage had never dissolved.91 Whilst this may have led to a justifiable allocation for 
the innocent wife, it left the guilty wife with a substantial lack of support and 
employment prospects, as a direct result of her gender. This shows that in stark 
contrast to the modern system, a ‘fair’ distribution beyond a capped living allowance 
was not yet a prospect at the end of the twentieth century.  
 
                                                 
87 Making it easier for husbands to avoid the detrimental financial consequences that would stem from 
the finding that they had committed a matrimonial offence.  
88 White (n 5) [17] (Lord Nicholls). 
89 See, Kettlewell v Kettlewell [1898] P 138. 
90 Sykes v Sykes [1897] P 306, 313 (Lord Ludlow LJ). 
91 See, Hartopp v Hartopp [1899] P 65, 72 (Gorrell Barnes J); ‘the guiding principle which will be 
found running through the cases is… Where the breaking up of the family life has been caused by the 
fault of the respondent, the Court, exercising its powers… ought to place the petitioner and the children 
in… the same position as if the marriage had not been broken up’. 
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Until the twentieth century the judiciary continued to require that, ‘before a guilty 
wife could obtain an order for maintenance, she would have to show special 
circumstances, such as misconduct of her husband’.92 This was influenced, at least in 
part, by the ecclesiastic practice of refusing maintenance to adulterous wives. This 
practice had been justified on the basis that the wife’s adultery was deemed ‘so 
heinous a betrayal of her husband as to deprive her of all right to his protection and 
support’.93 This model of asset reallocation was also supported by prominent legal 
commentators on the basis that, ‘morally it seems monstrous to compel a man to 
support through life the women who has dishonoured him’.94 The continuation of this 
practice can also be viewed as informed by the same policy that prevents parties 
relying on their own breaches of contractual obligation in order to obtain a benefit 
under that contract.95  
 
For these reasons, the initial post-1857 judicial approach can be categorised as 
pursuing a Contractual Model of asset reallocation. This also expressly bound the 
asset reallocation exercise to the justification for the divorce. Within this model, 
needs were catered for in such a way as to sustain sexual inequality and perpetuate 
the subordination of wives as economically dependent spouses. The causes were 
twofold. Firstly, as noted above, it required wives to satisfy a higher evidential 
threshold in order to substantiate a matrimonial offence claim. This led to it being 
criticised on the basis that it ‘sanctioned two standards of morality’.96 Secondly, this 
model appeared ignorant to the disproportionate financial consequences that wives 
would suffer on divorce. Either, the husband was guilty of a matrimonial offence and 
the wife was entitled to a capped living allowance, or, alternatively, the husband 
satisfied the lower threshold and it was the wife that was held guilty of a matrimonial 
offence. This latter finding opened up the very real potential for the wife to be left 
destitute and without entitlement. Thus, it can be readily assumed that this 
discriminatory law would have deterred married women from instigating such 
proceedings. 
 
                                                 
92 Home Office, Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce 1951-1955 (Cmd 9678, 1956) 132. 
93 Barton (n 66) 362. 
94 J MacQueen, Divorce and Matrimonial Jurisdiction (London : Maxwell & Son 1858) 55. 
95 See New Zealand Shipping Co v Société des Ateliers et Chantiers de France [1919] AC 1. 
96 McGregor (n 73) 178. 
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This makes it apparent that both of the historic models of asset reallocation used the 
concept of need as a device through which to maintain the wife’s dependence on her 
former husband. Such provision was never granted on the basis of entitlement. It 
could be suggested that the contractual model used need provision as a reward for the 
innocent wife. However, due to the limited quantum of provision that was granted in 
pursuit of this objective, it arguably makes more sense to view the Contractual Model 
as using the concept of fault as a deterrent against offending the institution of 
marriage. Accordingly, both the Ecclesiastic and Contractual Models of asset 
reallocation viewed divorce as ‘harm[ing] the moral and social fabric of society’.97 
However, due to their often-vulnerable financial positions, this had discriminatory 
consequences for many wives. Needless to say, these models were unfit for use 
within an egalitarian society and their use often failed to produce what would be 
considered a ‘reasonable’ award within modern financial proceedings. 
 
The Gradual Move towards ‘Reasonable’ Awards and the Fairness Objective 
 
 
With the turn of the twentieth century, the Court of Appeal expressly stated in 
Ashcroft v Ashcroft and Roberts that the terms of the MCA 1857 gave the court 
absolute discretion when determining an order for maintenance, ‘so that she may not 
be turned out destitute on the streets’.98 This arguably reflected the beginning of a 
move away from strict adherence to the theory that a breach of the marital contract 
was the sole justification for granting a maintenance order on divorce. Instead, a 
paternalistic judicial agenda can be detected here, recognising and responding to both 
the wording of the governing statute and the negative financial consequences divorce 
would often have for wives; who prior to the introduction of the Married Women’s 
Property Act 1882 could not hold separate property or contract as a feme sole. 
 
The Act’s reference to, and emphasis on reaching, a ‘reasonable’ award led the 
President of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division to state that: 
 
                                                 
97 Carol Smart, ‘Divorce in England 1950-2000: A Moral Tale’ in S Katz et al (eds), Cross Currents: 
Family Law and Policy in the United States and England (OUP, New York, 2000) 366. 
98 Ashcroft v Ashcroft and Roberts [1902] P. 270, 273 (Gorell Barnes J). 
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[I]t is no doubt true that the considerations of good sense and fairness which apply in 
fixing alimony [sic] must have due weight in determining the proper award of 
maintenance after a decree of divorce.99  
 
This expanded the previous observation made by Lindley LJ in the Court of Appeal 
that, when making maintenance awards in cases where ‘the husband’s income is 
large, the practice of the Court is to fix a fair proportion’.100 This development was 
influenced by the growing perception that divorce had a disproportionate effect on the 
financial standing of wives.101 Furthermore, the recognition of fairness as a guiding 
principle was encouraged given the contemporaneous attempts by the legislature to 
abolish the discriminatory common law doctrine of coverture.102 Thus, the courts 
began to recognise that: 
 
[T]he origin of the wife’s right to alimony [sic] was the right which the husband had 
to all the property of the wife.103 
 
This recognition of fairness and the need to avoid the discriminatory consequences of 
coverture began to influence the judicial model of asset reallocation on divorce. This 
change was justified on the basis that the judiciary were ‘doing little more than 
returning to the wives what had been theirs and which was lost on marriage’.104 
 
Thus, it was with reference to attaining fairness that this new model of judicial asset 
reallocation began to supplant the view that maintenance was a remedy for a breach 
of the marital contract. Nevertheless, realisation of the new fairness objective 
continued to be influenced by the view that ‘women remained dependent and society 
                                                 
99 Gilbey v Gilbey [1927] P 197, 200 (Lord Merrivale) (emphasis added). 
100 Sykes (n 100) 309 (Lindley LJ) (emphasis added). 
101 This judicial move towards recognising sexual equality mirrored contemporary Parliamentary 
sentiments when enacting the Married Women’s Property Act 1882. This statue permitted, for the first 
time, married women in England, Wales and Ireland to control and own property in their own right. 
For more information see, Lee Holcombe, Wives and Property: Reform of the Married Women’s 
Property Law in Nineteenth Century England (University of Toronto Press, 1982). 
102 See Married Women’s Property Acts 1870, 1882, 1883, 1893. Over the following decades, this 
trend towards implementing equality continued with the 1923 Matrimonial Causes Act’s removal of 
the unequal grounds for proving a matrimonial offence. 
103 See Leslie v Leslie [1911] P. 203, 205 (Evans P). 
104 Eekelaar and Maclean (n 53) 6. 
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expected husbands to support their wives’.105 Accordingly, the courts continued to 
make provision for wives needs on divorce. However, it was argued that a narrow 
interpretation of spousal needs was ‘not the primary consideration’ when calculating 
maintenance orders on divorce.106 Consequently, in a bid to respond to societal calls 
for a less discriminatory approach to asset reallocation, a Royal Commission 
recommended that the judiciary should be granted with greater discretionary powers, 
in order to interpret the statute’s call for ‘reasonable’ awards more fairly. 
 
Provision beyond Maintenance 
A significant, albeit unexpected, expansion to the court’s powers, when granting 
financial orders on divorce, occurred following the Royal Commission on Marriage 
and Divorce (Morton Commission) of 1956.107 This Commission was set up in order 
to respond to the wide-ranging calls for divorce reform in the light of societal changes 
following World War II and the most recent Matrimonial Causes Act of 1937.108 
Their remit was extensive, looking at a number of issues relating to marriage, divorce 
and matrimonial finance and property. 
 
There is little doubt that the Morton Commission had a conservative ethos, warning 
that abandoning the view of marriage as a ‘life-long union of one man and one 
woman’ would be ‘an irreparable loss to the community’.109 However, this 
Commission did take some steps to respond to the disproportionate financial 
consequences that resulted from divorce. In particular, it recommended that the 
judiciary be given an unfettered power to grant financial orders requiring the 
reallocation of capital lump-sums between spouses on, or after, granting a decree of 
divorce.110 This was later enacted via the Matrimonial Causes Act 1963, which gave 
the courts the power to order the husband to pay the wife ‘such lump sum as the court 
                                                 
105 Ira Mark Ellman, ‘The Theory of Alimony’ (1989) 77 Cal.L.Rev 3, 5. 
106 See Acworth v Acworth [1943] P 21, 23 (Scott LJ). 
107 Home Office (n 92). 
108 This statute had extended the grounds for obtaining a divorce. However, a ground for divorce that 
did not require fault to be proved remained notably absent. 
109 ibid 9-11. 
110 ibid 516. 
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thinks reasonable’.111 Accordingly, as Cretney aptly states, ‘the courts and the 
legislature began to move away from thinking solely in terms of income maintenance, 
and towards making provision by way of capital adjustment’.112  
 
This was a huge step towards permitting independence after divorce, as lump-sum 
payments had the potential to preclude the dependency of ex-wives. For the first time 
a clean break between the financial obligations of the spouses became feasible. The 
potential to avoid continued dependence was created as the judiciary no longer had to 
rely solely on granting periodic need-based maintenance orders. This continued the 
twentieth century theme of removing sexual discrimination from this area of law. 
Accordingly, in a bid to avoid discrimination, the courts began to attribute weight to 
various novel considerations, including the wife’s matrimonial contributions and the 
objective of spousal self-sufficiency.113 For the purposes of this thesis it should be 
recognised that it was this grant of far-reaching discretion that enabled the judiciary 
to begin to respond to the discriminatory result that often resulted from divorce.114 
 
However, this common law trend to avoid discrimination and realigning the historical 
law with its current state was not permitted to advance uninterrupted. Instead, 
legislative intervention attempted to modernise English and Welsh divorce law, 
whilst contemporaneously introducing an outdated, ill-conceived objective to guide 
the exercise of judicial discretion. 
 
The New Ground for Divorce: Irretrievable Breakdown 
It was during the 1960s that the Church of England produced the Report, Putting 
Asunder. This Report had recommended the introduction of the concept of breakdown 
as the new ground for divorce in England and Wales, on the basis that ‘empty ties add 
increasing harm to the community and injury to the ideal of marriage’.115 They 
believed that it was necessary that ‘the court should be empowered to declare defunct 
                                                 
111 Consolidated in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1965, s.16(1). 
112 Stephen Cretney, Family Law in the Twentieth Century (OUP 2003) 416. 
113 Eventually codified in the amended MCA 1973. 
114 Whereby wives had been reliant on meagre maintenance orders. 
115 Home Office (n 92) 341. 
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de jure what in their view is already defunct de facto’.116 These recommendations, 
which were drawn upon by the Law Commission in 1969,117 resulted in the 
introduction of the Divorce Reform Act 1969. This required a new, single ground to 
be proven before a judge could declare a decree of divorce; that the marriage had 
‘broken-down irretrievably’.118  
 
Ostensibly, this reflected a legislative endorsement of the dissolubility of marriage as 
well as the negative consequences that can stem from requiring fault to be proved. It 
also recognised that the attribution of fault was no longer an essential element of the 
asset reallocation process. However, many of the grounds used to establish whether 
the relationship had ‘broken down irretrievably’ remained directly attributable to 
fault.119 Furthermore, the judiciary were directed to have regard to the parties’ marital 
‘conduct’ when reallocating assets on divorce.120 For these reasons, ‘fault’ continued 
to influence judicial reasoning when reallocating assets, long after the introduction of 
the breakdown legislation.121 Thus, it is apparent that whilst the Government intended 
to modernise the asset reallocation process, central elements of the Contractual Model 
continued to restrain the law’s development.122 
 
Nevertheless, it was clear that the importance attributed to matrimonial conduct in 
‘ancillary relief’ proceedings was diminishing. Even prior to the legislative reforms of 
the late 1960s, the Church of England Report, Putting Asunder, recognised that:  
 
[T]he law is moving away from basing divorce on a finding concerning the 
delinquency of one of the parties towards basing it on a finding concerning the state 
of the marriage relationship and the demands of distributive justice.123 
                                                 
116 Report of a Group Appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury in January 1964, Putting Asunder: A 
Divorce Law for Contemporary Societies (Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, London 1966) 
38. 
117 See, Law Commission, Financial Provision in Matrimonial Proceedings (Law Com No. 25, 1969). 
118 This was proved via the satisfaction of a number of statutory grounds; see Divorce Reform Act 
1969, s.2.  
119 For example see Divorce Reform Act 1969, s.2(1)(a), which accepted adultery as a fact for proving 
the ground in s.1 that the marriage had broken-down irretrievably. 
120 Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1970, s.5(1) 
121 E.g. see, Wachtel v Wachtel [1973] Fam 72. 
122 This offered a compromise position for more radical supporters of the indissoluble nature of 
marriage. Nevertheless, these issues largely go beyond the remit of this thesis.  
123 Putting Asunder (n 116) 37. 
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Therefore, it was apparent during the mid-twentieth century, that the general societal 
consensus was that divorce should be easier to obtain, and that asset reallocation 
should be based on a model that strives for distributive justice and the avoidance of 
discrimination. However, it will now be shown that the means by which the 
Government introduced these policies into the law led to the realisation of neither. 
Nevertheless, it will be recognised that these legislative reforms were also an 
important step towards entrenching the current emphasis that is placed on the need 
principle. 
 
The Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act of 1970 and the ‘Minimal Loss 
Principle’ 
The reforms of the late 1960s were accompanied by the enactment of the Matrimonial 
Proceedings and Property Act 1970.124 This Act was directed towards amending the 
law surrounding the financial consequences of divorce, in the light of the liberalised 
ground for divorce. The combined effects of these statutes were to vest the 
jurisdiction to determine whether the marriage had irretrievably broken down, and the 
resultant financial consequences, within the discretion of the courts. 
 
The 1970 Act followed the Law Commission’s recommendation to remove gender 
discrimination by ending the ‘distinction between the powers of the courts in relation 
to husbands and wives or petitioners and respondents’.125 The 1970 Act also sought to 
introduce considerations to which the judiciary had a ‘duty’ to regard when exercising 
their judicial discretion.126 Section 5(1) expressly required the courts to have regard to 
the parties’ ‘financial needs’ on divorce.127 This was a significant development for the 
purposes of this thesis as it was the first time that the judiciary were placed under a 
duty to consider the concept of need as a unique consideration within asset 
reallocation hearings. The fact that the judiciary had a ‘duty’ to consider this concept 
emphasises the importance that the legislature had decided to attribute to it. Similarly, 
                                                 
124 Which was later consolidated by the MCA 1973. 
125 Law Commission (n 117) para 115. 
126 Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1970, s.5(1). 
127 ibid, s.5(1)(b). 
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the courts were required to consider ‘contributions made by looking after the home or 
caring for the family’ when exercising their discretionary powers to grant financial 
orders on divorce.128  
 
The Act of 1970 introduced these considerations in order that the judiciary could then 
exercise their discretion so ‘as to place the parties, so far as it is practicable, and 
having regard to their conduct just to do so, in the financial position in which they 
would have been if the marriage had not broken down’.129 This was dubbed the 
‘minimal loss principle’. Supporters of this principle argued that its implementation 
was a measure that intended to avoid the ‘systematic impoverishment of divorced 
women’ that inevitably resulted from the increased availability of divorce.130 
Consequently, any reallocation made under the heading of need was directed towards 
sustaining the marital standard of living; similar to the Ecclesiastic Model’s approach. 
Owing to the power to make financial orders for capital lump sum payments 
unrestricted in amount, the court’s power to distribute assets and allocate maintenance 
was now far greater than it had ever been previously.131 Thus, it is apparent that the 
need principle’s first statutory codification was an attempt to protect wives from the 
impoverishment that often occurred on divorce. Whilst, prima facie, this was a 
laudable objective, the principle itself was greatly criticised. 
 
Firstly, the principle has been described by Cretney132 as an attempt by the Law 
Commission133 to codify the dictum of Lord Merrivale in the 1928 case of N v N.134 
However, Cretney noted that Lord Merrivale was focused on discouraging the use of 
the ‘one-third principle’ as opposed to introducing a universal principle of ancillary 
relief.135 Therefore, the introduction of the minimal-loss principle may have been 
based on an inaccurate interpretation of the existing case law.  
 
                                                 
128 ibid, s.5(1)(f). 
129 ibid s.5; subsequently consolidated as MCA 1973 s.25(1). 
130 See L Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution (The Free Press 1985) 14. 
131 MCA 1965, s.16(1) allowed the court to order such lump sums ‘as the court thinks reasonable’. 
132 See, Cretney (n 112) 427. 
133 In their report; Law Commission, (n 117) 71. 
134 (1928) 44 TLR 324, 328 (Lord Merrivale P); ‘I must take into consideration the position in which 
the parties were, and the position in which the wife was entitled to expect herself to be and would have 
been, if her husband had properly discharged his marital obligation’. 
135 Cretney (n 112) 427. 
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It was a surprising oversight that the Law Commission’s Report of 1969,136 which led 
to the introduction of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1970, ‘contained 
virtually no discussion of the implications that the change in the basis of the ground 
for divorce might have for the determination of the financial consequences of 
divorce’.137 Despite the removal of both the doctrine of coverture and the requirement 
to prove fault, it appeared that the courts were prevented from severing the marital 
obligations. As the Law Commission put it, ‘in short, although divorce terminates the 
legal status of the marriage it will usually not terminate the financial ties of the 
marriage which remain lifelong’.138  
 
This legal principle also seemed to be inconsistent with the era’s liberalised social 
views, where divorce had come to be viewed as acceptable.139 Similarly, Kevin Gray 
criticised the minimal loss principle for being at odds with the general current of legal 
reform at the time, which had contemporaneously made it much easier for parties ‘in 
a broken marriage to make a fresh start in life’.140 Thus, it appeared that the 
legislature had disregarded the fundamental goal of divorce: bringing an end to the 
legal relationship and enabling a separation of the spouses’ lives.  
 
Subordination of the Contractual Model and the Rise of Needs Provision 
The recognition of some of these criticisms cumulated in the Court of Appeal ruling 
in Wachtel v Wachtel where Lord Denning MR stated, that ‘there are divergences of 
view and of practice between Judge[s]’.141 Lord Denning MR confirmed that conduct 
should only be considered in ‘rare cases where blame can be assessed’.142 Thus, 
despite the absence of legislative guidance, Lord Denning MR quickly recognised 
that in the new era of liberalised divorce laws, an evaluation of spousal conduct 
should no longer be a central tenet of the financial reallocation process. Accordingly, 
                                                 
136 Law Commission (n 117). 
137 Masson, Bailey-Harris and Probert (n 36) 350. 
138 Law Commission (n 79) para 22. 
139 See, Roderick Phillips, Putting Asunder: A History of Divorce in Western Society (CUP 1988) 561-
71.  
140 Gray (n 58) 317. 
141 Wachtel (n 61) 72 (Lord Denning MR). 
142 ibid 85 (Lord Denning MR) 
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this case represented a renewed move away from the Contractual Model’s approach, 
as the consideration of conduct was confined to extreme cases. 
 
Instead, the court seemed to fall back onto a needs-based fractional allocation of 
income and capital, through a revival of the one-third rule; a doctrine whose lineage, 
as noted above, has resonance with principles applied in the Ecclesiastic Courts. The 
only justification that can be found for this rule, other than tradition, is the case of 
Sansom v Sansom.143 Here, Sir Jocelyn Simon P justified the one-third rule on the 
basis that, ‘in a typical case the court was concerned with three groups of needs – 
those of the wife, those of the husband and those of children for whose support the 
husband was liable’.144 However, no longer was it the case that the husband would 
receive custody by default, thereby precluding the fractional allocation rule from 
being practically relevant or legally justifiable. However, the reliance placed on it by 
Lord Denning MR in 1974 implicitly supported a needs-oriented approach to asset 
reallocation. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the judiciary subsequently refused to follow this arbitrary and often 
unfair fractional allocation rule.145 Instead, it became clear that in routine cases ‘the 
court would use its powers to ensure that the wife and children were adequately 
housed’.146 This was the first time that the judiciary had begun to exercise their 
discretion compatibly with the modern approach to needs in everyday divorces, 
whereby, if assets are limited, priority provision is made for parties’ needs. Thus, 
early provision for needs appeared to develop in a bid to protect wives from suffering 
a financial detriment on divorce. 
 
The Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 – Pursuit of the ‘Clean Break’ 
Objective 
                                                 
143 [1966] P 52. 
144 ibid 55 [Sir Jocelyn Simon P]. 
145 See, Page v Page (1981) 2 FLR 198 CA; Ormrod LJ noted that, ‘in many cases where the assets are 
small relative to the needs and obligations of one party, [the application of a one third principle would 
produce] a result which is too low and obviously does not accord with the requirements of [the Act].’  
146 Cretney (n 112) 429. 
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Owing to the criticisms surrounding the minimal loss principle and pressure from The 
Campaign for Justice in Divorce,147 in 1980 the Law Commission undertook another 
examination of the options for reform in this area of law.148 In particular, they 
recommended the removal of the minimal loss principle and argued that instead the 
law should promote the parties to become self-sufficient through the imposition of a 
clean break; to the extent that this would be consistent with the welfare of any 
children.149 These recommendations were implemented into the MCA 1973 via the 
Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984. 
 
Thus, the express objective of the asset reallocation process on divorce was almost 
completely reversed. It went from adherence to the Ecclesiastic Model, whereby 
financial obligations stemming from marriage were consistently preserved following 
separation, to one that recognised that the preservation of such obligations would 
hang ‘like millstones round [the spouses] necks’.150 This left questions regarding the 
continued relevance of needs provision; which was, ostensibly, at odds with the new 
objective of the asset reallocation exercise. 
 
In effect, the clean break objective promoted lump-sum capital reallocation, enabling 
the divorced spouses to ‘go their separate ways without the running irritant of 
financial inter-dependence or dispute’.151 Consequently, it may be argued that this 
statute represented the first successful attempt to provide judicial discretion with a 
principled objective that was compatible with the modern context of divorce law, 
‘where women have become potentially equal economic partners and marriages 
frequently do break down.’152 However, to state that reaching a clean break is the 
guiding objective of the asset reallocation exercise, may be to overstate its 
importance. Instead, the courts are merely under a duty to ‘consider’ whether it could 
be achieved when making financial orders on divorce.153 Consequently, provision for 
                                                 
147 A pressure group which represented the grievances of divorced men. 
148 Law Commission (n 79). 
149 ibid paras 24, 46(5)(a). 
150 Law Commission (n 117) para 9. 
151Whitting v Whitting [1988] 1 WLR 565,574 (Balcombe LJ), citing Tandy v Tandy (CA, October 24 
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152 J Freedman and others, ‘Property and Marriage: An Integrated Approach’ (Institute for Fiscal 
Studies, Report No. 29, 1988) 1. 
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need has remained a distinct and respected concept within the asset reallocation 
exercise. The discussion as to the weight currently granted to the clean break 
objective will be returned to in Chapter Two. This chapter will also question its 




This chapter has shown that reallocating the assets owned by one spouse in order to 
provide for the needs of their former spouse has a convoluted and somewhat 
uncertain legal pedigree. It has also evidenced that the asset reallocation process is a 
product of its time, consistently being developed in order to respond to the context it 
operates within. Accordingly, whilst various concepts have been developed and 
retained in a bid to guide this process, their meaning and application has been 
required to change. This is evident when looking at the development and evolving use 
of need provision. 
 
Whilst not receiving statutory recognition until 1970, needs provision has consistently 
been attributed weight when reallocating assets in everyday divorces.154 Thus, it has 
been shown that facets of modern needs provision can be evidenced within the 
Ecclesiastic Model. Under this model the Ecclesiastic Courts refused to permit 
anything more than a divorce a mensa et thoro, as ‘marriage had the immutable 
character of divine law and was held, by God's own ordinance, absolutely 
indissoluble’.155 Accordingly, the maintenance obligation that was voluntarily 
undertaken on marriage was life-long. Periodic maintenance for spousal needs was 
the means by which the Ecclesiastic Courts continued to enforce this fiscal obligation. 
Ultimately, such provision was granted with the aim of preserving the parties’ marital 
standard of living. 
 
Contrastingly, provision for needs on divorce was later justified by the secular 
judiciary under the Contractual Model.156 This model often awarded innocent wives 
                                                 
154 See, Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1970, s.5(1)(b). 
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their expectation interest, in order to place them in the position they would be in had 
their spouse not committed a matrimonial offence. Thus, provision for needs was 
justified under the guise of damages for breach of the civil contract that the couple 
entered into on marriage. This reliance on establishing guilt was again raised in order 
to justify sustaining the marital standard of living for the innocent spouse.157 
 
It was with the turn of the twentieth century that a willingness to avoid discrimination 
and pay increased respect to spousal entitlement can be detected within legislative 
activity158 and judicial reasoning.159 Thus, as the century progressed, needs provision 
through a fractional allocation rule, or, as a ceiling to awards,160 began to be viewed 
as inappropriate interpretations in order to protect spousal entitlements on divorce. 
Instead, the understanding that ‘considerations of good sense and fairness… must 
have due weight in determining the proper award’ began to receive recognition.161 
Unsurprisingly, this led to the judiciary interpreting the governing statute as granting 
them vast powers of discretion, in order to reallocate assets so as to prevent 
inequitable results.162 Thus, provision for a broader understanding of needs was 
justified as a response to the discriminatory consequences that arose through the 
doctrine of coverture.163 
 
It was following these developments that a number of statutes were implemented in a 
bid to update the law and provide guidance for judicial discretion.164 Whilst this did 
not always lead to positive developments,165 the leading statute, the Matrimonial 
Causes Act, began to enshrine a number of considerations to which the judiciary 
should have regard. This now includes an express obligation on the courts to consider 
parties ‘financial needs’ on divorce.166 However, since this consideration’s 
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codification the only guidance that has been provided as to the meaning and operation 
of this term has stemmed from the common law. 
 
This thesis will now go on to identify recent judicial developments that have 
influenced the role and objectives that are now associated with need provision. The 
next chapter will attempt to assess the emergence of the current model of asset 
reallocation, and the importance attributed to need provision within this process. In 
order to extrapolate the various objectives and facets of modern need provision, this 
forthcoming chapter will evaluate its position in statute and subsequent judicial 
embellishment. In turn, this will allow a comprehensive critical evaluation of the 
current model of asset reallocation and the role and requirements of needs provision 
in this process. 
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Chapter Two: The Fairness Model of Asset Reallocation: The Role of Needs 




This chapter will identify the role that the need principle plays in everyday divorces 
under the current Fairness Model. Ultimately this chapter will show that as provision 
for needs has come to be respected as a guiding principle under the Fairness Model, 
the judiciary have justified an expanded remit in which to exercise their discretionary 
powers. 
 
Through analysing the growing recognition that has been paid to need provision, this 
chapter shall explore the range of pragmatic considerations that have been subsumed 
and considered under this principle’s heading. This will be with a view to identifying 
the existence of any guidance or rules fettering judicial discretion. It will also look to 
the leading statute in order to develop an understanding of the influence that the 
judicial approach to the need principle has had when interpreting the codified 
considerations designed to govern the asset reallocation process.  
 
This chapter will end with an examination of the other relevant objectives that have 
been attributed weight under the Fairness Model. This section will question the 
compatibility of these objectives with the current approach to need provision. This 
section will provide further evidence of the primary weight that is currently attributed 
to the need principle within modern asset reallocation hearings. 
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This chapter analyses the current approach to the reallocation of assets in everyday 
divorces, which will be termed a Fairness Model and involves catering for needs with 
a view to obtaining a fair division of the assets. The first step towards achieving this 
is to uncover the implications of recent judicial embellishment regarding the concept 
of need. As this concept is now considered a judicial tool that, ‘is relevant to every 
divorce and dissolution’, this chapter will inevitably have a strong focus on the 
principle’s development through the case law.167  
 
This chapter will then investigate the statutory facets of modern need provision. This 
will provide a greater understanding as to the objectives pursued via such provision. 
Reference will be made to some ‘big money’ divorces during this chapter, to the 
extent that they provide useful obiter statements that guide the everyday needs 
provision exercise. 
 
This chapter will then turn to assess the other policies and objectives that influence 
the use of judicial discretion in everyday divorces. These will be evaluated for their 
compatibility with the current clear prioritisation of needs. They will also be assessed 
for their continued relevance within the Fairness Model of asset reallocation, given 
recent changes to the family law landscape.  
 
These findings will lead on to the following chapter’s focus on the deficiencies of 
modern need provision. Ultimately, it will be argued that excessive reliance is being 
placed on need provision within everyday divorces. In turn, it will be argued that the 
failings of the law justify an exploration into proposals for reforming the asset 
reallocation process.  
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The Fairness Model 
 
This section plots recent judicial developments that led to the emergence of the 
Fairness Model of asset reallocation. This will allow this thesis to evaluate the effect 
that these developments have had on need provision within everyday divorces. This 
will be achieved by assessing the case law that continues to guide the asset 
reallocation process.  
 
It is important to note at the outset, why the judiciary have taken on the role of 
developing the current model of asset reallocation. Since its amendment in 1984, the 
MCA 1973: 
 
[e]xpresses no objective, and… does not of itself give any clear guidance as to the 
principles on which the court should act, nor of the underlying policies on which asset 
and income distribution are justified.168  
 
Due to this vacuum evident in the key statutes, ‘the House of Lords and the Court of 
Appeal displayed increased enthusiasm for a judicial role articulating fundamental 
policies and rationales to underpin the distribution of assets and income on marriage 
breakdown’.169 Thus, the senior judiciary have become the leading authority for 
guidance on these issues. However, this has had to occur incrementally. Nevertheless, 
the judiciary have always recognised the impossibility of laying strict rules to guide 
their discretion, due to the multitude of factual scenarios that present themselves to 
the courts. Thus, it has frequently been recognised ‘that judicial glosses on the statute 
should be treated with caution’.170 
 
When looking at financial reallocation cases heard during the 1990s, Diduck 
identified a shift in judicial focus at the end of the twentieth century. She firstly 
noted, ‘decisions expressed in a language of paternalism/ welfare… in which the 
breadwinner was obliged post-separation simply, in effect, to continue his pre-
                                                 
168 Miller; McFarlane (n 7) [5] (Lord Nicholls); [124]-[125] (Baroness Hale). 
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separation marital obligation to support reasonably his dependents’.171 This reasoning 
was evident even in cases concerned with considerable assets. For example, in Dart v 
Dart172 Diduck opined that Thorpe LJ’s judgment was:  
 
[F]irmly located within the traditional discourse of the provider’s responsibility to his 
dependant – to meet needs.173  
 
However, towards the end of the 1990s she noted a judicial shift towards, ‘language 
of equality/ rights… in which the breadwinner became responsible to “share” what 
became re-conceived as the “fruits of the marital partnership”’.174 She attributed this 
move to egalitarian social movements of the time. Thus, in cases such as SRJ v 
DWJ175 the respondent’s continuing obligation to financially support his wife was 
‘located in a discourse of rights, compensation, mutuality, and gender equality’.176 
This change of emphasis was later justified by Hale LJ177 as:  
 
The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 was designed to move away from the application 
of strict property law principles, with their dependence upon evaluating contributions 
in money or money’s worth, towards the recognition of marriage as a relationship to 
which each spouse contributes what they can in their different ways.178  
 
Therefore, whilst the provision of needs had historically been used as a tool to protect 
dependant wives, the judiciary had begun to view such provision as inadequate to 
satisfy the requirements of the twenty-first century approach to asset reallocation. 
However, needs provision was preserved in those cases concerned with the division 
of limited assets out of necessity; as assets are often incapable of stretching beyond 
it.179  
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Accordingly, in the everyday divorce, provision for needs began to take on a central 
role in the evolving reallocation exercise.180 This has occurred over the past fifteen 
years as a result of common law attempts to pursue a new model of asset reallocation; 
the Fairness Model. Thus, the judiciary attempted to align the law with principles of 
entitlement, partnership, and gender equality. This forthcoming section will identify 
why the judiciary have used the concept of need as an integral requirement of the 
Fairness Model’s operation within everyday divorces.  
 
The Twenty-First Century Judicial Approach to Needs  
 
In White v White the House of Lords unequivocally recognised that the objective to be 
pursued when reallocating assets on divorce ‘must be to achieve a fair outcome’.181 
This case stands for the proposition that the focus of judicial discretion when 
reallocating assets should be the pursuit of a fair division. As Lord Nicholls stated 
‘[i]n seeking to achieve a fair outcome, there is no place for discrimination between 
husband and wife and their respective roles’.182 Hence, White confirmed that a central 
concern of the Fairness Model was the avoidance of discrimination. It was also 
established that implicit in the Fairness Model’s approach were three components, 
namely:  
 
[T]he overall objective of achieving a fair outcome; consideration of all the s.25(2) 
criteria relevant on the facts and, at the end of the exercise, application of the 
yardstick of equal division of assets as a check on the provisional quantum of an 
award.183  
 
It was Lord Nicholls view that ‘fairness requires the court to take into account all the 
circumstances of the case’.184 Accordingly, the extent to which the statutory 
considerations were to be attributed weight and balanced was left as a matter for the 
judges to decide, in the light of the specific factual circumstances. Hence, the 
                                                 
180 See, Diduck (n 171). 
181 White (n 5) [23] (Lord Nicholls). 
182 White (n 5) [24] (Lord Nicholls). 
183 Masson, Bailey-Harris and Probert (n 36) 360. 
184 White (n 5) [24] (Lord Nicholls). 
48 
consideration of ‘financial needs’185 was entirely subsumed within the discretionary 
search for a fair division of the assets. Lord Nicholls went on to state that: 
  
In assessing financial needs, a court will have regard to a person’s age, health and 
accustomed standard of living… [and] the available pool of resources.186 
 
Nevertheless, he consistently emphasised that in ‘big money’ divorces187 the parties’ 
‘financial needs’ were merely one of the statutory considerations to be considered 
within the search for fairness.188 Accordingly, in ‘big money’ divorces this new 
judicial gloss represented a move away from the paramountcy of providing for needs, 
towards recognising the spouses’ entitlements to the assets that stemmed from the 
marriage.189 This new model’s change in emphasis was influenced by trends 
occurring within family law generally. In particular, there was an increasing 
recognition from both academics190 and members of the judiciary191 that divorce had 
a disproportionate impact on the financial standing of wives. Accordingly, the 
Fairness Model attempted to respond to this. 
 
Nevertheless, in everyday divorces, the available pool of resources dictated that the 
judicial approach would continue to be guided by basic need provision. However, the 
attribution of various statutory considerations meant that need provision was given an 
elevated role within the Fairness Model’s approach in everyday divorces.  
 
It was in the case of Miller; McFarlane that the House of Lords articulated further 
guiding principles in order to ‘determine what is the content of fairness… that 
[justifies] the redistribution of assets on divorce’.192 As Lord Nicholls stated, the need 
for like cases to be treated alike is an important aspect of fairness, and ‘if there is to 
be an acceptable degree of consistency of decision from one case to the next, the 
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courts must themselves articulate… the applicable if unspoken principles guiding the 
court’s approach.’193 He went on to articulate that these implicit guiding principles 
are the concepts of needs, compensation and sharing.194  
 
With reference to the principle of need, Lord Nicholls stated that in everyday 
divorces, ‘the search for fairness largely begins and ends at this stage… [as] the 
available assets are insufficient to provide adequately for the needs of two homes’.195 
This case made it apparent that in the context of everyday divorces, the newly 
conceived need principle was to be a central guide in the Fairness Model’s approach.  
 
Supporting this dictum, Baroness Hale stated that the ultimate objective of the court 
should be ‘to give each party an equal start on the road to independent living'.196 This 
approach instilled renewed importance in pursuing the clean break objective.197 
Nevertheless, with this objective in mind, Baroness Hale suggested that, ‘it can be 
assumed that the marital partnership does not stay alive… unless this is justified by 
need or compensation’.198 This implied that spouses were entitled to have their needs 
provided for, to the extent that this was compatible with the objective of achieving a 
fair division of the assets. However, this failed to explain the extent to which 
provision was to be made for the spouses’ needs. Nor did it provide an idea as to the 
substantive considerations of this principle. The need principle’s precise 
contemporary role will now be the subject of evaluation. 
 
An Application Dependent on Available Assets 
 
In order to understand the role of the need principle in modern day litigation, the first 
question that requires addressing is; in what class of divorces does the principle of 
need become a guiding judicial consideration? The answer to this question will 
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illuminate the importance of this principle, under the Fairness Model’s approach to 
reallocating assets in everyday divorces. 
 
It is readily apparent that the judicial application of this principle is not a static 
exercise. This is despite it being described as a ‘factor of magnetic importance’.199 
There are two broad categories of cases that need distinguishing. Firstly, there is the 
everyday divorce, which, as described above, is concerned with reallocating limited 
assets or even debts. In these cases the judiciary have the difficult task of meeting the 
needs of two households, out of the assets that formerly supported one. These cases 
are classified as ‘everyday divorces’ as they form the bulk of applications for 
financial reallocation on divorce. This is because ‘even at fairly high asset and 
income levels it can be difficult to divide one household into two while retaining a 
similar standard of living’.200 
 
The second, more unusual, class of cases is where the divisible resources exceed what 
would be required to meet both spouses’ needs. The approach of the judiciary in these 
cases is remarkably distinct and accordingly an in-depth analysis of these cases goes 
beyond the remit of this thesis. However, the approach of the judiciary in such cases 
will be recognised, to the extent that it affects the asset reallocation exercise in 
everyday divorces. 
 
The following discussion will identify the prevailing approach that has been adopted 
by the judiciary when recognising the applicability of the needs principle under the 
Fairness Model. The purpose of this discussion is to evaluate the weight attributed to 
the needs principle during the everyday asset reallocation process. It will be shown 
that the Fairness Model attributes weight to the need principle solely in accordance 
with the court’s conception of fairness. However, broad themes or considerations, 
which can be shown to have consistently affected judicial reasoning, will be drawn 
out from the available reported judgments in this area. 
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Weight Attributed to Needs in Everyday Divorces under the Modern Fairness 
Model 
 
Where the available assets are less than what would be required to maintain the 
parties’ previous standard of living, the Fairness Model pays central reference to 
parties’ needs. Consequently, ‘determining needs for a couple is arguably the most 
significant factor in the overwhelming majority of cases’.201 Given the central role it 
plays, one may expect that the principle’s application is a transparent task. However, 
this is not the case and, as a result, the law is relatively inaccessible to litigants and 
has suffered from regional variations in its judicial application.202 Recognition of 
these points recently prompted the Law Commission to produce a Report concerned 
with, inter alia, evaluating the current state of contemporary needs provision.203 A 
critical evaluation of this Report’s findings and recommendations will be reserved for 
Chapter Three. 
 
The needs principle is still applicable to cases concerned with the division of 
considerable assets; however, it is not applied with the same frugality. Miller; 
McFarlane held that the three strands of fairness, ‘must be applied in the light of the 
size and nature of all the computed resources, which are usually heavily 
circumscribing factors’.204 Thus, what is readily apparent from the relevant case law 
is that the principle of needs is heavily reliant on the couple’s particular 
circumstances. Needs, therefore, is not a principle of objective universal application. 
Instead, quantum justified under this principle’s heading requires consideration of a 
number of factors. According to Sir Mark Potter P: 
 
The principle of need requires consideration of the financial needs, obligations and 
responsibilities of the parties (s.25(2)(b)); of the standard of living enjoyed by the 
family before the breakdown of the marriage (s.25(2)(c)); of the age of each party 
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(half of s.25(2)(d)); and of any physical or mental disability of either of them 
(s.25(2)(e)).205 
 
This dictum makes clear the opinion of the previous President of the Family Division; 
needs provision should be applied through recourse to the relevant statutory 
considerations contained within section 25 of the MCA 1973. Accordingly, this 
chapter will assess the need principle through the lens of the relevant statutory 
considerations. 
 
Nevertheless, before this is undertaken, this thesis will now look at the pragmatic 
considerations that the courts recognise when reallocating assets on the basis of the 
need principle. This will involve evaluating the specific circumstantial factors that are 
considered under this principle’s heading. Again, any reference to ‘big money’ cases 
will be for illustrative purposes only. 
 
Circumstantial Considerations of Needs Provision: S.25(2)(b) 
 
There remains no definition of ‘need’, nor any codified guidance outside of the 
complex and somewhat contradictory case law. However, a careful evaluation of the 
relevant statutory provisions and case law does reveal some general trends the 
judiciary follow in order to self-regiment their discretionary interpretations of this 
principle. As Schneider has stated, ‘it may be efficient to accord discretion to the 
decision-maker who is a “repeat player” who regularly applies a narrow set of 
policies to standard fact patterns’.206 This efficiency occurs given the unique position 
of the judiciary, who are required on a daily basis to calculate needs under the asset 
reallocation process. These pragmatic considerations will be analysed in order to gain 
a comprehensive understanding of the principle’s operation within everyday divorces. 
This will then inform the forthcoming chapter, which intends to critically evaluate the 
Fairness Model’s approach to the need principle. 
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i) Children of the Family 
 
The relevant statutory provision states that where there is a ‘child of the family’ who 
is under eighteen, their welfare must be the court’s ‘first consideration’.207 The 
importance of providing for children of the family has also been consistently 
recognised by the judiciary, who have acknowledged that, ‘the most common source 
of need is the presence of children’.208 It should be noted that provision for children’s 
welfare needs is considered separately from child maintenance; now calculated and 
enforced by the new governmental body, the Child Maintenance Service.209 
 
Children’s welfare ‘needs go beyond just the cost of housing, food and clothing, and 
are understood to include the need to have someone to care for them’.210 Therefore, 
the parent to whom a child arrangement order is made granting the children the ability 
to reside with them, generally has their needs provided for first, as an extension of the 
provision for the child’s welfare.211 This is because it has frequently been reiterated 
by the judiciary that, ‘it is one of the paramount considerations… to cover the need of 
each [party] for a home, particularly where there are young children involved’.212  
 
Thus, the statutory requirement to first consider the children’s welfare, inevitably 
translates into prioritising the needs of the care-giving spouse. This supports the 
implicit policy of need provision; as care-givers are likely to become increasingly 
financially vulnerable, following their withdrawal from the employment market. 
Furthermore, child-carers will have great difficulties in finding employment that 
provides financial remuneration on par to the earnings of their ex-spouses. Therefore, 
the priority given to provision for care-givers’ needs recognises that these spouses are 
less likely to be able to maintain their own, or their children’s needs. Consequently, 
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such provision helps to redress economic disparity between the spouses following 
divorce and is also in line with current social attitudes.213 
ii) Housing 
In order to achieve the Fairness Model’s objective, ‘in the typical ancillary relief case 
the District Judge will always look first to the housing needs of the parties’.214 
Providing separate housing for the parties following a divorce is a primary and often 
exclusive issue for the law to deal with as ‘there is nothing more awful than 
homelessness’.215 In cases involving minimal assets, sale of the matrimonial home 
will often be the primary means by which to obtain capital, in order to provide for 
both parties’ housing needs.216 This approach is no doubt influenced by the value 
attributed to owner-occupation in England and Wales, which is particularly high 
when compared to home-ownership rates in continental Europe.217  
 
A sale of the matrimonial home may be required either at the time of divorce or, at a 
later date when a stipulated event occurs.218 The judicial innovation and precedent set 
in the cases of Mesher v Mesher219 and Martin (BH) v Martin (D)220 show a 
paternalistic rationale of asset reallocation. Such judicial innovation can be seen as 
precluding the historic inequalities that were present during the operation of the 
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Contractual Model of asset reallocation, whereby, the courts had to be aware of the 
need to protect wives from being ‘turned out destitute on the streets’.221 
 
This prioritisation of housing need has lead the court to generally allocate a ‘larger 
share in the capital value of the family home’ to the party who has given up work in 
order to care for and raise the family’s children.222 This is because the partner who 
has continued to work will have their income to rely on when applying for a 
mortgage. Thus, the current pattern by which judges provide for housing needs 
supports the implied policy of the needs principle; to protect vulnerable spouses from 
suffering unfair financial consequences on divorce. 
iii) Spousal Maintenance 
Spousal maintenance is often the final facet of need considered when ordering 
financial reallocation on divorce.223 It is generally intended to ‘assist the receiving 
party to pay living expenses’.224 This is often achieved by considering the section 25 
factors and, consequently, granting a periodical payment order; which requires one 
spouse to make periodic financial contributions to support the other spouse.225 The 
likelihood of such an order being granted is higher among cases concerned with the 
division of limited assets. This is because of the impossibility of granting a capital 
lump sum order in such cases. 
 
Following the introduction of the power to order lump sum or property 
reallocation,226 the extent of financial provision via periodic payments between 
spouses has become the centre of much contentious academic debate.227 In particular, 
some academics have claimed that they are ‘very much [in] doubt that an indefinite 
order for periodical payments in sums well in excess of strict need are in tune with the 
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views of the population as a whole’.228 Ultimately, there remains a clear tension 
between, ‘crystal ball gazing’ and providing ‘a meal ticket for life’; in other words, 
between making a fixed term or a joint lives maintenance order.229 
 
These debates have become more pronounced following the introduction of the 
statutory obligation requiring the court to consider the desirability of limiting the 
duration of a periodic payment order.230 Some claim that this consideration should be 
‘upgraded to one which directs the court to bring the financial obligations of each 
party towards the other to an end where possible… [with] time limits on support’.231 
To this end Baroness Deech has introduced a Private Member’s Bill into the House of 
Lords, which intends to limit the duration of periodic payments between divorced 
spouses to a period of five years.232 However, as noted above, ‘the courts are aware of 
the difficulties experienced by those who have given up work, wholly or in part, to 
look after children’.233 Periodic payment orders are often granted as a response to this 
difficulty.234 Thus, it is apparent that some discretion must be permitted to a judge in 
order to consider the entire circumstances of the case when deciding on a fair duration 
of a periodic payment order. 
 
Nevertheless, it remains the case that once both parties have had their housing needs 
calculated the courts will generally then turn to: 
 
[D]etermine what budget the [spouse] reasonably requires to fund… expenditure in 
maintaining the home and its contents and in meeting other expenditure external to 
the home.235  
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The available assets will inevitably dictate the extent to which the courts can provide 
for the financially vulnerable party’s needs. However, ascertaining the scope of 
‘maintenance needs’236 requires predicting the presiding judge’s understanding of 
fairness. This is inevitably an extremely difficult task, due to the extent of discretion 
that is granted to the judiciary when making this decision. Chapter Three will return 
to evaluate the consequences of the current Fairness Model’s reliance on discretion, 
before Chapter Four queries the likely advantages of implementing Baroness Deech’s 
reform proposal. 
vi) Rehabilitative Vocational Training 
In order to prevent divorced parties becoming dependent on either the state or their 
ex-partners, the courts have shown themselves willing to consider and make orders 
that enable the parties to pursue work. This trend is interesting for the purposes of this 
thesis, as it is directed towards providing spouses with the means to provide for their 
own long-term needs. Some judges have gone as far as to state that this consideration 
is as important as housing:  
 
Just as homes are of primary importance, so is the ability and the opportunity to work. 
It may be that as a result of the years of marriage, one or other of the parties will need 
some capital provision to enable him or her to get back into the labour market, or to 
retrain for a profession, or to modernise a skill which, through the years of marriage, 
has grown rusty.237 
 
Provision under this heading may help to achieve a clean break, even if pursued via 
the grant of a periodical payment order.238 This is because vocational training will 
enable an ex-spouse to return to the workforce in order to earn their own income. This 
will assist in precluding dependence upon the receipt of long-term periodic payments 
from their ex-spouses. Provision under this heading has been supported by Kevin 
Gray who has stated that, maintenance after divorce ‘should be limited in amount and 
duration to that which is necessary to obviate “marriage-conditioned” needs and to 
                                                 
236 A term used to denote those facets of the need principle which are concerned with maintaining an 
ex-spouse. 
237 Cordle (n 214) [33] (Thorpe LJ).  
238 See MCA 1973, s.25A. 
58 
enable a former spouse to acquire financial independence for the future’.239 This 
reflects an attempt to affect a restitutio in integrum, as such provision will attempt to 
return the spouse to the position they would have been in had the marriage never 
taken place. 
 
The above section has identified the need principle’s contemporary operation, when 
applied within the context of everyday divorces. However, it must be remembered 
that the above approach has informally developed through the accretion of judicial 
decision-making patterns, with recognition of the fact that each case will turn on its 
facts. Thus, as the law stands, ‘the only universal rule [guiding judicial discretion] is 
to apply the section 25(2) criteria to all the circumstances of the case (giving first 
consideration to the welfare of the children) and to arrive at a fair result that avoids 
discrimination’.240 
 
Whilst, in practice, the need principle often dominates the asset reallocation process 
in everyday divorces, it has consistently been emphasised that although the need 
principle, ‘is very helpful in ensuring the court achieves a fair result… care needs to 
be taken to ensure that [this principle is] not treated as some kind of quasi-statutory 
amendment’.241 Thus, it is apparent that the asset reallocation process must be guided 
by the section 25 considerations and the need principle merely offers a description, 
‘of the approach to the reasoning to be used in applying the statute to achieve a fair 
result’.242 
 
Accordingly, this chapter will now turn to assess the extent to which the need 
principle has influenced the court’s approach to the section 25 statutory exercise. 
Focus will be placed on those statutory considerations whose interpretations have 
been influenced by the need principle. The conclusions drawn from this section will 
allow this thesis to extrapolate the objectives currently justifying the weight attributed 
to the need principle in the typical everyday divorce. 
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Other Statutory Considerations Relevant to the Interpretation of Needs 
i) S.25(2)(c) – Standard of Living Enjoyed Before Breakdown 
It is clear from Chapter One that within the early Ecclesiastic Model of asset 
reallocation, the parties’ standard of living has been a key consideration when 
quantifying maintenance. The marital standard of living also remained a particularly 
important consideration during the latter half of the nineteenth century, where the 
Contractual Model dictated that the judiciary should attempt to maintain an innocent 
spouses’ standard of living.243  
 
In recent years, the spouse’s standard of living has remained a primary component in 
the need-assessment exercise. This is evident in G v G, where Charles J stated, ‘the 
lifestyle enjoyed during the marriage sets a level or benchmark that is relevant to the 
assessment of the level of… lifestyles to be enjoyed by the parties’.244 However, he 
did go on to recognise that, ‘the objective of achieving a fair result… is not met by an 
approach that seeks to… fund a lifestyle equivalent to that enjoyed during the 
marriage’.245 Therefore, regardless of the available divisible assets, the parties’ 
previous standard of living is going to be a relevant consideration when calculating 
the extent of need provision. Thus, tying need provision to the parties’ previous 
standard of living pays respect to the historic development of needs provision. 
However, Chapter Three will question whether the continued emphasis on this 
consideration fails to respect contemporary legal developments and views of divorce. 
 
Attempts have consistently been made by the courts to provide guidance as to the 
standard of living that should be maintained when providing for needs. In the context 
of ‘big money’ cases, Baroness Hale’s dictum in Miller; McFarlane, that needs 
should be ‘generously interpreted’ with reference to the matrimonial standard of 
living, has received some support.246 However, this fails to provide guidance for 
everyday divorces and this expansion of the need principle has recently been the 
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subject of criticism for creating confusion due to its deviation from the ‘precise 
language of the statute’.247 
 
It has since been held that appellate courts should be unwilling to interfere with an 
assessment of need based on ‘reference to the standard of living during the marriage’ 
unless it is ‘plainly wrong in the sense that it was outside the generous ambit within 
which there is room for reasonable disagreement’.248 This dictum makes it apparent 
that the assessment of need, established with reference to the parties’ previous 
standard of living, is a wholly discretionary exercise. Thus, there remains no clear 
guidance as to the extent that the previous marital standard of living should affect the 
type and quantum of financial orders likely to be made in everyday divorces. The 
consequences of relying on such a discretionary consideration in the majority of asset 
reallocation cases shall be the subject of evaluation in Chapter Three. 
ii) S.25(2)(d) – The Age of Each Party 
The application of this statutory consideration reaffirms that needs provision is highly 
dependant on spousal circumstances. In relation to this subsection, it has been stated 
that ‘it is of importance… particularly where the people concerned are not young, to 
look very closely to see what the effect of the marriage has been’.249 This has enabled 
the judiciary to take into account a range of considerations when assessing the 
relevance of section 25(2)(d), including comparing the financial position of the 
spouse had they not married with their financial position following the divorce.250 
Particular emphasis has been placed on assessing spouses’ pension entitlements and 
their ability to earn their own living.251 
 
Nevertheless, these considerations have not always weighed in favour of the 
economically dependant spouse. The recent Court of Appeal case of Wright v 
Wright,252 evidences this. Mrs Wright, a 51 year old mother, who was in receipt of a 
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periodical payment order, had been expected to start to contribute financially due to 
the impending retirement of her 59 year old ex-husband. However, in the years prior 
to the husband’s application to vary the maintenance order, it was held that she had 
failed to train, start work or ‘save or add to her pension provision’.253 Consequently, 
she had failed to ‘relieve pressure on Mr Wright and his resources… [and failed] to 
prepare for independence’.254 Therefore, Roberts J held that it was appropriate, given 
the husband’s impending retirement, to reduce the maintenance payments over the 
next four years until its cessation.255 This decision was upheld by the Court of 
Appeal.256 
 
This case makes it apparent that this subsection’s inclusion in the MCA 1973 does not 
necessarily require the judiciary to calculate need on the basis of the spouse’s age. 
Instead, it prompts the judiciary to look at all of the surrounding circumstances and 
factors that are connected to the parties’ ages. Financial independence, the ability to 
find employment and pension arrangements are all carefully considered when 
viewing need in the light of this statutory subsection. This reveals that when this 
section is applied through reference to the need principle, the courts are looking 
solely at the spouses’ age, but rather the effect that their age has on their ability to 
support themselves financially. 
iii) S.25(2)(e) – Any Physical or Mental Disability of Either Spouse. 
It is readily apparent that section 25(2)(e) can be a very influential consideration 
when quantifying awards on the basis of need. The Court of Appeal stated that, ‘[i]n 
some cases the needs of the disabled spouse may absorb all the available capital’.257 
This case ultimately held that ‘[t]he needs, both immediate and long term of the 
[disabled] husband have priority and no order should be made for the wife which 
would interfere with providing, within reason, for those needs’.258 This makes it 
apparent that the needs of the disabled spouse will take priority. However, if the 
assets that are awarded to a disabled party extend beyond their needs, the remainder 
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can revert to the other spouse, ‘subject to the s.25 factors’.259 This reasoning 
transposes into modern law a paternalistic policy, similar to that which guided the 
judiciary in the latter half of the twentieth century.260 This demonstrates that the need 
principle under the Fairness Model continues to influence the judiciary to pursue a 
paternalistic policy, through making provision for those needs that the former spouse 
would otherwise be unable to satisfy. 
 
This approach is also supported when one looks to the recent High Court decision of 
SS v NS where Mostyn J stated, ‘[w]here the needs in question are not causally 
connected to the marriage the award should generally be aimed at alleviating 
significant hardship’.261 Clearly, special consideration and provision for the needs of 
a disabled spouse can be justified with regards to this objective of alleviating 
significant hardship. This reasoning has clear implications for the provision of needs 
in everyday divorces. In particular, this approach makes it clear that judges are 
required to not only calculate the extent of needs, but must also balance the parties’ 
ability to provide for their own needs following divorce. Thus, it is apparent that the 
needs principle requires a number of speculative judgements to be made by the court. 
Nevertheless, this is to be expected in an area of law such as this, due to its pivotal 
reliance on the exercise of judicial discretion. 
 
The above evaluation of needs provision through the lens of the statutory provisions 
makes a couple of points evident. Firstly, it is apparent that the weight attributed to 
the various facets of need will depend on the application of judicial discretion. This 
prioritises flexibility and allows the judiciary to reallocate assets in the manner which 
they deem fair, with careful reference being given to the spouses’ circumstances.  
 
What is interesting is that it appears that the need principle is being drawn upon as a 
more general means of protecting financially vulnerable spouses on divorce. Thus, 
sections 25(2)(d) and (e) protect spouses who may be unable to work and more 
broadly section 25(2)(c) seems to be directed towards preventing divorcees from 
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having suffer a greatly reduced standard of living. In this sense, the needs principle 
appears to reflect a paternalistic agenda to protect financially vulnerable spouses from 
suffering unfair financial consequences on divorce. Accordingly, in everyday 
divorces the need principle is of pivotal importance, with reference to the parties’ 
current and future abilities to satisfy their own needs. 
 
Thus, the above sections have concluded that an implicit objective guiding the 
operation of the need principle is the protection of financially vulnerable spouses. 
However, it must be remembered that there are many other considerations that have 
influenced judicial decision-making. Therefore, this thesis will now evaluate the other 
objectives and principles that have been recognised by the judiciary to be relevant to 
the asset reallocation exercise. These matters will be assessed for the extent to which 
they are reconcilable with the need principle, the current context of the law and 
current societal views. This will lead to a conclusion as to whether they should 
continue to receive recognition within the asset reallocation process, and to what 
extent.  
Other Objectives Present Within the Fairness Model 
 
It is now apparent that in everyday divorces, protecting financially vulnerable spouses 
has become a central guiding objective in the asset reallocation process. It is the 
influence of the need principle that has led to the guiding statutory provisions to be 
interpreted compatibly with this objective. However, although the need principle is 
given a priority status in such cases, protecting vulnerable spouses is not the only 
relevant objective influencing applications of judicial discretion. 
 
This section intends to evaluate the various alternative objectives that are present 
within the Farness Model. Whilst, this section is unlikely to identify an overarching 
consensus as to what the objectives of the asset reallocation process should be, 
uncovering some of the debate concerning the objectives that are present within the 
law will help to expose any shortfalls. Thus, this section will focus on identifying 
those competing policies that judges are required to balance. This will be with a view 
to assessing their relative weight and the extent to which they are compatible with the 
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need principle. Brief conclusions will also be drawn as to whether these objectives are 
being given sufficient or excessive weight during the asset reallocation process. These 
conclusions will inevitably have implications for this thesis’ view regarding 
appropriate paths for reform, discussed in Chapter Four. 
 
i) Fairness and the Avoidance of Discrimination 
 
As shown in Chapter One, it is since the beginning of the twentieth century that 
fairness has been considered an important consideration within the asset reallocation 
process on divorce.262 Unsurprisingly, in recent years, it has been endorsed as an 
important objective by academics and the judiciary alike: ‘[e]veryone would accept 
that the outcome... should be fair’.263 Accordingly, this policy consideration has now 
unequivocally reached the status of an overarching objective of the asset reallocation 
process.264. It is for this reason that this thesis classifies the current law as reflecting a 
Fairness Model when reallocating assets on divorce. Any counter argument to the use 
of fairness as a guiding principle goes against an instinctive understanding of what 
the role of the law should be when guiding this process.  
 
However, the controversy with this policy objective does not arise with its 
acceptance; instead it becomes apparent on its application. Lord Nicholls rightly 
recognised that, ‘fairness, like beauty, lies in the eye of the beholder’.265 In a later 
case, he elaborated on this by stating that, fairness ‘is grounded in social and moral 
values… [which] cannot be justified, or refuted, by any objective process of logical 
reasoning’.266 This led Eekelaar to criticise the law on the basis that, ‘[fairness] is 
only presented as a device for structuring the reasoning process: we are not told what 
reasons do or do not justify departing from it’.267 Therefore, it is apparent that the aim 
of a fair division of the assets reflects a notoriously elusive objective, depending upon 
parties’ expectations, burdens and other factors unique to the case. 
                                                 
262See, Gilbey (n 99) 200 (Lord Merrivale). 
263 White (n 5) [24] (Lord Nicholls) See also Freedman(n 152) 135. 
264 Particularly following, White (n 5) (Lord Nicholls). 
265 ibid [1] (Lord Nicholls) 
266 Miller; McFarlane (n 7) [4] (Lord Nicholls). 
267 J Eekelaar, ‘Back to Basics and Forward into the Unknown’ (2001) 31 Fam. Law 30, 32. 
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This is an unsatisfactory position given the current state of the law, where increasing 
numbers of litigants are divorcing without legal advice. The implementation of this 
policy as an overarching objective may have exacerbated the potential for 
disagreement in this context. This is because once litigants learn of this objective their 
sense of entitlement will be based on an entirely individual, subjective interpretation 
of fairness. This may lead to wasted expenditure on litigation if parties have vastly 
divergent interpretations of fairness. Nevertheless, this elusive objective continues to 
guide the exercise of judicial discretion when reallocating assets on divorce, 
regardless of its reliance on subjective social judgments. However, whilst precise 
applications of the fairness objective may lead to inconsistent findings, this is not to 
preclude a reasonable investigation into the requirements of fairness. 
 
One accepted ‘community value that can inform the judicial answer’ as to the 
requirements of fairness is the removal of discrimination.268 Lord Nicholls has clearly 
supported this reasoning by stating, ‘discrimination is the antithesis of fairness.’269 
Accordingly, some members of the judiciary have since read these leading judgments 
and come to the conclusion that, beyond fairness, ‘[t]he only other principle of 
universal application… is non-discrimination’.270 Similarly, Hasday has argued that, 
‘a crucial question in any family law debate has to be whether the particular proposal 
at issue is consistent with equality or not’.271 Thus, the law should have no space for 
discriminatory presumptions stemming from gender. However, beyond this 
requirement to treat all litigants equally, there are no clear requirements of fairness. 
 
In order to implement this policy into practice, the law cannot impose universal rules, 
as these will not achieve fairness in all of the situations that present themselves to the 
court. Inevitably, a degree of flexibility is required that can only be achieved through 
permitting a measure of judicial discretion. However, this recourse to discretion fails 
to assist the average litigant when attempting to reach an out of court settlement or 
evaluating their likely entitlements. Nevertheless, a compromise is required and due 
                                                 
268 Masson, Bailey-Harris and Probert (n 36) 327. 
269 Miller; McFarlane (n 7) [1] (Lord Nicholls). 
270 B v B (n 170) [51] (Wall LJ).  
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to the impossibility of choosing either rules or discretion, Schneider has concluded 
that the correct question is to ask, what would be the best mix of rules and 
discretion?272 Reaching the correct balance between these two countervailing 
adjudicative methods will be the subject of evaluation within Chapter Four. 
 
Owing to the difficulties of defining fairness, there is inherent uncertainty in any 
given case as to the extent that needs provision would be compatible with the 
objective of achieving a fair division of the assets. It has been established above that 
‘the search for fairness largely begins and ends at this stage’.273 This implies that 
fairness dictates that adequate provision must be made for the financially vulnerable 
or dependent spouse. However, it must also be recognised that fairness has ‘two 
faces’ and that any order made ‘must be fair both to the applicant in need and to the 
respondent who must pay’.274 Thus, whilst the need principle may justify financial 
provision for the financially weaker spouse, the court must also consider the extent to 
which it remains fair to enforce the marital obligations beyond divorce. What is often 
the counter-consideration to the need principle shall now be examined.275 
 
ii) Clean Break and the Need to Disentangle Lives 
 
Alongside the need principle, the grant of a clean break order is another modern 
objective that helps to guide the Fairness Model’s approach to reallocating assets on 
divorce. The clean break provisions within section 25A MCA 1973 reflect the policy 
of the law to ‘encourage spouses to avoid bitterness after family-breakdown and to 
settle their money and property problems… begin[ning] a new life which is not 
overshadowed by the relationship which has broken down’.276 This section imposes a 
duty on the court to consider terminating parties’ financial obligations to one another 
when making orders on divorce. Thus, these statutory provisions seek to recognise 
and enforce the finality of divorce and those financial obligations, which stemmed 
from the now legally-terminated relationship. 
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Following the divorce of a childless marriage, enduring provision currently made 
under the need principle sits uncomfortably with the desire to bring a clean break 
between ex-spouses’ financial obligations to one another. Thus, whilst the courts have 
rightly recognised that a clean break may not always be achievable,277 the use of the 
need principle in order to provide a ‘meal ticket for life’ is patently wrong, stretching 
its significance beyond what it can justifiably be intended to achieve.278 As Probert 
argues, ‘an ex-spouse is not an insurer against all hazards’.279 To impose such an 
obligation on former spouses clearly fails to strike the correct balance between these 
competing considerations. Ultimately, the clean break objective weighs against the 
finding that long-standing periodic payments, on the basis of needs, represent a fair 
reallocation of the divisible assets. 
 
This policy may justify orders that are aimed at enabling financially vulnerable 
parties to re-enter the workplace; a ‘rehabilitative’ order.280 Such orders may promote 
the parties to work together in order to reach individual self-sufficiency. Williams 
supports this argument and claims that these orders will give ‘former husbands an 
incentive to provide the child care and other support needs in order to enhance [the 
mother’s] market potential’.281 Thus, such orders help to prevent dependency, as both 
parties will be empowered to earn their own living; thereby, precluding dependence 
on maintenance payments from their ex-spouse. 
 
However, when seeking to balance these considerations, it is important to recognise 
that over the course of a marriage, spouses’ lives and assets become increasingly 
entwined. This is amplified when the marriage has existed over a long period of time 
and with the existence of dependent children. Therefore, it is often not possible to 
sever all maintenance obligations between spouses immediately on divorce and, the 
court must be wary of the importance of periodical payment orders in many everyday 
divorces where capital lump-sum orders are not feasible. Furthermore, as noted 
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above, parties who have been out of work for decades cannot be expected to obtain 
equivalent employment to the spouse who had been working for the duration of the 
marriage. Therefore, in many everyday divorces the Fairness Model will often weigh 
in favour of long-term maintenance orders.  
 
This fact has recently been recognised by the Law Commission as a justification for 
the retention of the need principle within the asset reallocation process.282 They noted 
that over the course of the marriage the parties’ lives become increasingly merged 
and recommended that any reallocation of assets on divorce should be directed 
towards unravelling this fusion i.e. through transitional provision for needs.283 Thus, 
it is important to recognise that in order to reach the correct balance between the need 
principle and a clean break the available financial orders must be applicable with 
sufficient flexibility in order to cater for the myriad of factual scenarios that come 
before the courts. Thus, discretion continues to play an inevitable role in the Fairness 
Model’s approach to asset reallocation.284 
 
Accordingly, the clean break statutory provisions must be recognised in tandem with 
the other statutory considerations when attempting to reach a fair reallocation. This 
was clearly recognised by the draftsmen behind these provisions, given that the 
wording of the statute states that financial obligations should only be terminated when 
it is ‘just and reasonable’ and periodic payments should only cease when it is possible 
for the receiving ex-spouse to, ‘adjust without undue hardship to the termination of 
his or her financial dependence on the other party’.285 Therefore, judges are only 
likely to implement a clean break, when to do so is reasonable and not going to cause 
the financially vulnerable spouse undue hardship. Again the statute is relying on a 
judicial interpretation of these subjective terms in its search for a fair allocation. 
 
Thus, the clean break policy can be seen as an important objective, given the current 
trend of divorce law and the need to prevent the law imposing endless obligations 
between ex-spouses. However, given the importance that has been attributed to 
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protecting vulnerable spouses on divorce, it must be recognised that attaining a clean 
break ‘is inadequate as the sole objective of the law dealing with financial provision 
on divorce’, especially within everyday divorces.286 Instead, its realisation must be 
balanced against the need to protect vulnerable spouses, currently applied through the 
lens of the need principle, under the broader heading of fairness. Chapter Four will 
return to explore the most appropriate means of balancing and attributing these 
competing policies weight, given the current context of the law. 
 
iii) Saving State Expenditure 
 
An obvious, albeit controversial, policy that is currently effecting the operation of the 
Fairness Model is the desire to save State expenditure. This has resulted from the 
fundamental worry that, ‘the community may become responsible for supporting 
individuals (through state benefits) if the agreement reached does not meet the weaker 
party’s needs’.287 In recent years, following important changes to legal aid access, the 
Government is clearly pursuing this policy within the context of asset reallocation 
proceedings. In particular, the Government is dissuading couples from pursuing court 
adjudication whilst the judiciary are preventing divorced parties becoming dependant 
on welfare payments. This section intends to analyse the effects that this policy has 
had on the current asset reallocation process. 
 
As noted above, LASPO 2012 reflected an intention to cut the legal aid budget by 
£350m and with legal aid in private family law disputes bearing the brunt of these 
austerity cuts.288 This has promoted increasing numbers of divorcees to pursue self-
ordered financial settlements,.289 In recent years this policy has helped to reduce the 
number of financial remedy applications to the court by over 23%.290 Whilst the 
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precise figures of savings are unobtainable, inevitably, reduced numbers of cases 
reaching court adjudication will result in reduced costs for the State.  
 
The argument that ex-spouses, rather than the State, should hold the responsibility to 
provide for each other’s needs following divorce, has long been recognised by senior 
members of the judiciary. Most notably, in the House of Lords ruling in Hyman v 
Hyman, Lord Atkin recognised that it is, ‘in the public interest to… prevent the wife 
from being thrown upon the public for support’.291 More recently, whilst writing 
extra-judicially, Baroness Hale argued that it should be impossible to opt-out of 
providing for needs on divorce, as ‘relationship generated needs should be catered for 
within the family rather than by the state’.292 These arguments help to explain both 
the current law’s approach to need provision and why the, ‘first consideration… [is to 
be] given to the welfare, while a minor, of any child of the family’.293 Hence, both 
judicial dicta and current legislative policy support the view that preventing State 
dependence is an important policy within the asset reallocation process. 
 
However, this objective has not received universal acceptance among academics. 
Firstly it should be recognised that ‘[p]rivate domestic labour benefits both the state 
and the men they live with’, thus it appears unreasonable for the state to impose all 
liability for reimbursement onto the private sphere.294 The most condemnatory 
criticisms of this reasoning can be traced back to the 1970’s, following the 
introduction of the irretrievable breakdown ground for divorce. It is from this period 
that recognition began to grow for the fact that divorce ‘carries no stigma [and]… no 
longer is one [spouse] guilty and the other innocent’.295 Thus, the notion of personal 
responsibility for a divorce was removed and the possibility of serial marriages began 
to be accepted. According to Kevin Gray, this ‘abrogation of personal responsibility 
for the success of the marital relationship necessarily entails the socialisation of the 
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maintenance obligation after divorce’.296 This leaves advocates of a need-centric 
approach with a difficult question to answer; what is the justification for imposing 
‘the State’s role as social insurer’ on to an ex-spouse?297 As the Scottish Law 
Commission has recognised: 
 
[t]he whole point of divorce is to sever the relationship of husband and wife… the 
desire to spare the public purse is arguably not a sufficient reason for requiring a man 
to support an impoverished stranger.298 
 
As Gray viewed it, orders made under this policy are ‘in reality an unconstitutional 
form of taxation’.299 Furthermore, this implicit policy of the law is likely to obscure 
the extent of entitlement, thereby, increasing uncertainty for all litigants. Therefore, 
the desire to save State expenditure can be seen to be an inadequate policy on which 
to justify asset reallocation, as there are insufficient reasons justifying imposing the 
state’s obligation of social security onto an ex-spouse. 
 
However, whilst it is apparent the need principle currently furthers this objective, the 
degree to which this policy influences modern needs provision is uncertain. For one, 
the extent to which this policy affects the reasoning of a judge is incalculable. 
Furthermore, it has yet to receive express statutory recognition as a guiding objective. 
Instead, this policy’s influence occurs impliedly when judges interpret the legislative 
intent behind the leading statutory provisions which guide their discretion. 
 
Nevertheless, given the current application of the need principle, it is apparent that 
this policy continues to influence judicial reasoning in everyday cases. Thus, in such 
cases, excessive weight is being attributed to the need to provide for the financially 
vulnerable spouse’s needs out of the assets of the breadwinner. As shown above, this 
is resulting in the care-giving spouse having a priority claim to their ex-spouses’ 
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assets. Accordingly, it is argued that the law is incorrectly ascribing excessive weight 




Another policy that has guided the modern asset reallocation process in everyday 
divorces is the desire to compensate spouses for, ‘any significant prospective 
economic disparity between the parties arising from the way they conducted their 
marriage’.301 This was another of the enunciated rationales of fairness identified in 
Miller; McFarlane.302 This policy is reflected in the statutory consideration, which 
requires judges to have regard to, ‘the contributions which each of the parties has 
made or is likely in the foreseeable future to make to the welfare of the family, 
including any contribution by looking after the home or caring for the family’.303 
 
This principle has generally justified financial provision for the care-giving spouse 
who has given up their job to look after the family’s children and home, thereby 
negatively impacting their earning potential.304 The policy behind this principle 
recognises that ‘men can only earn their incomes and accumulate capital by virtue of 
the division of labour between themselves and their wives… The cock bird can 
feather his nest precisely because he is not required to spend most of his time sitting 
in it’.305 Therefore, the care-giving spouse’s non-financial contributions enabled the 
bread-winning spouse to maximise his or her earning capacity.306 Any such 
‘relationship-generated disadvantage’ may justify imposing a continuing financial 
obligation on to the ex-spouse.307 
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Nevertheless, in recent years, there has been academic and judicial discourse as to 
whether this principle should be recognised as a freestanding objective in the asset 
reallocation process, or, alternatively, merely recognised as a facet of the need 
principle.308 These issues and implications will be returned to in Chapter Three, 
which will question the precise contemporary interaction between the principles of 
compensation and need. 
 
The purpose of looking at these policy objectives which influence the modern asset 
reallocation process has been to assess their relative importance, legitimacy and the 
extent to which they are compatible with the need principle. It is concluded that the 
Fairness Model, as applied in everyday divorces, relies almost exclusively on a 
subjective judgment in order to balance these competing considerations. Furthermore, 
in a bid to save State expenditure, this balance has, ostensibly, become too heavily 
weighted in favour of providing for the financially vulnerable spouse’s needs. These 
findings will now be used to critically evaluate the current prioritisation granted to the 




This chapter has shown that the need principle is of crucial importance under the 
Fairness Model’s approach to reallocating assets in everyday divorces. However, it 
has been recognised that despite the fact that need often acts as the sole guiding 
principle in such cases, there are no strict rules that fetter judicial discretion. 
 
Furthermore, the judicial interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions reveals 
that the judiciary have interpreted the needs principle as providing them with 
considerable discretion to reallocate assets through the subjective lens of fairness. 
Whilst this interpretation can be praised for helping to avoid some of the inequities 
that occurred under the Ecclesiastical and Contractual Models of asset reallocation, 
the absence of any express guidance relating to the policies pursued via these 
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statutory considerations prevents the finding that the need principle is a transparent 
construct. Flexibility, through the application of judicial discretion, reigns supreme.  
 
This has resulted in the judiciary pursuing a model of asset reallocation in everyday 
cases which is based on a laudable objective; fairness. However, the task of balancing 
the statutory considerations as well as the other relevant principles and objectives, 
remains a highly subjective method of pursuing this elusive objective. Accordingly, 
an evaluation of the negative consequences that stem from this legal position will be 
the subject of the next chapter. Reform proposals will then be evaluated for the extent 
to which they are able to successfully balance the competing requirements of legal 
certainty and flexibility of application. This will lead to a conclusion as to which 
proposal provides the most appropriate balance, given the current context of the law.  
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Now that the need principle’s role under the Fairness Model has been recognised, 
this chapter will identify the prevailing criticisms of the law’s current approach. 
Inevitably, this will begin by looking at the MCA given that many of the specific 
criticisms relating to the use of the need principle are symptomatic of broader 
problems within this piece of legislation. 
 
This thesis will then assess the specific criticisms relating to the need principle. This 
chapter will attribute these criticisms to a number of influences, including the 
principle’s historical development, its position under the current Fairness Model, the 
judicial interpretations applied to this principle and the current landscape in which 
the asset reallocation exercise operates within. 
 
It will end with an assessment of the Law Commission’s recent Report into this area. 
This section will question whether the recommendations raised in this Report provide 
a satisfactory response to the aforementioned criticisms. In turn, this will allow this 
thesis to improve upon the Law Commission’s findings where it can be shown that 
they omitted to give satisfactory weight to any of the notable criticisms raised against 
this principle’s current operation. 
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This chapter will analyse the problems with the judicial reliance on satisfying parties’ 
needs when reallocating assets in the everyday divorce under the current Fairness 
Model. The focus will be on uncovering the causes and extent of the criticisms that 
surrounds the need principles operation in this context. Thus, the negative 
consequences that these criticisms will have on all litigants will be evaluated. The 
focus of this chapter will remain on everyday divorces, given the importance the 
needs principle holds in such cases. However, reference will also be made to big 
money cases, in order to present a comprehensive evaluation of this principle’s 
contemporary use. 
 
This thesis has already concluded that owing to the absence of a Parliamentary 
response to the absence of legal guidance in this area, the senior judiciary have 
become the leading authority as to the law’s application and development. This has 
occurred through various judicial interpretations of the legislative provisions. 
Therefore, this chapter will also identify the deficiencies that have developed as a 
result of the law’s incremental development through judicial precedent. When 
consolidated with the aforementioned criticisms of the law, this thesis will provide a 
comprehensive assessment of the legal deficiencies that justify some means of 
reform. The most appropriate response to these legal deficiencies will then be 
analysed in Chapter Four. 
 
It must be noted from the beginning that this chapter aims to provide its evaluation 
with careful reference to the current context of the law. Thus, it will be shown that, 
given the recent legal aid cuts,309 the difficulties facing parties involved in such 
litigation have been emphasised. This is because, with the removal of public funding 
for legal representation in private family law disputes, professional legal advice and 
judicial adjudication is now an unaffordable luxury for most of these cases.  This 
leaves many to settle out of court, with little guidance as to how to allocate assets. 
Accordingly, the law must respond to the fact that, now more than ever, uncertainties 
within the law have the potential to prevent a fair division of the assets. 
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The chapter will conclude with an evaluation of the Law Commission’s most recent 
report into this area of law.310 This will draw upon the understanding of the role that 
the need principle has assumed under the Fairness Model, developed in previous 
chapters. It will accordingly question whether this Report provides a satisfactory 
recommendation for reform given the criticisms of the law that are now to be 
identified. 
 
Overarching Problems with the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 
 
In order for this chapter to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the need principle, 
as it is applied in everyday divorces, it is important to firstly recognise some of the 
deficiencies with the leading statute, which governs the operation of judicial 
discretion in this area.  This is because the deficiencies surrounding the need principle 
are largely symptomatic of two more general problems with the leading statute 
governing asset reallocation on divorce. The following sections intend to identify 
these two statutory criticisms. In an attempt to provide a response to these problems, 
the Law Commission produced an in-depth Report, following a public consultation, 
recommending the introduction of guidance as to the operation and parameters of this 
principle.311 Reference will be made to some aspects of this report in this section in 
order to support criticisms of the contemporary approach to asset reallocation on 
divorce. This Report’s recommendations for reform will also be evaluated towards 
the end of this chapter. 
 
i) Absence of a Clear Statutory Objective 
 
The key statutory provisions relating to financial relief on divorce are contained 
within Part II of the MCA 1973. The majority of sections within this part of the 
statute are concerned with the types of orders which can be made by the judiciary on 
divorce. It also provides a number of matters that the judiciary must have regard to 
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when making such orders on divorce.312 However, no attention is paid to outlining a 
specific objective to be achieved, or the ‘financial position which is to be restored’, 
when making such financial orders on divorce.313 As Chapter Two has shown, the 
only way to extrapolate the objectives of the financial reallocation process from the 
statute is to do so through implication. Therefore, one has to look at the matters which 
the courts are required to consider and, drawing upon contemporary judicial 
interpretation of these subsections, form a conclusion as to why such matters are 
included as considerations.314  
 
A similar uncertainty that arises from the key statutory provisions is the absence of 
any guidance as to the weight to be attributed to the various statutory considerations. 
This naturally has key significance when understanding the weight to be attributed to 
the need principle. Whilst need is one of the statutory factors to be considered, it must 
be questioned whether there is any theoretical justification for it assuming such a 
prominent role in the asset division process on divorce.315 
 
ii) Absence of a Hierarchy of the Statutory Considerations 
 
As noted in Chapter Two, section 25 MCA 1973 provides a number of considerations 
judges must have reference to when reallocating assets on divorce. However, despite 
needs provision often being the primary and sole consideration in the search for a fair 
division in everyday divorces, the courts have consistently emphasised that there is no 
hierarchy governing the order in which the statutory considerations are to be 
applied.316 This fact was identified by the House of Lords in Piglowska v Piglowski 
where Lord Hoffmann stated that the weight attributable to each consideration ‘must 
depend upon the facts of the particular case’.317  
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315 See MCA 1973, s.25(2)(b). 
316 White (n 5) [36] (Lord Nicholls); Miller; McFarlane (n 7) [144] (Baroness Hale). 
317 (1999) 1 WLR 1360, 1370 (Lord Hoffmann). 
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This reliance on judicial discretion as a means of attributing weight to the variety of 
statutory considerations, fails to provide an accessible formula for litigants. Thus, it 
has been rightly recognised that ‘the assessment of needs is essentially an exercise of 
judgment and discretion’.318 This is a relatively inaccessible form of law for all 
litigants, especially those who are self-represented, who may struggle to find, 
interpret and apply the relevant judicial dicta.  
 
Consequences of these Legislative Omissions 
As has been demonstrated, the need principle is of paramount significance in the 
majority of divorces, yet there remains no clear statutory definition or objective 
guiding its application. Consequently, practitioners who are engaged with applying 
the principle on a daily basis have stated that, ‘to say that the uncertainty is 
concerning is an understatement’.319 Similarly, Eekelaar has noted that the 
discretionary-based approach of section 25 allows for a variety of justifiable orders to 
be made.320  
 
This absence of a clear statutory objective or a hierarchy of the statutory 
considerations has led the Law Commission to state that, ‘[a] member of the public 
reading section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973… [will] not know what they 
are supposed to achieve’.321 This is because the statutory considerations may justify 
entirely different applications of judicial discretion.322 Consequently, when self-
ordering their finances on divorce, litigants may fail to reach a consensus as to how 
much weight to attribute to the need principle in order to ensure that their self-ordered 
settlement reflects a fair division of the available assets.323 This prevents litigants 
from gaining a precise understanding as to their likely entitlements, thereby, 
promoting further unnecessary adversarial and costly litigation. This is clearly 
                                                 
318 Alexander Chandler, ‘”What is the Measure of Maintenance?” How does the court quantify spousal 
periodical payments?’ (Family Law Week, 2009) 
<http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed33597> accessed 12 Jan 2015. 
319 Marshall (n 201) 324. 
320 J Eekelaar, ‘Should Section 25 be Reformed?’ [1998] Fam Law 469, 470 
321 Law Commission (n 18) para 3.4. 
322 Cf MCA 1973, s.25(2)(b) and s.25A. 
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incompatible with the Ministry of Justice’s policy objectives to reduce court delays 
and promote disputes to be resolved outside of court.324 
 
Instead, if a clear statutory objective of the reallocation exercise was enunciated, all 
litigants would be provided with a clearer understanding of the rationales justifying 
the division of their assets on divorce. The Law Commission has supported this 
argument, stating that such an objective could provide litigants with ‘an indication of 
the outcome that they should be aiming for’.325 This could enable litigants to calculate 
with greater accuracy the duration and amount of an award that is likely to be 
justified through the court’s application of the need principle. Consequently, as 
spouses will have a greater understanding of the brackets of their likely entitlements, 
there would be a reduced likelihood of proceedings being escalated to court 
adjudication, 
 
However, as the law stands, such an objective does not exist to guide the application 
of the need principle in everyday divorces. Consequently, the need principle’s 
operation in such divorces can be subject to a number of criticisms. Identifying the 
most prominent deficiencies that surround the principle’s operation will form the 
central focus of the remainder of this chapter. It will be shown that many of the 
deficiencies surrounding the need principle’s current operation can be directly 










                                                 
324 See, Ministry Of Justice, ‘Making the family justice system more effective’ (14 June 2013) 
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Needs Provision on Divorce: A Flawed Principle 
 
As Chapter Two has shown, judicial developments over the past decade have 
attempted to ‘formulate guidelines that would facilitate the settlement of ancillary 
relief cases generally’.326 However, the judicial development of the law has been 
greatly criticised and many view this area of law as a source of great confusion.327 
Consequently, in everyday divorces, where the need principle is paramount, litigants 
are unaware as to how the judiciary will apply this principle when dividing their 
assets. With this in mind, this thesis will turn to examine those criticisms that relate 
directly to the need principle. Thus, this section will identify and evaluate those 
aspects of needs provision in which legal developments have failed to produce 
satisfactory results. This will help support arguments for reform that will be raised in 
Chapter Four. 
 
i) Judicial Embellishment: Generous Interpretation of Needs 
 
The precise parameters of the needs principle remains an area of great contention. 
This has occurred following some members of the judiciary applying an expanded 
interpretation of this principle. More specifically, there is a divergence of approach as 
to whether the principle demands provision for ‘strict’ needs or ‘needs generously 
interpreted’.328 This latter term has been used in cases involving considerable assets 
as a justification for a substantial award on the basis of needs. For example, in 
McCartney v Mills McCartney the sharing principle was subsumed within this 
concept of the wife's needs, and after a short marriage she received an award of £16.5 
million.329 Similarly, as discussed above, some cases have absorbed the principle of 
compensation into a generous assessment of needs.330 
 
                                                 
326 Masson, Bailey-Harris and Probert, (n 36) 365. 
327 See e.g. S Davis, ‘Equal Sharing: A Judicial Gloss Too Far?’ [2008] Fam. Law 428; J Eekelaar, 
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328 See, Miller; McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24 [144] (Baroness Hale). 
329 [2008] EWHC 401 (Fam), [2008] 1 FLR 1508. 
330 See VB v JP [2008] EWHC 112 (Fam); [2008] 1 FLR 742. 
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This expansion of the needs principle has no statutory recognition and has received 
criticism from some members of the judiciary. Ward LJ stated that: 
 
Confusion will be avoided if resort is had to the precise language of the statute, not… 
upon need always having to be ‘generously interpreted’.331 
 
This criticism rightly recognises that this expansion detracts from the principle’s 
transparency and, thus, the widening militates against the formation of a predictable 
principle that is capable of comprehension by those litigating in everyday divorces. 
The press reported comments of Thorpe LJ during a recent high net worth case, 
Davies v Davies332, can be seen to reflect a more appropriate recognition of the need 
principle, namely, ‘any mention of needs is completely inappropriate in a case of this 
scale’ and ‘we only mention needs when there isn't a lot to go around’.333 
 
There are two main problems that stem from this expansion of the needs principle. 
Firstly, it permits judges to justify any award with the rubberstamp of ‘needs 
generously interpreted’. As shown in Chapter Two, the needs principle is often the 
only principle guiding judicial discretion in an everyday divorce. Therefore, to allow 
the judiciary to interpret the principle expansively at will, without reference to 
external legal authority, ultimately allows for a completely unfettered exercise of 
discretion. As Chandler has noted, ‘like the overarching aim of “fairness”, 
“generosity” is a subjective and elusive concept that provides no quantifiable 
guidance as to the court's proper approach’.334 Consequently, it precludes litigants in 
person and practitioners from making an accurate assessment as to the awards that 
can be expected on the basis of needs. This may lead to further litigation and the 
negative consequences associated with this in the context of divorce proceedings. 
Therefore, if the Government wants to achieve its aim to ‘discourage unnecessary and 
                                                 
331 Robson (n 170) [43] (Ward LJ). 
332 [2012] EWCA Civ 1641. 
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adversarial litigation at public expense’ they would be well advised to clarify the 
boundaries of the asset reallocation process in everyday divorce cases.335 
 
The second problem that stems from this judicial embellishment is the incidental 
effect it is having in everyday cases. In Charman v Charman (No 4) Sir Mark Potter P 
stated: 
 
It is clear that, when the result suggested by the needs principle is an award of 
property greater than the result suggested by the sharing principle, the former result 
should in principle prevail.336 
 
However, it is apparent that in everyday divorces concerned with limited divisible 
assets, a ‘generous’ interpretation of needs will frequently justify an award greater 
than that proposed through the sharing principle. Whilst, a ‘generous’ interpretation 
of needs has generally been reserved for those cases deemed to have sufficient assets 
for this purpose, there remains no guidance as to the threshold for this expanded 
principle to bite. Undoubtedly, this is likely to lead to inflated expectations as to 
entitlements on the basis of needs.  
 
Furthermore, in the context of everyday divorces, this expanded interpretation 
arguably represents an unacceptable judicial gloss on the governing statute. It was in 
McFarlane v McFarlane that the judiciary recognised that the rationales of fairness, 
‘should not be given a free standing life, interpretation or application as if they were 
themselves part of the statute rather than descriptions of the approach to the reasoning 
to be used in applying the statute to achieve a fair result.’337 This has led some 
academics to claim that, ‘needs (s.25(2)(b)) cannot, as a matter of law, dominate the 
exercise’.338 However, if needs are to be ‘generously interpreted’ in everyday 
divorces, then such provision is likely to dominate the Fairness Model’s approach to 
an even greater degree than it already does.339 Therefore, this judicial expansion of 
                                                 
335 Ministry of Justice, ‘Reform of Legal Aid In England and Wales: Government Response’ (Cm 
8072, 2011) 4. 
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the principle should be rejected on the grounds that it is a judicial development that 
unacceptably interferes with the operation of the governing statute and the legislative 
intent that is inherent within its provisions. 
 
Thus, it is argued that this expanded concept of needs ‘generously interpreted’ should 
have no applicability to everyday divorces, where the judiciary are already struggling 
‘to stretch modest finite resources so far as possible to meet [a strict interpretation] of 
the parties' needs’.340 This will prevent unrealistic expectations and preclude litigants 
from mistakenly relying on this expanded principle when calculating their needs in 
cases where it is wholly inapplicable.  
 
ii) Outdated Statutory Considerations: Standard of Living (s.25(2)(c)) 
 
Another criticism of the modern interpretation and application of the need principle 
looks to the historical development of the principle. When assessing parties’ needs on 
divorce, a key statutory consideration is the parties’ former standard of living.341 As 
Chapter One demonstrated, this has been an important consideration when calculating 
maintenance, long before the introduction of the MCA 1973. However, it will now be 
argued that no-one should be entitled to a sustained standard of living after divorce, 
as this consideration is no longer justified, given current understandings of marriage. 
Furthermore, it will be recognised that this consideration is incompatible with the 
trend of modern divorce law. 
 
As identified in Chapter One, the initial recognition of this consideration on divorce 
stemmed from the ‘indivisible spiritual unity’ that resulted from marriage.342 
Therefore, the financial obligations that were created on marriage were considered 
equally indissoluble under the Ecclesiastic Model of asset reallocation on divorce. 
Recognition of the ‘standard of living’ consideration was continued by the secular 
courts when providing expectation damages for the innocent spouse, following a 
breach of the civil contract of matrimony:  
                                                 
340 Miller; McFarlane (n 7) [12] (Lord Nicholls). 
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[W]here the breaking up of the family life has been caused by the fault of the 
respondent, the Court… ought to place the petitioner and the children in… the same 
position as if the marriage had not been broken up. 343 
 
However, currently marriage is dissoluble on the basis that it has ‘broken down 
irretrievably’, and the statutory clean break provisions signal that there is legislative 
support for the ending of perennial financial obligations on divorce.344 Therefore, it is 
apparent that marriage is no longer viewed as an indissoluble sacrament. Nor is 
marriage viewed as a contract giving rise to a right to damages on divorce.345  
 
As the previous chapters have concluded, the need principle has been developed with 
the intention of protecting vulnerable spouses. It was not developed with the intention 
of entitling parties to a sustained standard of living beyond divorce.346 Thus, the 
justifications for maintaining spousal standards of living are no longer legally 
relevant; having been based on the historic Ecclesiastic or Contractual Models of 
asset reallocation. Hence, attempting to provide a sustained standard of living should 
no longer be justified through recourse to the need principle. 
 
Miles has also disagreed with the use of this consideration as, ‘the marital standard of 
living [is] too slippery a concept’.347 This subsection requires the judge to look at all 
aspects of the parties’ lives which is an inevitably subjective assessment. Therefore, it 
places excessive reliance upon judicial discretion to determine the standard of living 
and the needs that stem from this standard. Equally, it should be recognised that in the 
context of everyday divorces, this subsection will give litigants an excuse to pursue 
an award that is generally unobtainable. This is because, as noted in Chapter Two, 
‘the assets that had sustained a particular standard of living for one household [are] 
usually insufficient to sustain that level for two households’.348  
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Baroness Deech has argued that this consideration should have limited weight as, ‘no 
one should be entitled to a standard of living for all time depending on whom they 
marry’.349 Similarly, members of the judiciary have remarked, ‘it was wholly 
unrealistic to expect to go on living at the rate at which she perceived she was 
living’.350 Nevertheless, Baroness Deech views this consideration as contributing to 
such expectations, as she argues that the current law dissuades women from careers, 
prompting them to ‘find a footballer’.351  
 
An argument may be made in a case involving a child arrangement order stipulating 
that the child will spend time residing with both parents,352 that the standard of living 
should remain the same between the houses on the basis of the need to avoid 
detrimental disruption to a child’s wellbeing.353 However, it is submitted that it is 
only as an extension of the section 25(1) MCA 1973 duty to protect a child’s welfare 
needs that the previous standard of living should continue to be attributed any weight. 
 
Recognition of these points would help to rein in interpretations of the need principle, 
thereby making it a more accessible term for all litigants to apply. The potential to 
remove this statutory consideration from the asset reallocation process will be 
evaluated in Chapter Four. 
 
iii) Inconsistency with the Clean Break Policy 
 
Some academics have criticised the continued provision for needs after divorce from 
a theoretical perspective. As Chapter One has shown, the general theoretical direction 
of recent divorce reforms have increasingly reflected the acceptability of both divorce 
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and the termination of financial ties between ex-spouses. Many view continued 
adherence to the need principle as inconsistent with this trend. 
 
As recognised above, the common law maintenance obligation was ‘formulated in the 
shadow of religious dogma which asserted that marriage constituted an indivisible 
spiritual unity’.354 Accordingly, in a secular society where the law has moved away 
from the Ecclesiastic Model of asset reallocation and divorce is both socially and 
legally permitted, such theological considerations should now be considered 
inappropriate. Instead, the modern divorce law was ‘designed precisely to allow the 
parties in a broken marriage to make a fresh start in life’.355  
 
It was a result of arguments, such as Gray’s, gaining traction that led to the 
introduction of section 25A(2) into the MCA 1973.356 Section 25A(2) requires that 
the judiciary consider how long it should take for the financially dependent spouse to 
‘adjust without undue hardship to the termination of his or her financial dependence 
on the other party’ when making a periodical payment order.357 However, it has been 
suggested that this subsection is directed towards ending dependency but ‘does not 
apply with the same force’ when periodical payment orders are made in attempt to 
reach a fair result.358 Thus, it is apparent that the Fairness Model of asset reallocation 
gives priority to achieving fairness over an attempt to realise a clean break. Again this 
reaffirms this thesis’ view that the law governing asset reallocation on divorce be 
classified as pursuing a Fairness Model.  
 
Thus, it is apparent that any conflict between the theoretical requirement to bring 
financial obligations between spouses to a swift end and judicial notions of fairness is 
inevitably solved by giving primary appreciation to the ‘goal of overall fairness’.359 
Therefore, the weight attributed to both need provision and granting a clean break is 
entirely dependent on the exercise of an extensive judicial discretion. Yet again, there 
is an absence of accessible information guiding litigants as to the likely weight that is 
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to be attributed to this consideration. Given the rise of cases settled out of court, there 
is now an increased desire for a transparent, structured approach to the judicial 
balancing exercise. Therefore, any proposal for reform will have to provide a 
structured response as to how balance the clean break policy with the need to protect 
vulnerable spouses.  
 
iv) Senior Court Adjudication only Utilised in ‘Big Money’ Cases 
 
A pragmatic criticism has been levelled at the use of incremental case law as a means 
of developing the need principle. Owing to the costs involved, it is the minority of 
divorce proceedings that ever rely upon court adjudication to determine how assets 
are to be reallocated.360 It is both impossible and inappropriate for parties to spend 
thousands of pounds on legal costs and trial adjudication in everyday divorces, where 
only limited assets are available for division.  
 
This point is further reinforced when one considers the financial costs required for 
cases to reach appellate, precedent-setting courts. Consequently, the senior courts, 
whose statutory interpretations lead to guidance for the lower courts, are more likely 
to adjudicate on cases involving substantial assets. Therefore, such judicially 
developed law is only directly applicable to divorces with similar circumstances. 
Comparatively, in everyday divorces, the only guidance provided in relation to the 
appropriate application of the need principle, stems from infrequent obiter dicta.361 
This has left a dearth of guidance as to how limited assets should be split, despite the 
fact that, ‘those needs cases are probably in even greater need of guidance from the 
higher courts than are the big money cases’.362  
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Chapter Two has already shown that the sparse obiter comments that are relevant to 
everyday divorces have established that the need principle will be the primary, if not 
only, consideration when reallocating assets in such cases.363 However, the existing 
case law has left a notable absence of express, detailed, senior judicial scrutiny of the 
precise application of this principle in everyday divorces. As exemplified in Chapter 
Two, an understanding of the constituent elements and policies justifying and guiding 
the likely application of this principle, can only be identified through a careful 
examination of the case law. 
 
v) Uncertain Relationship between Need and other Judicial Principles 
 
In the face of the aforementioned legislative omissions, the judiciary have 
consistently attempted to declare both the existence of an overriding objective of the 
asset reallocation process on divorce,364 as well as to announce some of the 
constituent principles required to obtain it.365 However, the interaction between these 
principles has not always been clear, as the senior judiciary have recognised that 
‘there can be no invariable rule on this’.366 Consequently, the search to expose and 
explain such underlying principles has been compared to: 
 
[a] frenzied butterfly hunter in a tropical jungle trying to entrap a rare and elusive 
butterfly using a net full of holes. As soon as it appears to have been caught it escapes 
again and the pursuit continues.367 
 
Furthermore, as noted above, the fact that senior court adjudication is only obtainable 
where there are substantial assets worth fighting over, means that those judicially 
enunciated guiding principles have arisen in relation to such cases. Therefore, their 
applicability to everyday divorces has been described as ‘not tested in the law 
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reports… [leaving us] to speculate about how the principles are, and should be, 
applied to more “normal” families’.368   
 
Nevertheless, this section will attempt to draw some conclusions regarding the 
relationships between the principles of need and that of compensation and sharing, 
when drawn upon in everyday divorces. This will be with a view to understanding 
when the principles apply and how this could be clarified for litigants, particularly 
those who are self represented. 
 
a) Needs and Compensation 
As noted in Chapter Two, the extent to which these principles remain separate is a 
contentious issue. From the moment these two principles were introduced, Lord 
Nicholls recognised the similarities between them. In particular, he warned that they 
‘often overlap in practice, so double-counting has to be avoided’.369 Thus, there has 
been a move towards recognising that: 
 
[i]n cases other than big money cases, where… the wife has plainly sacrificed her 
own earning capacity, compensation will rarely be amenable to consideration as a 
separate element… compensation is best dealt with by a generous assessment of her 
continuing needs.370 
 
This view that compensation should be subsumed into a more generous assessment of 
need has been supported by the Law Commission. In their most recent Report on 
Matrimonial Property, Needs and Agreements, it was suggested that, ‘compensation 
may simply make explicit what has always been regarded as an element of need, that 
is, making provision, on divorce, for the long-term financial consequences of the 
marriage’.371 However, this amalgamation has not received universal acceptance from 
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within the judiciary, and if it is to be accepted, the above criticisms regarding 
applying a generous interpretation to the need principle would be amplified.  
 
In McFarlane v McFarlane, Charles J noted that, ‘the compensation principle is fully 
in play’.372 He justified the principle’s continued relevance on the basis that it 
‘provides an additional and helpful basis of reasoning for a spouse to continue to 
share in the earning resource of the other spouse after the end of the marriage’.373 
However, this reasoning could equally be raised in justification for a wider 
understanding of the need principle. Therefore, he fails to justify the retention of 
compensation as a stand-alone principle. 
 
Further criticism of the compensation principle has come from the dictum of Mostyn 
J, in SA v PA (Pre-Marital Agreement: Compensation).374 Whilst this case was 
concerned with the division of substantial assets, Mostyn J outlined five separate 
reasons to support his belief that the principle of compensation is always ‘extremely 
problematic and challenging both conceptually and legally'.375 Notably, he stated that, 
‘it is hard to identify any case where compensation has been separately reflected as a 
premium or additional element [to the principle of needs]’.376 This again suggests that 
compensation should be subsumed within the need principle. Whilst he went on to 
accept that he was bound by the House of Lords in Miller; McFarlane, he attempted 
to limit the separate application of the principle of compensation to such a small 
category of cases as to make it almost irrelevant.377 It remains to be seen whether his 
constraints will receive judicial favour.  
 
Consequently, the extent to which compensation continues to exist as a separate 
principle remains uncertain and requires clarification. It appears that the Law 
Commission are advocating the absorption of the policy justifying the compensation 
principle into a generous interpretation of needs, in an attempt to pay better 
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recognition to the trend occurring within the case law.378 However, even if this 
development received statutory recognition, it would fail to provide assistance for 
litigants when providing for needs on divorce. Instead, it would merely become 
another facet of needs to accommodate, leading to further subjective questions 
regarding how generous the provision of needs should be. Equally, by subsuming 
further considerations into the principle of needs, the practitioner’s role of providing a 
likely bracket of outcome, becomes more difficult. Clearly, some form of 
authoritative guidance is required in order to clarify the policy considerations that are 
relevant to the need principle. The precise content and most appropriate form of such 
guidance or rules will be the subject of evaluation within Chapter Four. 
 
b) Needs and Sharing 
The policy behind the sharing principle was introduced into the law via a crosscheck 
against discrimination, following White v White.379 This facet of fairness requires an 
equal division of the matrimonial assets, ‘unless some other good reason is shown to 
do otherwise’.380 On the interaction of these divergent principles, the court has 
appeared to advocate a starting point of equal sharing, before modifying this sum on 
the basis of need.381 This approach intends to ‘bypass ultimately irrelevant 
argument[s] about “need”, however that concept is defined and assessed’.382 Whilst 
this structure may help to prevent unnecessary litigation in big money cases, it has 
been criticised when applied to everyday cases on the basis that, ‘the fact that the 
parties' needs will be determinative may make notionally starting at 50:50 appear 
pointless’.383 It may also place the burden of justifying a departure from the sharing 
principle on the party with the greatest need. 
 
However, unprincipled psychological considerations have been found to exist which 
effect the parties’ bargaining positions when reallocating asset on divorce. Davis et al 
found that the belief that the family’s financial resources belong to the breadwinner 
                                                 
378 E.g. see, VB (n 330) [59] (Potter P). 
379 White (n 5). 
380 ibid [150] (Lord Nicholls).  
381 See, Charman (No 4) (n 6) [77 (c)] (Sir Mark Potter P). 
382 Miles (n 368) 386. 
383 ibid. 
94 
had a strong psychological influence on both parties during mediation proceedings.384 
Furthermore, Fehlberg found that ‘[e]ven amongst couples with a philosophy of 
sharing, a sense of “ownership”, or entitlement, is associated with having earned the 
money’.385  
 
The order of applying the need and sharing principles raised in White can thus be 
supported on the basis that this notional starting point helps to avoid such 
psychological influences from affecting the parties’ expectations of entitlement. 
Specifically, it helps to avoid the stigma that the courts are ‘giving’ to one spouse 
‘property which “belongs” to the former’.386 Therefore, this order of applying these 
two principles can be praised as it helps to militate against this unprincipled 
psychological influence unduly affecting a parties’ bargaining position. However, a 
rule or legal presumption to this effect does not exist, and it remains entirely within 
judicial discretion to disregard this principle when ordering provision for need. 
Chapter Four will evaluate the possibility of enacting such a rule or presumption, 
requiring the equal sharing of asset on divorce.  
 
vi) Needs Principle’s Failure to Protect Vulnerable Spouses 
 
The final criticism of the modern need principle relates to the principle’s failure to 
achieve the objective that the judiciary have implicitly attributed to it. As has been 
established in Chapter Two, when the need principle is analysed through the lens of 
the statute, with reference to subsequent judicial commentary, it becomes apparent 
that the need principle is intended to protect financially vulnerable spouses from 
suffering unfair financial consequences on divorce. However, there exists much 
socio-economic research to suggest that this is not being achieved.387 For example, 
when looking at the British Household Panel Survey, Fisher and Lowe noted that 
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following divorce, ‘the income of men increases by about 23%, whilst that of women 
falls substantially; 31%, after controlling for household size’.388  
 
These figures may be explained with reference to women’s biological position as the 
child-bearer, combined with social expectations relating to motherhood. This 
generally results in the wife giving up her employment and forgoing ‘investment in 
her own career’, in order to care for the children and home.389 Furthermore, on 
divorce, ‘mothers overwhelmingly retain physical custody of their children’, which, 
inevitably interferes with any hopes of continued labour force participation.390 As a 
result, ‘the vast majority of divorced women [are] in a financially more precarious 
position that their former husbands’.391 Various socio-economic studies into the 
financial effects of divorce have consistently reiterated this conclusion.392 
 
Accordingly, it is apparent that the need principle is failing to pay sufficient respect to 
the non-financial contributions of such care-givers. Thus, any reform proposal should 
demonstrate an astute awareness ‘that marriage is about teamwork, sharing and 
equality’.393 Chapter Four will turn to assess the most appropriate means through 
which the law could attempt to implement these principles into practice in the 
everyday divorce. It is argued that the recognition of these principles may lead to a 
fairer division, by paying heed to the context in which marital investments and 
sacrifices occur. 
 
This thesis has now evaluated the specific criticisms relating to the contemporary 
application of the needs principle. It will now turn to assess the implications of these 
criticisms. This will involve questioning whether the aforementioned legal 
deficiencies are being overstated. It will conclude with a statement as to whether legal 
reform can be justified. 
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Consequences of these Inadequacies 
Given the law’s current reliance on judicial discretion, it has been criticised on the 
grounds that there are limited obstacles to prevent a judge basing their judgments on 
the ‘diversity of community views’.394 This point has been recognised by Bailey-
Harris, who has argued that: 
 
…the pattern of the law’s development fails to please. It is impossible to predict when 
an articulated statutory principle will be seized upon in a judgment, or when a new 
sub-principle will be invented, or when the search for principle will simply be 
disclaimed.395 
 
On the other hand, Lord Hoffmann has argued that despite the fact that many of the 
decisions in these proceedings may rest on ‘value judgments on which reasonable 
people may differ… [this is] an acceptable price to pay for the flexibility of the 
discretion conferred by the Act of 1973’.396 Similarly, Dowding has argued that the 
primary advantage of this system is that it allows the judiciary to ‘tailor the 
arrangements to the very specific circumstances of the individual family’, thereby, 
promoting the Fairness Model.397 
 
These arguments represent counter-positions in the discretion-transparency debate. 
This was described by Bailey-Harris et al. as:  
 
[t]he difficulty of steering between the Scylla of too wide a discretion vested in the 
courts (inevitably involving a high degree of diversity in judicial application, 
unpredictability of outcome and high costs in cases involving protracted litigation, as 
well as difficulties for practitioners in offering advice to clients) and the Charybdis of 
too-rigid a statutory formulation of principle (potentially productive both of injustice 
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in the individual case and of increased litigation in rebuttal or by way of 
exception).398 
 
Unsurprisingly, Lord Hoffmann, as a senior appellate judge, showed great trust in the 
ability of the judiciary to reach a fair decision, without the need for express lucid 
objectives or definitions to fetter the judiciary from applying their own value 
judgments. Alternatively, Bailey-Harris et al recognise the uncertainty that arises 
through this method of judging. Similarly, Eekelaar has pointed to evidence, which 
shows the difficulty that practitioners have when attempting to assess the outcomes of 
cases.399 Consequently, given the same facts, two judges may justifiably come to two 
differing conclusions. This is a worrying position of the law as it fails to inform 
litigants of their likely entitlements. Therefore, it is likely to deter settlements as both 
parties may see a potential benefit to be gained from court adjudication, particularly 
with reference to their personal interpretations of a ‘fair’ reallocation. 
 
Furthermore, in the context of the need principle, Diduck has argued that, ‘while 
solicitors may be able to see a broad trend in the law toward meeting needs, details in 
the way in which needs would be assessed and met remain variable and 
indeterminate’.400 Thus, even where parties have the benefit of legal representation, 
this is not to preclude unfounded expectations as to the level of provision that is 
justified on the basis of the need principle. This suggests that steps should be taken to 
assist both practitioners and litigants to develop a coherent understanding of the 
extent of entitlement to needs-provision on divorce.  
 
However, Hitching’s study into family law practitioners came to an alternative 
conclusion. Of note, she found that there was a ‘definite preference amongst 
practitioners for dealing with certain courts… [which was] based on predictability 
and knowledge/experience of judicial approaches within that court’.401 She cited this 
as being a ‘classic example’ of Galanter’s ‘repeat player’ concept; where the rules are 
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learnt through experience.402 Therefore, whilst judicial approaches may vary, the 
mantra ‘“know thy judge” proves to be an essential non-[legal] influence on the 
ancillary relief process’ and reflects the fact that there exists a ‘certain amount of 
consistency when it comes to judicial approaches in a certain area’.403 This led to 
Hitchings’ overarching conclusion; ‘in the everyday case where needs dominate… 
advice given to clients is pretty consistent, subject to local court culture and the 
practicalities of the individual case’.404 This view has been supported by Dowding 
who has argued that, ‘competent lawyers should be able to assess within a reasonable 
band the likely award for the client even within the bounds of a discretionary 
system’.405 Thus, these academics view the law as sufficiently clear, in order for 
practitioners to be able to give a client a reasonable expectation as to what they will 
receive.   
 
However, whilst this conclusion mitigates from the claim that the law is highly 
uncertain in the everyday case involving ‘competent’ practitioners who are aware of 
the approaches taken by local judges, it fails to prevent the argument that the law is in 
need of clarification. This conclusion is a result of the increasing numbers of litigants 
who are proceeding to court or reaching out-of-court settlements without legal 
representation or knowledge, following the legal aid cuts recognised above. As the 
Law Commission has noted, ‘it is not realistic to insist that lack of clarity about 
financial needs is acceptable because the term is well understood by lawyers’.406 
Therefore, a strong conclusion can be drawn justifying reform that would help clarify 
this area of law. 
 
Another consequence of the pervasive uncertainty was recently recognised by the 
Law Commission, who noted that there are ‘significant differences in the way the law 
is applied, both between individual judges and between different areas of the 
country’.407 This point has been supported by research undertaken by the law firm 
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Pannonne.408 Regional variation could promote undesirable forum-shopping. It also 
suggests the law is failing to adequately pursue a Fairness Model of asset reallocation 
as ‘an important aspect of fairness is that like cases should be treated alike’.409 This is 
further evidence that reform aimed at promoting consistency, through limiting 
judicial discretion, would support the claim that the law reflects a Fairness Model of 
asset reallocation. 
 
An alternative argument that requires recognition is the view that there may also be 
positive implications that arise out of a lack of certainty. This was recognised by 
Dowding who claimed that, ‘the lack of absolute certainty as to the outcome of any 
final hearing provides a powerful incentive to the parties to reach an agreement rather 
than risk a result which may be to the liking of neither’.410 However, this argument 
fails to recognise the often determined and bitter context that divorce occurs within. It 
also offends against the common sense notion that parties are more likely to reach a 
settlement when they have a sound understanding as to what a judge is likely to deem 
a fair allocation of the assets. Furthermore, this argument has no weight in everyday 
divorces where limited assets deem their applicability for court adjudication null. In 
such cases, the court process can be considered an unnecessarily costly device by 
which to split the limited assets. Therefore, in the context of the everyday divorce, the 
demands of a certain application of the need principle prevail. 
 
As a result of the above criticisms, the Law Commission produced a report evaluating 
this area of the law, particularly the precise meaning of the ‘financial needs’ 
principle.411 This Report is the final area of legal development that requires 
evaluation. It will be questioned whether the report adequately recognised the above 
criticisms, and the extent to which they provided an appropriate response to them in 
their recommendations for reform. 
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Evaluating the Law Commission’s Response 
 
The Law Commission’s project Matrimonial Property, Needs and Agreements 
resulted in a targeted review of the law relating to asset reallocation on divorce. The 
project involved a supplementary consultation that was undertaken in September 
2012 which was widespread and well-received by a range of academics, practitioners 
and professional legal bodies.412 Their responses were analysed in order to inform the 
conclusions of the final report which was published on the 27th February 2014.413 
Whilst this Report covered a number of legal areas, for the purposes of this thesis, 
focus will be on evaluating their recommendations regarding ‘financial needs’.414 
 
The project’s express aim was to respond to ‘the lack of transparency in the law 
relating to needs… and [the] inconsistency in the application of the law’.415 To this 
end, the project resulted in a number of concluding recommendations. Notably, it 
advocated the introduction of non-statutory guidance aimed at clarifying the meaning 
of ‘financial needs’.416 It was hoped that this guidance ‘would ensure that the law is 
applied consistently by the courts and… give people without legal representation 
access to a clear statement of their responsibilities and the objective of a transition to 
independence that a financial settlement should achieve’.417 The Law Commission 
recommended that the ‘guidance could be “translated” into a less technical and much 
shorter document aimed both at non-legally-qualified mediators and at litigants in 
person’.418  
 
This makes it apparent that whilst the Law Commission clearly had an acute 
awareness of the lack of transparency of the law,419 they failed to recommend a 
substantive change of law; instead advocating non-binding guidance with its roots 
outside of the leading statute. Thus, the Law Commission failed to recommend a 
                                                 
412 Law Commission, Matrimonial Property, Needs and Agreements (Law Com No. 208, 2012). 
413 Law Commission (n 18). 
414 Their chosen way of referring to the need principle. 
415 Law Commission (n 18) para 3.60. 
416 ibid paras 3.75-3.78. 
417 ibid para 1.25. 
418  ibid para 3.77. 
419 As well as some of the implications. 
101 
departure from the current discretion-dominated contemporary framework and as a 
result maintained reliance on the need principle in everyday divorces. 
 
Instead, the Law Commission recommended expanding the importance of the need 
principle through its implementation as a safeguard against unjust contracts, in the 
event that the Government approve another of the Law Commission’s 
recommendations; the introduction of so-called ‘qualifying nuptial agreements’ into 
law.420 If this recommendation is to be implemented, then there will be an increased 
need for couples to have a sound understanding of what this principle encompasses. 
Without this, couples cannot be certain that their nuptial agreements will be able to 
adequately satisfy this safeguard. The likely effect of raising the need principle to the 
position of such a safeguard largely remains speculative and goes beyond the remit of 
this thesis. However, it is important to recognise that if insufficient action is taken to 
ameliorate the current uncertainties that surround the need principle, the possibility of 
introducing ‘qualifying nuptial agreements’ that help to remove the need for court 
adjudication, is likely to be heavily undermined.  
 
In a bid to increase certainty, the Law Commission did engage in some detail as to the 
likely objective to be pursued and relevant considerations when providing for needs 
on divorce. They concluded that the most appropriate objective to be pursued when 
reallocating assets on the basis of need:  
 
[S]hould be to enable a transition to independence, to the extent that that is possible in 
light of the choices made within the marriage, the length of the marriage, the marital 
standard of living, the parties’ expectation of a home, and the continued shared 
responsibilities (importantly, childcare) in the future.421 
 
This objective was recognised as a response to the ‘merger over time that inevitably 
takes place during a marriage or civil partnership’.422 Whilst, ostensibly, enabling a 
‘transition to independence’ as an objective of the asset reallocation exercise can be 
praised, the Law Commission’s failure to advocate for a substantive change to the law 
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can be criticised. For one, this objective reflects an amalgamation of competing 
policy considerations and fails to offer litigants a clear understanding as to a likely 
level of entitlement. Furthermore, the retention of the ‘standard of living’ 
consideration lacks justification given the move away from the Ecclesiastic and 
Contractual Models of asset reallocation, where it had been a prominent, guiding 
feature. Given that the newly proposed objective intends to promote the severing of 
financial obligations on divorce, it seems incompatible with this subjective ‘standard 
of living’ consideration. The retention of this consideration also reflects the fact that 
the Law Commission failed to adequately recognise the problems in the current law 
that stems from the incompatibility between modern need provision and the 
realisation of a clean break. Further guidance is required as to how to balance these 
competing policies. 
 
A second difficulty with the Law Commission’s proposed objective is the effect that 
the ‘choices made within the marriage’ and the ‘expectation of a home’ 
considerations have when calculating entitlement. These are inevitably highly 
uncertain considerations that will likely promote contention and stand in the way of 
consistent applications of judicial discretion. This makes it apparent that the Law 
Commission’s recommendations are wholly misconceived, given their aim to respond 
to ‘the lack of transparency in the law and the fact that practice is not wholly 
consistent’.423 It remains to be seen whether the proposed guidance will be sufficient 
to offer a transparent means of amalgamating these variable considerations into an 
accessible guide for litigants; particularly those lacking legal representation. 
 
As the above sections have demonstrated, a number of criticisms surround the 
principle of needs and the asset reallocation process as a whole. The consequential 
uncertainty is a potent criticism given the current climate of austerity and the rise of 
litigants in person. Furthermore, it has been shown that, whilst the Law Commission 
have recognised the lack of transparency and consistency in judicial application that 
is present in the law governing asset reallocation, they failed to provide an 
appropriate recommendation that will induce transparency and move the law away 
from its current reliance on discretionary assessments. Providing a response to this 
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uncertainty will provide a guide in the forthcoming evaluation of the prevailing 
proposals for legal reform. 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has focused on the criticisms surrounding the current utilisation of the 
need principle within the asset reallocation process on divorce. It has also traced these 
deficiencies to more general problems with the applicable statutory provisions.424 It 
should now be evident that in the context of the everyday divorce, the priority 
recourse that the judiciary continue to pay to the need principle under the Fairness 
Model is arguably inappropriate. 
 
It is apparent that the recent legal aid cuts have exposed the legal framework to much 
stronger criticisms given its inaccessibility for many litigants. These condemnations 
are now aggravatingly present within everyday divorces, where court adjudication 
and now legal representation have become unrealistic and unobtainable sources of 
authority. Thus, litigants in person have wholly insufficient guidance when 
interpreting and applying the need principle within the context of the current Fairness 
Model. Furthermore, questions regarding the continued appropriateness of the need 
principle’s existence have arisen. These difficulties have occurred due to the 
uncertainties that surround the policy justifying need provision, as well as claims that 
the principle continues to pay adherence to outdated considerations and is 
incompatible with the current trend of divorce law. 
 
This chapter has also concluded that whilst the Law Commission did recognise a 
number of the pressing criticisms regarding the current law, they failed to recommend 
substantial reform; deferring the task of producing guidance to another body. It is 
with recognition of their findings that this thesis will now turn to assess more 
significant proposals for reform. In order to be justified, any such proposal will 
inevitably have to provide a sound response to the criticisms outlined in this chapter.  
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Accordingly, Chapter Four’s evaluation of the potential responses to these 
deficiencies will have the intention of promoting a straightforward, clear process for 
litigants as a central objective guiding and justifying its conclusions. This will 
inevitably require a discussion as to the correct balance to be reached between the 
grant of judicial discretion and the implementation of rules to guide the application of 
this discretion. These reform proposals will also be evaluated for their ability to 
protect financially vulnerable spouses on divorce, given that this is the implicit 
objective behind the contemporary need principle. Thus, any proposal that advocates 
the removal of the need principle will clearly need to introduce some other means of 
ensuring that this objective is not overlooked. 
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Building upon the findings of previous chapters, this chapter aims to assess some of 
the prevailing proposals that can be raised in a bid to reform the current model 
governing asset reallocation in everyday divorces. To this end it shall assess the 
Government’s response to the Law Commission’s recommendations, as well as three 
further proposals for reform. These proposals reflect a mix of approaches; one being 
the framework used in many other jurisdictions, one being a Bill working its way 
through the House of Lords and the final being an amalgamation of a number of 
other proposals.  
 
Each of these proposals will be evaluated individually in order to assess the balance 
they reach between discretionary judgments and strict rules when responding to the 
aforementioned criticisms of the Fairness Model. This chapter will also assess 
whether the proposals are compatible with modern societal views and the legal 
landscape within which it operates. It will conclude with the finding that the final of 
these proposals represents the most appropriate path for reforming the current 
framework’s model; namely replacing the focus on needs with a Presumptive 
Entitlement Model of asset reallocation. 
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After identifying key criticisms in this area of law, this final chapter will evaluate and 
propose various suggestions for reform. As the core focus of this thesis has been to 
assess the application of the need principle in the context of everyday divorces, this 
chapter’s focus will remain on evaluating the effects of these proposals on this class 
of cases.  
 
The starting point of this chapter’s evaluation of the various proposals for reform will 
focus on assessing the Government’s response to the Law Commission’s recent 
recommendations. Three alternative proposals, each at varying points of 
implementation, will then be examined. The particular proposals that have been 
chosen for evaluation within this chapter represent a range of responses to the lack of 
transparency innate within the approach taken by the courts under the current Fairness 
Model. They also all reflect, to some degree, support for the current trend of the law 
governing asset reallocation, whereby, marriage is increasingly being viewed as a 
partnership of equals, giving rise to entitlements to the ‘fruits of the marital 
partnership’.425 
 
These proposals for reform will also be evaluated for their compatibility with the 
current legal framework. Thus, reform proposals will be assessed for the extent to 
which they are likely to increase the accessibility of the law, given the Government’s 
recent changes to funding for family law adjudication. Accessibility here refers to the 
extent to which litigants will be able to comprehend and apply the law to their unique 
circumstances.426 
 
However, before these critical evaluations can occur, this thesis will attempt to 
identify the existence of a broad spectrum onto which various asset reallocation 
regimes can be mapped. This spectrum differentiates those regimes governed by 
flexible discretion and those that favour the certainty inherent in strict rules governing 
reallocation. Clearly, the current Fairness Model of asset reallocation falls within the 
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first category. This section will also analyse some of the benefits that stand to be 
gained from modifying the current model. 
 
Discretion v Rules: Reaching the Right Balance 
 
A key area of contention, when advocating reform of this area of law, is the balance 
between basing the law on rules or judicial discretion. It is clear from Chapter Two 
and Three that the need principle, as applied under the current Fairness Model, is 
heavily based on the use of judicial discretion. However, due to the need for the asset 
reallocation process to be able to retain an element of certainty whilst remaining 
flexible, Schneider has argued that there should not be ‘a choice between discretion 
and rules, but rather a choice between different mixes of discretion and rules’.427 Both 
are important, and an appropriate compromise needs to be struck. This section intends 
to outline why the model governing asset reallocation must strike such a balance, 
drawing upon the conclusions of previous chapters. 
 
The advantage of basing the law on discretion is that it empowers judges with ‘the 
ability to tailor the [financial] arrangements to the very specific circumstances of the 
individual family’.428 Consequently, the current legal framework, as explored in 
Chapter Two, has been praised on the basis that it offers the judiciary ‘the scope to 
devise a bespoke solution for each couple, appropriate to their individual needs’.429 It 
also allows the judiciary ‘to respond expeditiously to society's evolving preferences 
and practices’.430 This is particularly beneficial in the context of the asset reallocation 
process on divorce, as moral views regarding marriage and divorce have changed 
considerably431 and spouses increasingly ‘organise and conduct their family lives in a 
burgeoning and bewildering variety of ways’.432 Discretion also allows the law to 
react, adapt and develop. Consequently, discretion has been described as a ‘central 
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and inevitable part of the legal order’ due to its ability to ‘attain broad legislative 
purposes’.433 Thus, the flexibility that is provided through discretion allows the 
judiciary to draw upon a range of legal principles and attribute varying degrees of 
weight to the factual circumstances of the case. Unsurprisingly, flexibility and the 
ability to reach nuanced decisions, has generally been seen as ‘the leading positive 
argument for discretion’ based systems of asset reallocation.434 
 
However, as shown in Chapter Three, the MCA 1973’s reliance on judicial discretion, 
as a means of developing the law and the relevant legal principles, has failed to 
increase the transparency surrounding the asset reallocation process.435 Consequently, 
it has been suggested that ‘12 judges applying the same principles to the same case 
may produce 12 different answers’.436 This is evident in the current law when one 
considers the fact that there have been considerable differences in interpretations 
applied to the need principle.437 The uncertain results of court adjudication and the 
subsequent lack of predictability are perhaps the most obvious criticisms of using 
broad judicial discretion. 
 
There have also been inconsistent rulings, as discretion permits judges the freedom 
‘to take into account a wide array of information, which may be of questionable 
accuracy, reliability, or relevance’.438 As Chapter Two has shown, whilst broad 
patterns of judicial discretion may be discerned, this has not fettered the approach 
taken by any particular judge. This clearly militates from the realisation of the 
overarching objective, as, ‘an important aspect of fairness is that like cases should be 
treated alike’.439 Accordingly, it must be recognised that, a ‘broad discretionary 
jurisdiction… will not be satisfactory unless exercised with a reasonable degree of 
consistency’.440 This suggests that the law may benefit from being placed on more 
structured, rule-based foundations. 
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The potential introduction of new rules into the asset reallocation process has been 
supported on the basis that ‘rules seem likelier than discretion to inform people what 
the law is and what courts will do… [being] relatively accessible to prospective 
litigants’, thereby, helping to dispel ‘unreasonable expectations’.441 Thus, rule-based 
law has the potential to save time and ‘litigants may feel that a decision based 
observably on rules is at least not arbitrary and discriminatory’.442 These are 
important requirements in order to reduce costs, promote early settlement and provide 
litigants with ‘the sense that they have been treated fairly’.443 Rules have also been 
praised as they arguably ‘contribute to the legitimacy of a decision’ as they stem from 
the legislature as opposed to unelected judges.444 Nevertheless, as Chapter Three has 
shown, the Law Commission failed to support the introduction of any such 
prescriptive fetters.445 
 
Equally, a system of asset reallocation based entirely on rules suffers from a number 
of disadvantages; which, can be expressed in the negative form of the advantages 
gained through permitting discretion. Hence, a system based on rules fails to allow 
the law to react, adapt and develop in the same way as a system based on discretion. 
Discretion remains ‘necessary where no satisfactory rule can be written’.446 This is 
because ‘predictable outcomes are insufficient… unless they are also sound’.447 Thus, 
the law’s current reliance on discretion, as evidenced in Chapter Two, can be praised 
for recognising the need for flexibility in order to prevent inequitable results. 
 
Nevertheless, as Chapter Three concluded, within the current law governing asset 
reallocation on divorce, the balance is weighted too heavily in favour of discretion. 
Arguably, the approach in England and Wales should involve ‘limited discretion 
being exercised against the background of reasonable certainty’.448 With reference to 
                                                 
441 Schneider (n 430) 237, 240. 
442 ibid. 
443 Schneider (n 41) 74. 
444 ibid 69. 
445 See, Law Commission (n 18). 
446 Schneider (n 430) 235. 
447 American Law Institute, ‘Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and 
Recommendations’ (2001) 8 Duke Journal of Gender Law and Policy 1, 1. 
448 A Greensmith, ‘Let’s Play Ancillary Relief’ (2007) 37 Fam Law 203, 203. 
112 
the findings of the previous chapters, this thesis shall now suggest a means of 
implementing this balance into practice. 
 
Realigning the Balance 
 
This thesis has identified that some means of reform is necessary in order for the law 
to respond to the context it operates within whilst, simultaneously, finding the 
appropriate balance between the competing requirements of fairness. To this end, it is 
suggested that the law should move away from using needs as a guiding principle. 
Rather, this thesis suggests that the asset reallocation exercise should pay increasing 
respect to the understanding that marriage is a ‘partnership of equals’ and that in 
order to achieve this, steps need to be taken away from the need principle’s 
entrenching of dependence.  
 
The ‘partnership’ understanding of marriage is supported as it arguably ‘depicts 
marriage as a social and economic unit of equals… that approaches the issue of 
property alteration in terms of commitment to equality and to sharing implicit in the 
notion of marriage as a joining of lives’.449 Thus, this understanding of marriage will 
assist to preclude connotations of dependence through ‘acknowledging that the 
applicant is entitled to at least half of the assets, and not merely a “needy 
supplicant”’.450 It is posited that this will help increase the protection currently 
afforded to financially vulnerable spouses. Furthermore, it is suggested that this view 
of marriage could be translated so as to offer a more objective means of calculating 
entitlement on divorce, thereby, reducing the need for legal representation and court 
adjudication.451 Finally, it is suggested that this understanding of marriage is 
compatible with contemporary egalitarian views of gender and liberalised societal 
views of marriage. 
 
Accordingly, the remainder of this chapter will offer three proposals for reform which 
reemphasise this understanding of marriage, whilst downplaying the dominance 
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currently attributed to the needs principle. Each of these proposals will offer a means 
by which the current model can be aligned with a more rule-based approach. 
However, before this thesis turns to evaluate these three proposals, it will briefly 
assess the Government’s response to the Law Commission’s recent reform 
recommendations. This will endow an amount of legitimacy onto reform proposals 
that attempt to move the law in a similar direction. Any criticisms of this response 
will also justify why the forthcoming proposals have deviated from this route. 
 
The Government’s Response to the Law Commission’s Recommendations 
 
Following the consultation process and the publication of the Law Commission’s 
recommendations, the Ministry of Justice have requested that the Family Justice 
Council take forward the Law Commission’s recommendation to produce guidance in 
order to clarify the law surrounding need provision on divorce.452 This guidance has 
yet to be released, so a step-by-step analysis is not yet possible. Nor is it appropriate 
to conclude that such guidance will be an adequate substitution for the lack of senior 
court adjudication that is currently applicable to everyday divorces. 
 
It is appropriate to recognise that the body tasked with developing this guidance is 
composed mostly of lawyers and judges. However, ‘many consider lawyers are 
arguably part of the problem’.453 Furthermore, this organisation ‘is far less 
constitutionally accountable [and] less amenable to media and political scrutiny’.454 
Thus, the Law Commission’s solution to the law’s deficiencies is to place further 
reliance upon a body that have caused many of these problems. Whilst the legislature 
has relied on recourse to the judiciary over the past forty years, recent reductions in 
family law legal aid justifies more substantive reforms in the name of certainty. This 
was indeed recognised by the Law Commission who recommended that in the long-
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term, the ‘Government support the formation of a working group… to work on the 
possible development of a formula to generate ranges of outcomes for spousal 
support’.455 However, proactive steps in this direction have yet to be taken.  
 
Thus, the forthcoming reform suggestions must offer means of implementing 
certainty into the law, in order to guide litigants as to the requirements of the Fairness 
Model when reallocating assets in everyday divorces. This will aid in the promotion 
of out-of-court settlements by giving spouses an idea of the entitlements that stem 
from the partnership. It should also be noted that the Law Commission’s ‘transition to 
independence’ objective is accepted within all of the forthcoming proposals. 
However, varying weight is given to the importance of severing matrimonial 
obligations, as well as the need to protect financially vulnerable spouse. It is finding 
the correct balance between these objectives that arguably holds the key to that 
overriding requirement of fairness and, in turn, will help to identify the most 
appropriate reform proposal that the Government should adopt.  
 
Proposal 1) Community of Property 
 
If the discretionary current system reflects one approach to the asset reallocation 
exercise, the alternative is a community of property regime.456 These regimes can be 
differentiated on the basis that they ‘provide for a rule-based sharing of property 
when the community is dissolved by divorce or death’.457 In its most extensive form, 
this regime stipulates that on marriage spouses assets are completely pooled, with 
each earning a fifty per cent entitlement to that pool on divorce. In this way certainty 
is prioritised as objective rules guide the reallocation process. Accordingly, the 
opportunities for subjective exercises of judicial discretion are minimised. Such a 
regime is currently applied in the Netherlands. 
 
In recognition of the inappropriateness of relying on property rules to reallocate assets 
on divorce, such regimes often ‘provide for a primary, obligatory regime from which 
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no derogation can be made’.458 These default primary regimes are often then 
supplemented by a secondary regime which may offer steps spouses can take in order 
to preclude the application of the primary regime.459  
 
This section will assess whether current provision for needs should be replaced with 
the introduction of a community of property regime, which would offer a minimum 
level of protection for spouses on divorce. The introduction of such a rule based 
structure of entitlement would be likely to lead to increased certainty when assessing 
the likely effects of the law’s application, but would the benefits outweigh the 
disadvantages? Before this assessment can occur, an initial question must be assessed; 
does the current approach to need provision already encapsulate a primary 
community of property regime? 
 
Do we already have a community of property regime? 
 
A number of academics have suggested, to varying degrees, that the law relating to 
asset reallocation already reflects a ‘community of property approach to ancillary 
relief on divorce’.460 Most notably, Cretney has argued for over a decade that 
following the introduction of the yardstick of equality by the House of Lords in 
White,461 and the subordination of ‘special contributions’462 by the Court of Appeal in 
Lambert v Lambert,463 the courts have effectively introduced ‘into English law a 
regime of community of property (albeit only deferred community) limited to 
acquisitions’.464 ‘Acquisitions’ is the term Cretney uses to describe the class of assets 
that were acquired following the creation of the legal union. He classifies the legal 
framework as reflecting a deferred community regime, as property remains separately 
held throughout the duration of the marriage with the community regime arising at 
                                                 
458 ibid 2. 
459 Eg, in France couples are free to stipulate through contract the financial consequences of their 
divorce. 
460 A Barlow, ‘Community of Property – the logical response to Miller and McFarlane?’ (2007) 39 
Bracton LJ 19,19.  
461 White (n 5). 
462 As a means of proving a disproportionate entitlement to the divisible assets on divorce. 
463 [2002] EWCA Civ 1685, [2003] Fam 103. Later endorsed by the House of Lords in Miller; 
McFarlane (n 7) [68] (Lord Nicholls). 
464 S Cretney, 'A Community of Property System Imposed by Judicial Decision' (2003) 119 LQR 349, 
349. 
116 
the point of divorce. However, on divorce the judiciary are granted such broad 
ranging powers to reallocate assets, so as to undermine and override any application 
of proprietary rights. Therefore, in Cretney’s opinion, the effect of the current 
discretionary-based system is to preclude the applicability of proprietary rights 
between spouses on divorce. 
 
Nevertheless, Cretney does submit that such division only occurs after ‘sufficient 
provision had been made for “needs”’.465 Therefore, in the context of everyday 
divorces, need remains the paramount principle. Furthermore, the yardstick of 
equality was only ever intended to be applied as a ‘check’, not as a rule.466 When 
these facts are considered in tandem with the reality that ‘our system is still over-
laden with a large amount of discretion’, it becomes apparent that it makes little sense 
to describe the English system as operating a community of property regime.467  
 
However, it is apparent that the senior judiciary have been influenced by community 
of property reasoning, particularly in White.468 This has prompted some academics to 
claim that ‘development of a community system by the courts rather than by the 
legislature is arguably causing considerable uncertainty’.469 Therefore, it will still be 
questioned whether the introduction of some form of a community regime would 
clarify the law, thereby, improving on the current needs-based approach.  
 
The Introduction of a Community of Acquests Regime 
 
Whilst this thesis does not intend to go into the details of the multitude of variations 
that a community regime could take, it will evaluate some of the benefits and 
criticisms that would result from the introduction of a ‘community of acquests’ 
regime into English and Welsh law. This form of community of property has been 
chosen as it is, at least ostensibly, the least radical community approach that could 
replace the current law. This is the case as it is the community regime with the most 
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restricted scope.470 It dictates that ‘any property bought to the marriage remains the 
property of the spouse who originally owned it; while (almost) all property acquired 
during the marriage is shared’.471 This distinction is made on the basis that it is more 
difficult to justify an entitlement to those assets accrued by a spouse’s individual 
efforts prior to the marriage.472 
 
As Chapter One has established, this area of law has been developed with reference to 
contemporary understandings of marriage. Requiring parties to share their acquired 
property equally on divorce would ‘indicate that the relationship was viewed as a 
partnership, with each party having an equal entitlement to the assets’.473 Kevin Gray 
has supported this view that the concept of ‘matrimonial partnership’ should be the 
conceptual basis on which the law views the legal relationship and divides its assets. 
Gray has suggested that ‘a norm of equality… translates the concept of matrimonial 
partnership into unequivocal legal terms’.474 Such an approach has been praised as the 
origins of any rule entitling an equal division of the assets: 
 
[A]re to be found in the same ethic which sustains modern commitments to 
democracy and equality… Each adult’s contribution should be regarded as being of 
equal value, entitling equal economic rewards. 475  
 
Similarly, it has been stated that recognising spousal contributions as equal ‘promotes 
the view that support on divorce is not a gift bestowed through the discretion of the 
court, but rather is a just and equitable redistribution of resources’.476 In this way, a 
community regime may provide a means of providing increased respect to the value 
of care-giving and household contributions, thereby, representing a means of 
precluding disproportionate or unfair financial consequences from resulting on 
divorce.477 Whilst an equal division of the available assets may exclude conduct 
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considerations,478 it is predicated on the assumption that in the vast majority of 
divorces the parties to the marriage contributed equally to the family unit, and to start 
from any other point would be to place an obstacle in the way of reaching a fair 
allocation of the assets. Thus, the introduction of such a rule, prima facie, pays 
increased respect to the contributions of the care-giving spouse, by automatically 
giving rise to an entitlement to ‘an equal share of the fruits of the marriage’.479 
 
Introducing the equal division of matrimonial assets as the rule could also make, ‘it 
unnecessary to resort to court proceedings in every case of dispute’.480 This approach 
can be praised for making interpretation and application of the law an easier job for 
litigants as, ‘the calculation of the sharable value of their property would, in many 
instances, be no more difficult that the completion of an annual [tax] return’.481  
Similarly, such an approach has also been supported for having ‘the merit of 
certainty’ by fettering judicial discretion, thereby, reducing the likelihood of 
adversarial and expensive litigation.482 Such an approach would also increase the 
likelihood that consensual out-of-court settlements, reached without legal advice, 
would satisfy the requirements of fairness. 
 
Arguably, this reform suggestion also represents a move towards a ‘sensible’ 
approach, which pays better respect to the entitlements of the parties to the 
marriage.483 Similarly, Gray has recognised that this approach better accords with the 
trend of family law towards permitting a clean break on divorce.484 This is achieved 
by removing the subjective considerations inherent in the current law’s recourse to 
the need principle in everyday divorces, instead placing increased reliance on the 
grant of objective lump-sum orders. 
 
Nevertheless, the introduction of such a rule has also received criticism from a range 
of academics. Firstly, it has been doubted whether it could be applied to everyday 
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divorces with minimal assets or debts, as it is not flexible enough to accommodate the 
range of circumstances and special needs that come before the court.485 Thus, its 
application may be unlikely to provide adequate protection for financially vulnerable 
spouses in everyday divorces. This is because, in the majority of cases, the ‘resources 
that [have been] used to support one household will not easily stretch to two’.486 
Seemingly, the only way to tailor financial arrangements in such cases is reliance 
upon judicial discretion.487 However, to permit this would arguably undermine the 
certainty justifying the introduction of this reform proposal. 
 
Furthermore, the results reached through a community regime’s application may be 
particularly devastating in everyday divorces, given the fact that there are insufficient 
opportunities for spouses to contest the result reached.488 Thus, it is apparent that such 
a rule-driven regime has the potential to excessively interfere with the discretionary 
assessments of fairness, held to be of fundamental importance when protecting 
financially vulnerable spouses under the current model of asset reallocation. 
 
Such an approach also fails to account for ‘household composition’ following the 
divorce.489 Thus, the problems with this regime are exacerbated when ‘it is 
appreciated that it is most likely that any children of the marriage will remain with the 
wife after divorce’.490 Furthermore, in the majority of cases it is the wife who forgoes 
employment in order to fulfil the childcare responsibilities.491 An equal division of 
the post-marriage, acquired assets in these circumstances would allow the husband to 
keep his complete earnings, whilst leaving the wife to stretch half the families’ assets 
to cover her own and her children’s needs.492 Consequently, in many cases, the care-
giving wife will ‘still not [be] on an economic par with [her husband], even if granted 
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half of the assets of the marriage’.493 This is because ‘[t]he equal division between 
adults is not, therefore, an equal division between all family members’.494 Thus, to 
replace the current need principle with such a community regime would often fail to 
protect the financially vulnerable spouse.495 This is due to the limited ability that this 
regime has to deviate from the automatic entitlement it grants. 
 
An entitlement to an equal division of the acquired assets also fails to consider the 
parties’ future earning potentials and the need for transitional payments before the 
care-giving spouse is able to re-enter the workplace. These criticisms point to the 
incompatibility of this regime with the current overriding objective of achieving a fair 
division of the assets. It would replace a focus on needs with a static division of the 
assets that is incapable of providing a nuanced response to the diverse factual 
circumstances that can be present on divorce. Clearly, this would flip the current 
position so that the law would be placing excessive reliance on prescriptive rules, 
which would provide limited opportunities for derogation. 
 
It is for these reasons that even a modest community of property regime is deemed 
unfit to replace the approach taken under the Fairness Model in the context of 
everyday divorces. Whilst its attempts to pay respect to the matrimonial partnership 
and induce a clean break can be praised, it is often too absolute in its division, with 
limited opportunities for discretionary deviation from its application. Such regimes 
often fail to recognise that ‘the transition to independence should not be sudden… 
[and] in a significant number of cases independence is not possible’.496 Instead, 
further judicial discretion is necessary in order for the law to be able to respond to 
modern conceptions of fairness. 
 
Accordingly, it is argued that in the light of the findings from previous chapters the 
furthest the law should go in order to increase certainty should be the introduction of 
guiding presumptions. This would provide spouses with an idea of the likely 
allocation to be awarded, whilst not precluding judges from overruling such 
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presumptions if they were to lead to significant unfairness. A means of implementing 
such a reallocation-guiding presumption will be raised shortly. However, before this 
presumption-based approach is assessed, one final reform proposal that is currently 
working its way through the House of Lords will be evaluated. 
 
Proposal 2) Baroness Deech’s Private Members Bill 
 
This proposal involves reconceptualising need provision. In an attempt to 
‘reintroduce transparency, democracy and understandability into an area of law which 
has moved a very long way from its statutory basis’, Baroness Deech introduced a 
Private Members’ Bill into the House of Lords.497 Deech rightly recognised that ‘[t]he 
leading judgments in the field inevitably arise from big money cases that go to 
appeal… and their pontifications are not necessarily helpful for low-income 
families’.498 In the same debate, she also rightly recognised that reform was ‘urgent 
because legal aid has been removed from this area of the law’.499 These statements 
make it apparent that a key policy behind this Bill is to further certainty in low-asset, 
or, everyday divorces, thereby, responding to many of the current criticisms of the 
law outlined in Chapter Three.  
 
It is Deech’s opinion that, ‘some certainty about the way to split assets may be more 
important than total fairness’.500 This section assesses the extent to which her 
proposed Bill would promote certainty at the expense of fairness when governing 
asset reallocation in everyday divorces, and whether this can be justified. It will also 
question whether this Bill contains a more principled, objective basis to govern the 
provision of needs in these cases and ameliorate the criticisms concerning the current 
law outlined in Chapter Three. 
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Content of the Divorce (Financial Provision) Bill [HL] 2015-16 
 
A number of quite radical changes of law are contained within Deech’s Private 
Members’ Bill, and it largely calls for an overhaul of the governing statutory 
provisions within this area.501 Whilst an entire thesis could be centred on assessing 
the various provisions contained within this Bill, the forthcoming section intends to 
focus on those reform proposals that are likely to modify the current operation of the 
need principle within everyday divorces.  
 
Marriage as a Partnership 
Rather than relying on long-term periodic payment orders in order to provide for 
spousal needs in everyday divorces, Deech’s Bill attempts to reach a fair reallocation 
through an equal division of those assets, which are classified as ‘matrimonial 
property’.502 This term essentially encompasses property that was acquired following 
the inception of the legal relationship ‘otherwise than by gift, inheritance or 
succession from a third party’.503 Consequently, all those assets that were 
accumulated during the marriage are presumed to be the fruits of the parties’ 
combined labours, giving them an equal entitlement to the spoils.504 
 
This approach can be praised on the basis that it largely prevents the judiciary from 
entertaining arguments from high-earning husbands relying on their ‘special 
contribution’ in order to justify their entitlement to an increased proportion of the 
assets.505 Furthermore, it may help to clarify the approach to be taken when 
reallocating inherited wealth, which remains an area of contention, even following the 
attention it was paid by Ward LJ in Robson.506 Whilst conduct remains a 
consideration under the new Draft Bill, it is now only relevant where the conduct has 
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either ‘adversely affected the financial resources’, or, ‘it would be manifestly 
inequitable to leave the conduct out of account’.507 Whilst this confinement of the 
conduct consideration is minimal, it can be praised for elucidating and codifying the 
circumstances in which this consideration will justify an unequal division of the net 
matrimonial assets. 
 
Furthermore, this approach may have the effect of reversing a problematic 
psychological influence that has been recognised to play a factor in many current 
financial hearings. This is the criticism that the current system impliedly supports the 
view that the assets are the property of the breadwinner, with the care-giving spouse 
having to provide justification in order to receive a share.508 If there is a presumption 
in favour of equal division, then the onus is on the party who is arguing otherwise to 
persuade the judge.  
 
Thus, this approach towards classifying assets as ‘matrimonial property’ can be seen 
as a positive step towards increasing certainty. It would help to avoid some of the 
uncertainties present in the House of Lords decision Miller; McFarlane, regarding the 
appropriate classification of assets.509 Furthermore, a presumption in favour of 
dividing the net value of such assets can be praised for helping to prevent financially 
vulnerable spouses from suffering a disproportionate financial detriment on divorce.  
Matrimonial Property & Maintenance 
Deech’s Bill also intends to replace MCA 1973 section 25(2),510 and introduce a 
statutory, temporal cap on the grant of periodic payment orders. Whilst this cap was 
originally intended to preclude periodic payment orders being made for a period 
beyond three years, it has subsequently been softened. It is now contained within 
clause 5(1)(c) of the most recent draft of the proposed Bill, which states: 
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[A] party who has been dependent to a substantial degree on the financial support of 
the other party should be awarded such periodical payments as is reasonable to enable 
that party to adjust to the loss of that support on divorce over a period of not more 
than five years from the date of the decree of divorce.511 
 
This statutory provision is a result of Deech’s view that the current law is too heavily 
weighted in favour of care-giving wives, and is unfairly ‘punishing men and trying to 
limit the welfare liability of the state by making them pay’.512 Deech makes this 
argument despite the aforementioned socio-economic research that has found that 
divorce has a disproportionate impact on the financial standing of wives.513 
Nevertheless, if her view is accepted, then the current law is being too heavily 
influenced by a policy objective that Chapter Two has already deemed to encourage 
unfair results; saving state expenditure.514 
 
It is apparent that Deech’s Bill represents an attempt to bring the statutory 
foundations of the law governing asset reallocation in line with the ‘trend to get 
former couples towards a clean break… by expecting each to stand financially on 
their own feet where at all possible’.515 This trend has developed ‘as a means of 
incentivising a party who hasn’t traditionally worked to retrain and find work at the 
risk of having no monthly income’.516 This policy is supported within Deech’s 
proposed Bill through a clause directing the judiciary to consider ‘any intention of 
[the applicant] party to undertake a course of education or training’ when making 
financial reallocation on divorce.517 This recognition of the importance of 
rehabilitative payments can be praised for supporting the financially vulnerable 
spouse’s long-term self-sufficiency.  
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This aspect of her proposal is positive in providing a logical process in order to 
accommodate the clean break’s elevation to the position of a guiding policy or 
objective of the asset reallocation process. This helps to respond to the law’s current 
position where the consideration of this policy rests entirely on the exercise of 
judicial discretion. Arguably, it also offers an initial step to ameliorating the MCA 
1973, which was criticised in Chapter Three for lacking both an objective and 
guidance, in order to fetter exercises of judicial discretion.  
 
Nevertheless, Chapter Two has already recognised the difficulties inherent in 
upholding the clean break objective as a guiding policy within the asset reallocation 
process. Thus, it should be no surprise that the imposition of such a temporal cap on 
periodical payment orders has not received universal support. For one, members of 
the judiciary have long warned of the discrimination that could occur through 
achieving ‘a clean break… at the expense of fairness’.518 Sanders has similarly stated, 
albeit with reference to a previous draft of the Bill’s provisions, that:  
 
Arbitrarily limiting such an award to three years risks creating real financial hardship 
and… is highly likely to be discriminatory, as women are still more likely to make 
economic sacrifices during the marriage for the benefit of the family.519 
 
This argument should certainly be discomforting to any advocate of Deech’s Bill, 
particularly in the light of everyday divorces where there are minimal assets for 
division and one spouse has often left the workplace in order to care for the children. 
In such circumstances, it seems that maintenance for five years may still be 
considered inadequate support. Therefore, limiting periodic payments between 
spouses to a period of five years has the potential to greatly disadvantage financially 
vulnerable spouses. 
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However, the Draft Bill has recently been amended, in recognition of the 
impossibility of realising a clean break in all cases. It now concedes that this temporal 
cap can be disregarded, if, 
 
the court is satisfied that there is no other means of making provision for a party to 
the marriage and that that party would otherwise be likely to suffer serious financial 
hardship as a result.520 
 
This clause’s reliance upon a judicial evaluation of ‘serious financial hardship’ 
arguably undermines the certainty that this section intends to introduce. Nevertheless, 
it can be considered a necessary amendment in order to protect vulnerable spouses in 
everyday divorces where there are insufficient available assets to prevent this 
hardship. Consequently, the recent amendments to the Draft Bill have greatly 
increased the likelihood of it receiving Royal Assent, as it now specifically aims to 
prevent serious financial hardship from arising on divorce, thereby, importing the 
policy justifying modern needs provision whilst rejecting the unfair policy of saving 
state expenditure. 
 
Further Problems with Baroness Deech’s Bill 
Whilst the aim of this Bill’s implementation is to increase transparency, there are a 
number of provisions within the proposed Bill that appear to mitigate this objective’s 
realisation. Firstly, the effect of clause 5(2) is to require the court to ‘take into 
account’ ‘any advantage or disadvantage whether incurred before or during the 
marriage’ as well as, ‘contributions made before or during the marriage, including 
indirect and non-financial contributions’ when granting a periodical payment order.521 
Clearly, this will rely upon an extremely subjective judgment requiring an arguably 
impossible evaluation of the parties’ contributions. Furthermore the courts are 
directed to have regard to ‘all the other circumstances of the cases’.522 Arguably, such 
an open-ended statutory provision has no place in a statute that is attempting to 
                                                 
520 Divorce (Financial Provision) HL Bill (2015-16) 56, cl.5(4)(c). 
521 ibid 56, cl.5(2). 
522 ibid cl.5(4)(f). 
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introduce certainty into the law.523 The effects of this clause could be construed as 
permitting a judge to take any aspect of the divorcing spouses’ circumstances into 
account and accord it arbitrary weight.  
 
Finally, it must be noted that Deech’s Bill also requires the court to ‘have regard to – 
the needs and resources of the parties’.524 However, with the retention of this 
consideration comes uncertainty as to how it is to be reconciled with the new rule-
laden regime of asset reallocation. Can financial needs justify an entitlement to non-
matrimonial assets?525 Or does it merely weigh in favour of an unequal share of the 
net matrimonial assets? The inclusion of this principle, without an explanation as to 
its continued relevance, again fails to induce confidence in the ability of this statute to 
respond to the criticisms of the current law’s operation in everyday divorces as 
identified in previous chapters. 
 
Ultimately, it can be concluded that the above reform suggestion can be praised for its 
intention to introduce transparency into the law whilst precluding long-standing 
financial obligations between divorced spouses. However, it is doubted whether this 
Bill would in fact introduce certainty, given the open-ended nature of the 
considerations that judges must have regard to when reallocating assets. It also fails to 
explain how it plans to amalgamate these reform proposals with its continued 
reference to need provision. Consequently, it fails to prevent the judiciary from 
continuing to rely wholly on the need principle. For these reasons the above Bill fails 
to inject sufficient certainty into the law in order to present itself as an attractive 
option for reform. 
 
Furthermore, it is argued that the reasoning behind the imposition of the temporal cap 
is misguided. This argument is based on the fact that Baroness Deech believes that 
the current law promotes women to ‘find a footballer’ and rely on his income as a 
meal ticket for life.526 However, this thesis argues that footballers’ ‘WAGs’ are not a 
                                                 
523 To allow this would be to allow judicial discretion to reign supreme; in a similar way it currently 
does when the validity of a pre-nuptial agreement is in question; see, Radmacher v Granatino [2010] 
UKSC 42. 
524 Divorce (Financial Provision) HL Bill (2015-16) 56, cl.5(4)(e). 
525 Cf. Charman (No 4) (n 6); Jones v Jones [2011] EWCA Civ 41. 
526 See, Silverman (n 351). 
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leading problem in this area of law concerned with everyday divorces. Instead, the 
leading problem concerns implementing a transparent asset reallocation regime in 
everyday divorces, that is capable of being applied by litigants without the need for 
external legal representation and contentious court adjudication. 
 
Having indicated in previous chapters that certainty is a key requirement of the asset 
reallocation process, the next proposal intends to offer an alternative way in which 
that value could be better introduced into the law, without unnecessarily inhibiting the 
judiciary’s power to protect vulnerable spouses and order a fair allocation of assets. 
Rather than incorporating a temporal cap, this proposal relies on the duration of the 
marriage to produce presumptions which will help guide a fair capital reallocation 
and duration of periodic payment orders. Crucially for this thesis such presumptions 
will guide the reallocation process with reference to entitlements as opposed to needs. 
 
Proposal 3) Duration Guided Presumptions 
 
This section will identify and evaluate what this thesis considers the most appropriate 
means of reform in order to respond to the criticisms of the current law527 and pay 
respect to the view of marriage as a partnership of equals. It intends to amend the 
current framework so that in everyday divorces, awards are made on the basis of 
‘entitlement’ and not need. This change is in a bid to avoid connotations of 
dependence, whilst paying increasing respect to non-financial contributions.528 To 
this end, the forthcoming proposal amalgamates various reform suggestions. In 
particular, Eekelaar’s duration-based approach to asset reallocation will be identified, 
as much inspiration has been drawn from his work in this area.529 This proposal also 
incorporates elements of Deech’s Bill, and the approach it takes to asset 
classification.530 
 
                                                 
527 Outlined in Chapter Three 
528 Modifying legal language in order to change perceptions is by no means a novel method of legal 
evolution. For example, see Children and Families Act 2014, s.12(1) which relabelled ‘contact’ and 
‘residence’ orders ‘child arrangements’ orders. This was in a bid to reemphasise that the child is the 
centre of such proceedings.  
529 See, J Eekelaar (n 189); J Eekelaar, ‘Property and Financial Settlement on Divorce – Sharing and 
Compensating’ (2006) 36 Fam Law 754. 
530 See, Divorce (Financial Provision) HL Bill (2015-16) 56, cl.2. 
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In short, this proposal suggests a number of statutory amendments that will change 
the way that the asset reallocation process is approached in all divorces.531 Firstly, a 
new objective for the MCA 1973 will be introduced namely ensuring that each party 
receives their entitlement to the fruits of the partnership. Reaching this objective will 
be guided by three statutory presumptions, the first of which intends to introduce a 
presumption in favour of an equal division of ‘marital’ assets.532 The other two draw 
upon the duration of the relationship in order to produce a percentage-based 
presumption of entitlement. It is also recommended that the statutory amendment 
should outline the broad circumstances where a departure from the presumptions can 
be justified. When evaluating these justifications and the extent to which they justify 
such a departure, the courts will be permitted to continue to refer to section 25, albeit 
with some minor amendments.  
 
It is as a result of these statutory amendments that this proposal’s implementation is 
sufficiently distinctive that its implementation would justify a rebranding of the 
current model of asset reallocation. Thus, this proposal can be classified as 
introducing a Presumptive Entitlement Model of asset reallocation. 
 
As will be identified and evaluated, this proposal will statutorily classify some assets 
as ‘marital’ and others as ‘separate’, when calculating presumptive entitlement. 
However, it should be noted from the outset that this proposal does not advocate 
realigning the law with a community of property. Nevertheless, it is conceded that 
this proposal will have the effect of moving the law in the direction of a presumed 
community regime. However, the presumptions that it intends to introduce are only 
applied and scrutinised on divorce. Thus, this proposal does not grant spouses any 
entitlements or proprietary interests in the property owned by their spouse, prior to 
this date.533   
 
It will also be shown that this proposal furthers in part some of the recommendations  
advocated by the Law Commission, in their most recent Report on Matrimonial 
                                                 
531 Nevertheless, the forthcoming evaluation of its contents will occur with reference to its likely effect 
in everyday divorce proceedings. 
532 The precise meaning of this term will be identified shortly.  
533 Thereby, precluding the conclusion that it de jure introduces a community of property regime. 
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Property, Needs and Agreements.534 In particular, it responds to the Report’s call for 
clarity when reallocating assets in everyday divorces.535 However, a more progressive 
stance is taken to reforming the current framework, given the Law Commission’s 
failure to adequately recognise and respond to some of the deficiencies of the current 
law; as were identified in Chapter Three.  
 
Now that this thesis has outlined the broad content of this proposal, it will turn to 
assess the likely form of the statutory amendments to the MCA 1973 required in order 
to implement its various elements. The particular elements will then be turned to 
individually in order to examine them in greater detail. 
 
Effect on Statute 
 
The first amendment that requires implementation is the new objective of asset 
reallocation, outlined above. The concept of fairness will still be drawn upon under 
this new objective; however, within this modified form. The statute should then turn 
to outline how assets are to be classified when approaching the asset reallocation 
process. The next section would be directed towards outlining the three presumptions 
that provide the initial guide in the search for a fair entitlement. This will lead on to a 
section outlining the reasons for justifying a departure from these presumptions. This 
section should also include an express obligation on the judiciary to articulate their 
reasons for holding that the result obtained through application of the presumptions 
did not reflect a fair entitlement. 
 
Once the judiciary have established a sufficiently pressing reason for departing from 
the result reached through the presumptions, they would then be required to grant 
such financial orders that are compatible with the new statutory objective. It is at this 
point that the judiciary should be directed to have regard to the considerations 
currently contained within section 25 of the MCA 1973. However, a key amendment 
is the removal of section 25(2)(c), the marital ‘standard of living’ consideration, for 
the reasons identified in Chapter Three. Instead, this proposal’s presumptions will 
                                                 
534 Law Commission (n 18). 
535 Ibid para 3.60. 
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offer a more objective way of calculating the parties’ entitlements, which, similarly to 
the standard of living consideration, will vary with reference to the available assets 
for division. This will limit judicial discretion in relation to such matters, which  as 
noted in previous chapters constitutes a highly subjective area of the current law. 
 
The final statutory amendment that this proposal requires in order to be fully 
implemented relates to a procedural amendment. In particular, it is recommended that 
it should be possible to make an application for court adjudication, in order to 
determine a specific issue or question that has arisen. This is because such 
applications are likely to be considerably quicker and cheaper than full hearings. It is 
hoped that this will lead to a decrease in cases pursuing final hearings, allowing a 
judge to quickly determine a specific matter of contention. However, the parameter of 
this procedural amendment go beyond the remit of this thesis. Nevertheless, a number 
of examples as to when such applications could assist litigants will be identified. 
 
As the basic framework of this proposal has now been presented, this thesis will turn 
to an evaluation of its individual contents. Before the details of this reform suggestion 
are evaluated, this thesis will defend this proposal’s reliance upon using the duration 
of the relationship as a guide to a fair entitlement. This section will be presented first 
as this proposal draws upon the relationship’s duration as a determinative factor when 
providing its presumptive starting points.  
 
Use of Duration as a Guide to Entitlement 
 
The key distinguishing feature of this proposal is its reliance upon the relationship’s 
duration as an objective consideration, in order to provide litigants with an 
understanding as to their presumed entitlements. Thus, assets would continue to be 
held separately, but, over time, spouses would develop a claim to the assets held by 
the other spouse. Eekelaar, who has openly supported the use of the relationship’s 
duration as a guide to entitlement, has justified this approach on the basis that: 
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[d]uration of marriage is an excellent proxy for measuring a number of factors which 
are important in achieving a ‘fair’ outcome. They include: the degree of commitment 
to a relationship; the value of contributions made to it, which is not susceptible to 
straightforward economic measurement; and the extent of disadvantage undergone on 
separation.536 
 
This statement makes it apparent that tying reallocation to duration would not require 
a complete overhaul of the current Fairness Model of asset reallocation; as the final 
step would remain recourse to judicial conceptions of fairness.537 However, the 
requirements by which to achieve fairness are modified. In particular, the concept of 
entitlement is suggested as a replacement to the current need principle. Accordingly, 
this proposal’s implementation requires a number of statutory amendments, as the 
House of Lords have recognised that judicially developed presumptions: 
 
would go beyond the permissible bounds of interpretation of section 25…Whether 
there should be such a presumption in England and Wales, and in respect of what 
assets, is a matter for Parliament.538  
 
Thus, although this proposal impliedly supports a Fairness Model of asset reallocation 
as giving effect to entitlement is intended to produce a fair distribution of assets; it is 
sufficiently distinguished from the current framework’s approach, so as to require 
legislative intervention. Recognising this proposal in statute will also help to ensure 
consistency in judicial approaches. 
 
This thesis will now provide an analysis of the various individual aspects of this 
reform proposal. The first aspect of this proposal reflects a response to an uncertainty 
prevalent in the current law; what is the objective of granting financial orders on 
divorce? 
                                                 
536 Eekelaar (n 529) 756. 
537 Furthermore, a number of factors, generally tied to the relationship’s duration, make it increasingly 
unfair to fence off non-matrimonial property from reallocation; see, K v L [2011] EWCA Civ 550 [18] 
(Wilson LJ). 
538 White (n 5) [27] (Lord Nicholls). 
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Unpacking the Proposal’s Constituent Elements: 
The Objective to be Pursued 
The first criticism of the MCA 1973 that was identified in Chapter Three was the fact 
that it contains no objective.539 However, this proposal intends to incorporate such an 
objective into this statute. This will assist the judiciary to apply the law consistently 
and litigants to develop a coherent understanding of what the law is directed towards 
achieving.  
 
The proposal intends to realign the financial consequences of marriage with an 
understanding of this institution being a ‘partnership of equals’. It does not desire to 
deviate from the objective currently pursued by the judiciary; the grant of a fair 
division of the assets. However, it has a modified understanding of the requirements 
of fairness and the need for certainty. Accordingly, financial orders are to be granted 
on the basis of entitlement rather than need, with a presumptive starting point 
provided. An example of the form that this guiding objective should take is as 
follows: 
 
‘The court’s role when reallocating assets on divorce is to ensure that parties receive 
their entitlement to the fruits of the matrimonial partnership and that such provision is 
fair.’ 
 
It is argued that the change in language, from need to entitlement, will prevent the 
breadwinner from feeling that they are being unjustifiably denied a clean break.540  
This is because it arguably presents a less contentious way of justifying asset 
reallocation; with financial orders being granted on the basis that a spouse is entitled 
to such assets, as opposed to granting them on the basis that the spouse needs them.541 
Furthermore, it is argued that this change of language will promote self-ordering that 
involve clean break settlements, as, granting financial orders on the basis of 
                                                 
539 The last time that such a statutory objective existed, was prior to the enactment of the Matrimonial 
and Family Proceedings Act 1984. 
540 As occurs through modern need provision, which justifies reallocation that is far in excess of a lay-
man’s interpretation of ‘needs’. 
541 For example, can it be said that a spouse ‘needs’ a house? In many situations it arguably makes 
greater sense to claim that a spouse is ‘entitled’ to a house. 
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entitlement has a more objective end goal than the seemingly endless obligation to 
provide for the financially vulnerable spouse’s needs.542  
 
Finally, this change in language will also remove the concept of needs ‘generously 
interpreted’.543 The removal of this term will limit the scope of judicial discretion. It 
will also have the effect of preventing breadwinners from perceiving themselves as 
being unfairly burdened with an expansive interpretation of their previous obligation 
to provide for former spouses’ need. Conversely, its removal will help to preclude 
any expectations that entitlements may be ‘generously interpreted’. Thus, it is 
apparent that a number of arguments can be made supporting the view that the 
language of this new objective will help to elucidate the law’s operation, thereby 
deterring litigants from pursing full-scale court adjudication. 
 
The following presumptions will then provide a percentage-based framework in order 
to guide both the judiciary and litigants when approaching this search for a fair 
entitlement. However, before these presumptions can be discussed, it is necessary to 
recognise a further aspect of this proposal, namely, the method by which it classifies 
assets for division. 
 
Asset Classification 
The second proposed statutory amendment concerns asset classification. Under this 
proposal, classifying assets will be the first step in the reallocation process. Once 
completed, it will provide litigants with an understanding as to which assets the 
presumptions are to be applied.  
 
It is suggested that a slightly modified version of Deech’s approach to classifying 
assets for reallocation should be incorporated into the existing law.544 This involves 
recognising a distinction between ‘marital’ and ‘separate’ property. Simply put, the 
                                                 
542 Thus, this proposal realises that parties cannot expect a meal ticket for life, thereby, reining in their 
expectations on divorce. 
543 See Chapter Three for the criticisms that were raised against this expanded interpretation of the 
need principle. 
544 For the unmodified version see, Divorce (Financial Provision) HL Bill (2015-16) 56, cl.2. 
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former type would cover assets accumulated following the inception of the 
relationship, excluding gifts, inheritance or successions from a third party.545 
Conversely, the latter class would cover assets that were owned by either of the 
parties prior to the relationship, as well as those assets excluded from the above class. 
Issues relating to assets accrued following separation will be returned to shortly. 
 
With this first step in mind, this thesis will now turn to discuss the consequences of 
this classification process when calculating fair entitlements. This secondary stage 
occurs through the lens of the proposed presumptions. 
Presumption 1: Equal Division of ‘Marital’ Assets 
Given that this proposal is based on the view of marriage as a partnership of equals, it 
intends to introduce a presumption that the liquidated value of assets classified as 
‘marital’ should be divided equally on divorce. It is an interest in the ‘separate’ class 
of assets that would accumulate with reference to the relationship’s duration.546 This 
method of reallocation is justified on the basis that financial orders should not be seen 
to be ‘a gift bestowed through the discretion of the court, but rather [should be viewed 
as] a just and equitable redistribution of resource’.547 This leads to the second 
presumption; how quickly should spouses accumulate an interest in the ‘separate’ 
class of assets? 
Presumption 2: Durational Factor’s Influence on Separate Assets 
It was Eekelaar’s suggestion that the requisite time necessary in order to earn ‘an 
equal share in each other’s assets’, should be equivalent to the time it takes for 
spouses to ‘achieve the core aim of (most) adult partnerships’, namely, child 
rearing.548 Thus, he estimated that after a relationship of 20 years, spouses should be 
presumed to share all of their assets equally.549 
 
                                                 
545 This is a reflection of the wording contained within, Divorce (Financial Provision) HL Bill (2015-
16) 56, cl.2.  
546 Due to the commitment to the matrimonial partnership that this reflects. 
547 Diduck and Orton (n 294) 700. 
548 Eekelaar (n 189) 556. 
549 ibid 556. 
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If this estimation is to be accepted as the benchmark for deciding the requisite 
duration in order to give rise to a presumption of equal division of all the assets, then 
the ‘“durational factor” (the rate by which the spouses earn a share in each other's 
property) would be 2.5 per cent per year’.550 Eekelaar also suggested the imposition 
of a durational threshold in order for this durational factor to bite. He suggested that 
claims following the termination a relationship that lasted under three years should be 
excluded ‘so as to avoid having to make small adjustments in very short 
relationships’.551 However, in such circumstances the presumption in favour of an 
equal division of the ‘marital’ assets would remain. 
 
Presumption 3: Durational Factor’s Influence on Maintenance Entitlements  
Finally, it is suggested that in order to produce further clarification, any maintenance 
obligations should be similarly quantified with reference to the ‘durational factor’552 
and the disparity in earnings. Thus, in a similar fashion to the above presumption 
guiding capital reallocation of the ‘separate’ class of assets, a share in the former 
spouses’ earning potential should be presumed to accumulate over the course of the 
relationship.553 It should also be recognised that ‘earning potential’ should be 
interpreted broadly to include pension entitlements.554  
 
The grant of such maintenance-orientated periodical payment orders would then be 
capped temporally, again with reference to a presumption based on the duration of the 
relationship. It has been suggested that the temporal cap should be equivalent to half 
the duration of the marriage. 
 
If the above figures are to be accepted as the foundations for the guiding maintenance 
presumption, then a care-giving wife of 10 years would be presumed to receive 25% 
                                                 
550 ibid 556. 
551 ibid 556. 
552 i.e. 2.5% a year. 
553 i.e. for every year of marriage, the financially vulnerable spouse will be presumed to be entitled to 
2.5% of the difference between the spouses’ earnings, taken holistically. 
554 Given the fact that such equitable interests have increasingly come to represent a substantial 
proportion of the available assets. The understanding of these points was the impetus for the enactment 
of the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999. 
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of the difference between her and her husband’s net income for the next 5 years. This 
would be on top of any capital reallocation.555 
The Effectiveness of these Presumptions in Light of the Current Legal Framework 
 
It is suggested that these presumptions would help to avoid the criticism of the current 
law, examined in Chapter Three. Hence it would help to prevent diverging 
expectations of entitlement occurring, currently caused by the incompatibility 
between the contemporary framework’s reliance on both the need principle and the 
clean break policy.556 As these presumptions will assist parties to understand the 
likely quantum and duration that a periodic payment order will be granted for, they 
will provide litigants with a greater understanding as to how long it will take for their 
entitlements to be realised. It will also help to prevent long-standing financial 
obligations that are inconsistent with the fundamental nature of modern divorces. 
Therefore, this thesis supports the view that these presumptions provide an adequate 
middle ground between protecting vulnerable spouses and preventing excessively 
long financial obligations on divorce. In this way they incorporate the competing 
policies behind the need principle and the clean break sections. 
 
Furthermore, some of the difficulties that have arisen when applying the various 
judge made principles will be avoided. This is because it is posited that the above 
presumptions similarly encapsulate these principles. Clearly the presumption that 
‘marital’ property should be divided equally supports the policy behind the sharing 
principle; albeit this principle is generally only raised in big-money cases. 
Comparatively, it is the duration-based presumptions that reflect the extent to which 
the ‘need’ and ‘compensation’ principles should influence the resulting 
quantification. This is due to the fact that these presumptions impliedly recognise and 
respect the fact that the duration of the marriage generally reflects both the likelihood 
of ‘interdependence’ and ‘prospective economic disparity between the parties’.557 
Accordingly, spouses gradually develop an entitlement to the assets held by the other 
                                                 
555 Which, following a marriage of this duration, would result in a presumption that the wife should 
receive 50% of the ‘marital’ assets and 25% of the husband’s ‘separate’ assets. 
556 Contained within MCA 1973, s.25A.  
557 These were the justifications raised by the House of Lords for the need and compensation 
principles; see, Miller; McFarlane (n 7) [11], [13] (Lord Nicholls). 
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spouse, in order to preclude dependence and reflect an element of reimbursement for 
their domestic contributions. The main difference is that under this proposal these 
principles are given effect through the presumptions, rather than being drawn upon as 
meta-principles via subjective applications of judicial discretion, in a bid to interpret 
the key statutory provisions 
 
A final criticism that was levelled against the need principle’s operation in everyday 
divorces stems from the fact that there has been limited senior court guidance, 
outlining the principle’s likely application in this context. Clearly, the presumptions 
would offer much needed general guidance for litigants when attempting to calculate 
their entitlements. However, an express statutory provision requiring the judiciary to 
outline their reasons for deviating from the result reached via application of the 
presumptions will enable a body of guidance to be incrementally developed and 
recorded. This will assist all those involved in such proceedings to predict the likely 
outcome. 
 
Nevertheless, it is not suggested that these presumptions will always lead to a result 
that is compatible with the newly codified objective, or preclude competing 
arguments as to the appropriateness of their application. Thus, the next subject of 
discussion will be those situations or circumstances that justify a departure from these 
presumptions. 
 
When Can the Presumptions Be Departed From? 
 
It is recognised that whilst the proposal’s presumptions provide a useful starting 
point, they should be ‘departed from if some other factor becomes sufficiently 
compelling’.558 Thus, a number of necessary caveats need to be added to the above 
guidance in order that inequitable results are not enforced. 
1) Fairness 
                                                 
558 Eekelaar (n 189) 556. 
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The most important reason that could justify a departure from the result reached by 
applying the presumptions is if the award suggested falls short of achieving the new 
statutory objective. Ultimately, this thesis concedes that the power must remain with 
the judiciary to deviate from any application of the above presumptions that would 
lead to inequity, or, in other words, fail to satisfy the overriding objective of 
achieving a fair division of the assets as seen through the lens of entitlements and not 
needs. Nevertheless, it is posited that if the above presumptions were given statutory 
recognition, then any departure from their result would require express justification. 
This would prevent the suggested reform proposals from being ignored in favour of a 
subjective judicial evaluation of fairness.559 It would also help to ensure consistency 
in judicial decision-making, thereby increasing the guidance available for litigants to 
everyday divorces. 
 
It would be following an application for judicial adjudication on this matter of 
fairness that the courts would be required to have regard to the considerations 
contained within section 25. Thus, if the presiding judge deems that the statutory 
considerations point to a result that is different to that reached through the 
presumptions, it is open for that judge to grant whichever result most appropriately 
represents a fair entitlement. Any reasoning used to depart from the presumptions 
must be articulated. 
 
An example of where fairness may justify diverging from the presumptions is in the 
situation where it is deemed appropriate to grant a financial order with the objective 
of enabling one spouse to return to employment. It is argued that, ‘rehabilitative’ 
payments may justify diverging from the above presumptions if they further the new 
objective.560 These payments may be considered appropriate in situations where one 
spouse has given up their employment in order to support the family unit. Such an 
order would be justified on the basis of fairness as it strikes an appropriate balance 
between protecting financially vulnerable spouses and precluding excessive support 
                                                 
559 Thus, precluding judges from failing to adapt to the new reforms by continuing to apply the current 
law. 
560 i.e. orders that help the recipient spouse to re-enter the employment market. This could be achieved 
through granting a spouse sufficient assets to retrain or gain additional qualifications.  
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obligations following the divorce.561 However, due to the difficulties inherent in 
requiring an older spouse to return to work and the likelihood that many younger 
spouses who have left work will continue to have child-care responsibilities, it will be 
in the minority of cases that such payments will be ordered. 
2) Children of the Family 
As Baroness Hale has recognised, ‘an equal partnership does not necessarily dictate 
an equal sharing of the assets… it may have to give way to the needs of… the 
children’.562 Therefore, the duration-based presumptions should never preclude either 
parent from fulfilling the obligations that inherently arise from parenthood. This will 
reflect the consideration currently contained within MCA 1973 section 25(1), where 
the courts are directed to pay ‘first consideration’ to the ‘welfare’ of any ‘child of the 
family’. Thus, the courts should have a specific statutory direction to override any of 
the presumptions, to the extent that they fail to provide for the welfare needs of any of 
the children of the family. 
  
Whilst the quantification of a child’s needs may not be an easy task for litigants, it is 
suggested that guidance could be produced through elaborating on the considerations 
contained within clause 6 of a previous Draft of Baroness Deech’s Private Members’ 
Bill.563 Although this proposed section has since been removed, it provides a good 
foundation on which to develop such guidance. Specifically, it identified six 
considerations relating to the welfare of the families’ children, which the courts must 
have regard to when reallocating assets.564 Nevertheless, the precise content of such 
guidance goes beyond the remit of this thesis.  
 
 
                                                 
561 This is achieved through supporting the long-term goal of a ‘transition to independence’; see, Law 
Commission (n 18) paras 3.64, 3.67. 
562 See, Miller; McFarlane (n 7) [142] (Baroness Hale). 
563 See, Divorce (Financial Provision) HL Bill (2013-14) 55/3, cl.6. 
564  These considerations were: (a) any order for support for the child; (b) the need to provide suitable 
accommodation for the child; (c) the age and health of the child; (d) the educational, financial and 
other circumstances of the child; (e) the availability and cost of suitable childcare facilities, and; (f) the 
needs and resources of the parties. 
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Thus, once such a justification for departure has been recognised, the judiciary are 
permitted to refer to the statutory considerations contained within section 25,565 when 
calculating fair entitlements. Such recourse to these statutory considerations would be 
confined to cases where the courts have established that there are sufficiently pressing 
reasons to justify a departure from the result reached through the application of the 
presumptions. Thus, this provides a response to the second criticism raised against the 
MCA 1973: the fact that the statute has no hierarchy of its considerations. Whilst this 
proposal does not intend to restructure the section 25 statutory considerations on a 
hierarchical basis, it does intend to limit reliance on a judicial evaluation of these 
considerations. Therefore, whilst this criticism is not removed, it is confined to those 
cases where the presumptions are deemed unsuitable for application. 
 
As the individual elements of this proposal have now been identified, the potential 
shortfalls of this proposal will be examined with a view to providing a response to 
these criticisms. 
 
Evaluating the Proposal – Potential Problems and Responses 
1) Date of Relationship’s Commencement and End 
 
In order to provide a comprehensive evaluation of this proposal, a number of aspects 
of this new framework must be further clarified. Firstly, the starting date for the 
accumulation of an entitlement to the other spouses’ ‘separate’ property must be 
established. It seems that there are two points at which this could occur; the actual 
date of marriage, or when the parties start to cohabit. It is suggested that the most 
appropriate starting point would be whichever of these events occurred first. This is 
because both events are indicative of the requisite commitment to the relationship, in 
order for presumptive entitlements to begin to accumulate.566 
 
                                                 
565 As amended.  
566 Of course, if parties cohabited and then separated, this marital asset reallocation regime would not 
apply. 
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It has also been described as ‘unreal and artificial to treat the periods differently’ 
where the relationship has moved ‘from cohabitation to marriage without any major 
alteration in the way the couple live’.567 Similarly, it is argued that to fail to recognise 
this pre-marital cohabitation period as accumulating to the relationship’s overall 
duration, would be to, ‘clash with the public attitudes and practices of many 
couples’.568 If there is any uncertainty, perhaps in the case of a couple living together 
before embarking on a relationship, this matter could be decided via a specific 
application for court adjudication on this matter.569 
 
A similar issue is establishing when the duration-based accumulation period ends. It 
is suggested that this end point is triggered either on the date that one of the spouses 
move out of the matrimonial home, or, on the date that divorce proceedings are 
initiated.570 This is because both of these events represent the requisite intention to 
bring an end to the matrimonial partnership. Again recourse could be had to a specific 
application for judicial adjudication in uncertain circumstances due to the difficulties 
inherent in an attempt to formulate any such universal rule. 
2) Post-separation Accruals  
A further issue that may cause some difficulties is how to divide any such assets that 
are accrued following the separation of the spouses. This thesis intends to endorse the 
views of Sir Nicholas Mostyn QC raised in Rossi v Rossi571 and subsequently built 
upon in JL v SL.572 Whilst this thesis is unable to explore the intricate details of the 
enunciated approach to be taken to assets that could fall within this category, 
Mostyn’s approach will be briefly identified and supported. 
 
Firstly, Mostyn suggests that in order for such assets to be classified as ‘non-
matrimonial property’, or separate property under this proposal, they must:  
 
                                                 
567 GR v RW [2003] EWHC 611 [33] (Mostyn QC). 
568 Harris-Short and Miles (n 450) 468. 
569 As would be possible under the amended MCA 1973. 
570 Via the submission of a completed D8 ‘Divorce/dissolution/(judicial) separation petition’. 
571 Rossi (n 472). 
572 [2015] EWHC 360 (Fam). 
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[b]e acquired or created by a party by virtue of his personal industry and not by use 
(other than incidental use) of an asset which has been created during the marriage and 
in respect of which the other party can validly assert an unascertained share.573 
 
He went on to recognise that such property could still not be quarantined and that the 
‘longer the marriage the more likely’ that such assets can be shared between the 
spouses.574 He then outlined a number of other relevant factors that judges were 
required to consider when exercising their discretion to share such assets.575  
 
It is suggested that this approach could be continued, even following this proposal’s 
changes. This is because it places strong reliance on classifying assets and 
distributing them on the basis of duration, which has strong similarities with the 
approach taken under this proposal. The only area of divergence from Mostyn’s 
approach is from his statement that under short marriages such assets may be shared 
if ‘needs require this’.576 Due to this proposal’s desire to move away from the 
language and reliance on assessing needs, it is suggested that when judicial discretion 
is invoked into assessing such issues, the language of ‘entitlement’ should be the 
cornerstone.  
 
Thus, it is conceded that judicial discretion must continue to govern these problems as 
and when they arise. This is because the diverse range of circumstances that could 
come before the court makes the creation of any rule or presumption designed to 
guide such discretion potentially greatly incommodious. Therefore, the subjectivity 
inherent in judicial discretion must remain when considering arguments made in 
relation to such assets.  
3) Breaks in the Relationship 
Another potential problem to be considered is what would be the result of the 
relationship ending and then re-starting? It is suggested that if this is a clearly defined 
time, then it could be excluded from the duration of the relationship, but any gaps 
                                                 
573 Rossi (n 472) [24.3] (Mostyn QC) 
574 ibid [24.6] (Mostyn QC) 
575 ibid [24.7] (Mostyn QC) 
576 ibid [24.6] (Mostyn QC) 
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should be bridged. Again, a specific application for judicial adjudication may be 
required in uncertain circumstances, for example, if a married couple separate and 
live apart for ten years but then recommence their relationship for a short period 
before divorcing. However, it requires reemphasising here that although a break in the 
relationship may adversely effect spousal entitlements, this should never interfere 
with spouses’ support obligations regarding any children of the family. 
4) Classifying Assets 
A further issue that may potentially undermine this proposal’s attempts to introduce 
certainty, is the difficulties and complexities that may emerge when classifying assets 
as either ‘marital’ or ‘separate’ property. This may be particularly problematic in 
cases where one spouse runs their own business, which forms the majority of their 
assets. In such situations, a beneficial interest may be placed on the profits of said 
business activities. However, if the parties are not willing to openly negotiate, judicial 
adjudication may be required, albeit with the effect of undermining attempts within 
this proposal to avoid judicial involvement.  
 
Nevertheless, this proposal’s means of classifying assets can draw implicit support 
from cases concerned with the contemporary search for fairness. In particular, when 
sitting as a Judge in the Family Division of the High Court, Mostyn QC has expressly 
recognised that classifying assets as non-matrimonial, or separate: 
 
[R]epresents an unmatched contribution made by the party who brings it to the 
marriage justifying, particularly where the marriage is short, a denial of an 
entitlement to share equally in it by the other party.577 
 
This dictum recognises the relevance of the marriage’s duration when calculating 
entitlement. Therefore, classifying assets as ‘separate’ with a presumption that the 
other spouse accumulates an interest in this property over time, provides an 
appropriate balance between spouses’ overriding proprietary claims and temporally-
supported claims of entitlement to the partnership’s assets. This dictum also shows us 
that the judiciary are already concerning themselves with classification when 
                                                 
577 ibid [10] (Nicholas Mostyn QC). 
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reallocating assets. This supports the view that this proposal’s implementation would 
not be a complete overhaul of the current asset reallocation process. 
5) Impossibility of Imposing a Clean Break 
A final issue that may undermine this proposal is the fact that reaching a clean break 
may not always be a quick process. Accordingly, it could be argued that the reliance 
placed upon a presumptive-cap on the duration and quantum of periodic payment 
orders fails to protect financially vulnerable parties to the extent that they are 
currently in everyday divorce proceedings. Thus, it is unacceptable to remove 
provision for needs. However, this argument is not accepted for a number of reasons.  
 
Firstly, this proposal continues to allow the judiciary sufficient flexibility in order to 
prevent inequity from occurring. The new objective recognises that presumptive 
entitlements can be contested for their compatibility with fairness. Secondly, these 
presumptions provide financially vulnerable spouses with a much clearer 
understanding as to their likely entitlements. Thus, to deny either spouse their 
presumed entitlements would require pressing justification and judicial explanation. 
This will compel the judiciary to provide guidance as to the circumstances that deem 
the presumptions’ application inappropriate.  
  
Finally, its express qualification to safeguard and enforce the obligations of 
parenthood provides justification for the financially vulnerable, care-giving parent to 
receive a majority portion of the partnerships’ assets. Hence, this proposal would 
allow the law to recognise that parenthood in itself gives rise to an enduring financial 
obligation, whereas marriage does not.578  
 
The above section has provided a response to some of the potential problems and 
criticisms that this proposal may attract. This thesis will now turn to evaluate whether 
this proposal is compatible with the Law Commission’s recent recommendations for 
reforming this area of law. If so, this will provide further support for this proposal’s 
implementation. 
                                                 
578 Thus, reflecting the philosophy of the Child Support Act 1991. See s.1(1) of this statute which 
places a responsibility on parents to maintain their children. 
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The Proposal’s Relationship with the Law Commission’s Recommendations 
 
It is suggested that this proposal aligns with some of the findings and 
recommendations made by the Law Commission within their most recent Report into 
this area of law.579 This Report recommended that need provision should be guided 
by the merger over time principle, with the objective of a ‘transition to 
independence’.580 Thus, the Law Commission similarly recognised that the duration 
of the relationship is an important consideration that should heavily influence the 
result of the asset reallocation exercise.  
 
The legal inception of the duration presumptions could be considered a transparent, 
pragmatic means of implementing this merger over time principle, by providing 
support to parties during the transition to independence.581 This would be furthered 
through permitting rehabilitative payments that justify a departure from the 
aforementioned presumptions.582 Nevertheless, this proposal differs from that of the 
Law Commission in a number of key ways. 
 
Firstly, the introduction of clear guiding presumptions limiting the duration of 
provision would clearly reflect the transitional objective of independence. In contrast, 
the Law Commission was unwilling to recommend such limitations on provision due 
to its belief that ‘any such recommendation would be highly contentious… [because] 
the transition to independence should not be sudden’.583 However, this thesis would 
suggest that the more contentious aspect of the asset reallocation exercise is the 
complete absence of guidance to assist litigants. Furthermore, this proposal does not 
preclude a judge from disregarding these presumptions when they are incompatible 
with the newly codified objective. Thus, the contentious aspects of this incentive 
towards independence are mitigated through allowing final recourse to judicial 
                                                 
579 Law Commission (n 18). 
580 ibid paras 3.64. 
581 The level of such support being proportionate to the length of the relationship. 
582 Designed to enable that ‘transition to independence’. 
583 Law Commission (n 18) paras 3.65-66. 
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conceptions of fairness; now applied through the objective of giving effect to 
entitlements. 
 
This proposal also differs from the Law Commission due to their reliance on 
considering the parties’ previous standard of living, or expectations of a home when 
reallocating assets.584 It is argued that there are inherent difficulties in quantifying and 
giving legal effect to spouses’ expectations on divorce. Furthermore, as shown in 
Chapter Three, marriage should not automatically give rise to a right to be 
indefinitely maintained at a sustained standard of living and that such a consideration 
is likely to be unobtainable within everyday divorces. Thus, for the sake of 
transparency and to prevent diverging expectations as to entitlement, it is suggested 
that these considerations should not be attributed weight under the new model of asset 
reallocation. 
 
The final difference between the Law Commission’s recommendations and this 
proposal is the change of language from need provision to entitlements that this thesis 
supports. This change of language is intended to help preclude the psychological 
influence where recipients of asset reallocation are seen as ‘needy supplicant[s]’.585 
This will help to ensure financially vulnerable spouses are protected on divorce, to the 
extent that they are entitled to receive such financial protection.586 This change of 
language can also draw implied support from some areas of feminist commentary. In 
particular, Diduck and Orton have claimed that financial orders on divorce should ‘be 
seen as a right, expected and earned, rather than as a gift, act of benevolence or based 
on a notion of women’s dependency on men’.587 Therefore, reallocation on the basis 
of entitlement helps to preclude notions of dependence. 
 
It is also argued that making provision on the basis of entitlements will prevent the 
judiciary unfairly placing the obligation of ‘social insurer’ for the former-spouse on to 
the breadwinner.588 This will help to realign the current balance of fairness by 
ensuring the asset reallocation process is not influenced by external policy 
                                                 
584 See, Law Commission (n 18) para 1.27. 
585 Harris-Short and Miles (n 450) 477. 
586 Thus, reaching a balance between the competing faces of fairness. 
587 Diduck and Orton, ‘Equality (n 294) 687.  
588 Gray (n 58) 327. 
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considerations.589 It also deserves recognition that the law governing asset 
reallocation on divorce is only one way of ensuring that spouses’ ‘needs’ are satisfied. 
Accordingly, ‘many of the problems with finding a fair law of ancillary relief are due 
to the fact that we live in a flawed society with gendered inequalities’.590 Thus, if 
spouses’ needs are not satisfied through granting entitlements, it should arguably be 
an obligation for the State to make additional provision through social welfare 
payments.591 
 
The final way in which this proposal is in accordance with the Law Commission is 
due to their desire to prompt the production of guidance for all litigants, but 
especially for litigants in person. This is because, as stated above, one of the most 
pressing problems surrounding this area of law is the increasing numbers of litigants 
who have to forgo legal advice and apply a relatively inaccessible area of law to their 
unique factual circumstances. However, this proposal intends to go further than the 
production of non-statutory guidance, as recommended by the Law Commission, with 
its introduction of a statutory objective and guiding presumptions. 
 
It is suggested that these developments will help to limit the numbers of cases 
pursuing court adjudication. This argument is made as ‘settlement is more likely 
when the parties have similar expectations of the likely outcome of litigation’.592 
Parties are likely to have similar expectations, following this proposal’s 
implementation, as the presumptions will provide litigants with a clearer 
understanding of the court’s starting point.593 This will help to avoid excessive and 
unnecessary litigation expenditure, thereby incidentally assisting litigants in everyday 
divorces to provide for their own needs following their marriage’s termination. 
 
Thus, it can be concluded that this proposal has similar objectives to the Law 
Commission. However, the proposal advanced in this thesis offers more substantive 
steps for reform. Nevertheless, this proposal is not inconsistent with the Law 
                                                 
589 Identified in Chapter Two. 
590 J Herring, Family Law (5th edn, Pearson Education Ltd 2011) 268. 
591 Gray (n 58) 324. 
592 American Law Institute (n 447) fn 36. 
593 As well as the reasons that will lead to judges deviating from the result reached through the 
presumptions. 
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Commission’s recommendations, as they expressly supported the ‘development of a 
formula to generate ranges of outcomes for spousal support’.594 This proposal 
certainly offers a first step towards the development of such a formula, which is 
compatible with the trend of, likely, future legal reform.  
 
Therefore, it should be apparent that this proposal’s implementation would provide a 
fitting response to a number of the deficiencies that can be identified within the 
present framework governing asset reallocation in everyday divorces. Much of this 
amelioration is a result of limiting the areas that rely upon a subjective exercise of 
judicial discretion. Furthermore, it is largely compatible with the findings of the Law 
Commission’s recent report in this area. It is for these reasons that this thesis believes 
that moving the law in the direction of a Presumptive Entitlement Model is the most 




This chapter has assessed some of the proposals that may offer a means of 
ameliorating the deficiencies present within the current model governing asset 
reallocation on divorce. Due to the recent austerity measures taken, proposals have 
been evaluated for the extent to which they can provide transparency and guidance 
for litigants in person. Put simply, this requires the law to be more accessible in order 
to enable litigants (who often lack legal representation) to apply the law to their 
factual circumstances. However, this evaluation has consistently recognised that the 
search for fairness should not be subordinated in a bid to induce certainty.595 
Accordingly, the ideal reform proposal would enable such litigants to reach an 
expectation of entitlement that is consistent with judicial conceptions of fairness. This 
would prevent litigants from pursuing costly and arduous legal battles, thereby 
achieving the Government’s aim to ‘enable divorcing couples to dissolve their 
marriage efficiently and, wherever possible… without using the court’.596 
                                                 
594 Law Commission (n 18) para 3.159. 
595 Instead recognising that an appropriate balance must be struck. This has been achieved through 
offering guidance to litigants whilst not precluding final recourse to judicial conceptions of fairness. 
596 See, Family Justice Review Panel, ‘Family Justice Review: Final Report’ (Ministry of Justice, 
November 2011) 36 
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The chapter began by recognising two important guiding details, before embarking on 
its central focus. Firstly, it was observed that if we intend to continue to recognise 
fairness as a guiding objective, discretion is an inevitable requirement. Therefore, 
reform proposals would have to be evaluated for the extent to which they provide an 
appropriate balance between the competing requirements of flexibility and certainty. 
Secondly, it was suggested that the most appropriate way by which to pay respect to 
the competing ‘faces’ of fairness on divorce, was to recognise the foundation of 
marriage as being a ‘partnership of equals’ and thereby reallocating assets 
accordingly.597 This was intended to provide an objective starting point to the asset 
reallocation process, whilst also promoting reallocation with reference to the principle 
of entitlement rather than dependency. Thus, proposals were also evaluated for their 
compatibility with this understanding of marriage. 
 
Consequently, after rejecting the Law Commission’s recommendation on the basis of 
its failure to advocate on behalf of substantive reform, three reform proposals were 
evaluated. The particular proposals were chosen for evaluation on the basis that they 
provide the most appropriate response to this thesis’ previous conclusions regarding 
the current law’s deficiencies. These proposals were also evaluated for their 
adherence to the objectives pursued via modern needs provision, namely, the extent to 
which these proposals are able to protect financially vulnerable spouses.  
 
This chapter has unequivocally concluded that the final of these reform proposals 
should be implemented into law. This conclusion was reached on the basis that this 
proposal provided the most appropriate response to the law’s current shortfalls, whilst 
balancing the requirements of certainty with the need for the law to retain an element 
of flexibility in order to achieve fairness. Furthermore, it was argued that this 
proposal also offered an appropriate means of balancing the competing requirements 
of fairness.598 Thus, the supported proposal would offer a default position reflecting 
Ellman’s aspiration for the law to offer a ‘reasonably accessible and efficient 
                                                                                                                                            
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/217343/family-justice-
review-final-report.pdf> accessed 21 July 2015. 
597 North (n 274) [32] (Thorpe LJ). 
598 By providing for entitlements, whilst offering a time limit as to when the obligations of marriage 
are presumed to end; balanced under the heading of fairness. 
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administration of rules that do little harm in themselves, and yield a crude 
approximation of fairness’.599  
 
It was also recognised that the supported reform proposal is not advocating a 
complete overhaul of the law’s current model of asset reallocation which intends to 
reach ‘an outcome which is fair between the parties’.600 It continues to have final 
recourse to judicial concepts of fairness. However, it attempts to move away from this 
being the defining feature of primary recourse and accordingly, if this proposal was 
implemented, it would be appropriate to reclassify the law as reflecting a Presumptive 
Entitlement Model of asset reallocation. 
 
Nevertheless, this proposal continues to reflect a sustainable middle ground between 
maintaining the flexibility inherent in judicial discretion, whilst providing firm 
presumptive guidance for capital and periodic payment reallocation. In the context of 
everyday divorces that often occur without recourse to court adjudication, this new 
model provides a more justifiable means of protecting financially vulnerable spouses 
than the contemporary law’s reliance upon the need principle. Thus, this thesis has 
advocated in favour of a practical reform proposal, whose implementation could 
further the Law Commission’s recommendations by providing litigants with 
accessible, legal presumptions to guide their personal search for fairness.  
                                                 
599 Ira Ellman, ‘Why Making Family Law Is Hard’ (2003) 35 Ariz St LJ 699, 714. 




This thesis has evaluated the current model of asset reallocation, as applied in the 
context of everyday divorces. It has been identified that the need principle plays a 
central role in these cases and, accordingly, an evaluation of this principle has been 
the primary focus of this thesis.  
 
In order to assess why the law has traditionally provided for needs on divorce this 
thesis began with a historical exploration, where the foundations of the modern need 
principle were extrapolated. It was concluded that facets of the current need principle 
have long received recognition as far back as when the dissolution of marriage was 
considered a matter for the ecclesiastical courts. Whilst provision for spousal needs 
have been consistently protected since this period, it was not until the 1970s that this 
principle was expressly codified in statute. This occurred contemporaneously with the 
inception of the Fairness Model of asset reallocation, which was developed both as a 
means of protecting financially vulnerable wives from the detrimental effects of 
divorce and in a bid to pay increasing respect to spousal entitlements. This initial 
investigation concluded that, as the asset reallocation has consistently evolved as a 
product of its time, this principle was developed in order to respond to broader 
inequalities that women have faced throughout past centuries. 
 
Once the historical foundations of this principle were recognised, this thesis went on 
to assess the need principle’s subsequent judicial development. This assessment’s 
intention was to develop an understanding as to the role of the need principle within 
contemporary, everyday divorce litigation. Following an evaluation of the relevant 
case law and statutory provisions, this section identified the pivotal role that this 
principle currently plays in the context of the modern approach to asset reallocation; 
which was classified as pursuing a Fairness Model. This modern approach has been 
classified as such as it rejects guiding rules instead granting the judiciary a wide 
discretionary remit in a bid to ensure that the financial orders that are granted are ‘fair 
both to the applicant in need and to the respondent who must pay’.601  
 
                                                 
601 North (n 274) [32] (Thorpe LJ). 
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This section was able to deduce the existence of some patterns guiding the judicial 
approach to these cases. However, the evaluation’s conclusion recognised the 
inaccessibility of predicting the outcome of the current domestic model’s application 
of the need principle in any given case. This finding was discerned on the basis of the 
difficulties present when identifying which statutory considerations, judicial 
principles or relevant policies would be drawn upon and attributed weight when 
reallocation was made on the basis of need. 
 
Following this assessment of the need principle’s current role in everyday divorces, 
this thesis then turned to a critical evaluation of the law governing the asset 
reallocation process in these cases. The initial focus of this evaluation was the 
relevant statutory provisions that are intended to guide the application of judicial 
discretion. This section confirmed the unsatisfactory absence of guidance that exists 
to govern this discretionary exercise. The unpredictability was also recognised to 
have become a particularly pressing issue following the recent austerity measures 
taken in this area, which have placed legal representation and court adjudication out 
of reach for many litigants to everyday divorces.  
 
The evaluation then turned to identify six specific criticisms stemming from the need 
principle, when applied in this context. Many of these deficiencies were expressly 
attributed to this principle’s convoluted historical foundations and subsequent 
development through judicial elaboration. Ultimately, it was concluded that this 
principle’s current utilisation is no longer appropriate, particularly given the lack of 
guidance to provide litigants with an understanding as to the implications of this 
principle’s application. 
 
With an express intention to respond to these deficiencies, Chapter Four turned to 
assess some of the prevailing proposals that have been raised in a bid to modernise 
and ameliorate some of the deficiencies present within this area of law.602 However, 
before this was undertaken, it was suggested that the wording of the need principle 
should be amended, so that the law would be directed towards ensuring that spouses 
                                                 
602 Particularly given the fact that that this principle is now at odds with the current trend of divorce 
law which has increasingly recognised ‘that the whole point of divorce is to sever the relationship of 
husband and wife’; see, Scottish Law Commission (n 298) 200. 
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receive their entitlements. Whilst the amended law would continue to protect 
vulnerable spouses,603 it was argued that the change of language would help to 
preclude the negative psychological influences that stem from granting financial 
orders on the basis of ‘need’.604 It was also suggested that this change of language 
would bring the law into closer compatibility with the understanding of marriage as a 
‘partnership of equals’, which, in turn, would provide the law with an objective 
starting point to the asset reallocation process. To this end, three proposals were 
explored in order to assess which would strike a reasonable balance between the 
requirements of certainty and flexibility under the search for a fair reallocation.  
 
This evaluation concluded with the finding that the third proposal, centred on the 
introduction of duration based presumptions of entitlement, provided the most 
appropriate option for reform. This conclusion was reached on the basis that this 
proposal would provide an objective starting point on which to ground protection for 
financially vulnerable spouses, whilst offering breadwinning spouses an 
understanding as to the extent of their continued support obligation following divorce. 
Thus, its attempts to introduce clarity into the asset reallocation process were directed 
towards avoiding the need for legal representation or protracted and expensive court 
adjudication.605 
 
Through the implementation of a new objective as well as presumptions to guide the 
newly branded search for fair entitlements, the supported reform proposal is classified 
as replacing the current law’s Fairness Model with a new Presumptive Entitlement 
Model of asset reallocation.606 Whilst it is accepted that some may view this proposal 
as too radical a change to the current approach to asset reallocation on divorce, it is 
submitted that such progressive reform is required given the absence of substantial 
legislative intervention for over three decades, in an area so innately connected to 
contemporary social, moral and religious values.  
                                                 
603 As is the implicit objective of modern need provision. 
604 By precluding connotations that one spouse is dependent upon the assets owned by their former 
spouse. 
605 Although it accepts that this remains a necessary process in some cases in order to ensure that the 
overarching objective of fairness is not discarded. 
606 However, fairness does remains; merely the opportunities for subjective applications of judicial 
discretion based on its application are limited. 
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